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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (14 Nov 59) FOR QT-UT-693239

24 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Robert E. Lynch
ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO 96384

AVCA GO-MH

20 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15 and USAhV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

1 Incl
as

Donald R. Wellman LCo AGC
for WILLIAM L. DUPART
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

FOR OT VT
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
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SECTION I: OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS

The 92 day period between 1 May 1969 and 31 July 1969 saw the completion of LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE I and marked the beginning of LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE II, a continuing attack on Logistical problems in order to render efficient, effective, and responsive combat service support to the fighting man.



LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE I was comprised of four phases as shown in the above chart. Phase I involved initiation of a broad spectrum of technical programs aimed at increasing efficiency and economy in logistical operations. During Phase II, these programs were carefully examined, strengthened, and consolidated, while analytical planning was conducted to prepare the Command for future activities.

By 1 February 1969, the Command was again ready to attack. A whole array of new project "weapons", with names like COUNT II, CIVIDITION, LEVELS, SKILLS I, and PRE-PUNCH, were employed during Phase III to refine and improve the logistical support provided by this Command.

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
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The chart below depicts only a portion of the programs utilized during LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE I, and indicates how they interrelate and interact in the overall plan of logistics improvement.

COMMAND AND CONTROL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM



As the Command entered Phase IV in May 1969, our programs continued, still moving toward our goal of effective logistical support. Still greater emphasis was placed on efficiency and economy in operations. It was also time for an assessment, to look at the results of our offensive, to make refinements, and to prepare for the logistic battles yet to come. The ground gained during LALINCS

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
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OFFENSIVE I can be seen in the following accomplishments:

- a. The inventory of 388,673 line items by depots and 188,283 line items by DSU/GSU's as part of project COUNT II, a command wide cyclic inventory initiated in February 1969.
- b. The retrograde of 340,506 STONs of cargo out of Vietnam during this calendar year.
- c. The frustration, diversion, or cancellation of excess requisitions valued at \$72.1 million as part of project STOP/SEE, a selective program initiated in September 1968 to reduce theater inventories.
- d. The cancellation of \$58.2 million worth of requisitions resulting from a review of NCR 500 ledgers as part of project CLEAN, a cyclic review to purify DSU records and prevent excessive net assets which was initiated in September 1968.

Through these and other programs, theater customer satisfaction remained at 75 percent, still above the objective, and demand accomodation improved slightly to 88 percent during the past quarter. (See charts below).

THEATER CUSTOMER SATISFACTION




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
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DEMAND ACCOMMODATION






One of the most significant accomplishments directly related to effective combat support is the high level of operational rates for combat equipment. Despite the extreme conditions to which equipment in Vietnam is subjected, the close coordination between a more efficient supply and maintenance system has kept the operational rates for combat equipment at a level never before achieved in a combat zone. Below are charts depicting the operational readiness rates for self propelled and towed howitzers, personnel carriers, and other combat vehicles.






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


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Results of other programs initiated in LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE I show the continuing improvement of the logistical situation within Vietnam. The Class V Retrograde Program instituted in September 1968 has resulted in a total of 64,671 STONs of Class V being removed from Vietnam as of 31 July 1969. This is a continuing program to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition which is beyond in-country repair capability. Project CHALLENGE was initiated by this Command in October 1968 and continues to ensure prudent use of the transportation system and eliminate unnecessary or non-essential shipments within country. During the past quarter, 43,112 STONs of cargo were challenged, of which 22,282 STONs were downgraded in priority and 7,681 STONs were stopped from being shipped as non-essential.

In waging LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE I, the Command has made significant gains. Inventories of all classes of supply are down to more manageable levels, and millions of dollars have been saved through the cancellation of requisitions for unneeded supplies. Additional millions have been saved by employing a new concept of supply, with ammunition as a pathfinder, which utilizes knowledge of what is enroute and where it is (inventory in motion) to preclude large stockages on the ground.

On 1 July, the Command entered a new logistical term, LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE II. Its aim is continued progress toward efficiency and effectiveness at an even more rapid, mature and sophisticated rate. Based upon the Command's greater capability resulting at the end of LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE I, the attack will continue on many of the same, and some new targets.


New weapons have already been brought forward. Project RETRO-RIGHT is one of these. It was initiated in July and is concerned with all aspects of the retrograde program from initial identification of a retrograde item through delivery to the proper consignee, to include inspection, packaging, and documentation. A retro-coding system for CONEX containers has been established to assist in processing retrograde once it reaches the consignee. A comprehensive regulation on retrograde is being written and will be published in late August 1969. This intensified concentration should turn the retrograde problem into another logistical victory.

In an effort to provide the depots with a quick reaction means to request and receive disposition instructions for depot excesses, Project SEE/MOVE was established in July 1969. Its objective is to provide a team of technicians in each depot to identify excesses, conduct a physical inventory of selected items, and report the items to the USAICCV for possible retrograde. The USAICCV will determine disposition of the items and issue telephonic instructions to the SEE/MOVE team in order to expedite the materials. The team will assist the depot in expediting shipment of excesses through the ports if the items are to be retrograded. As of 5 August 1969, 348 line items have been partially or totally retrograded with a savings of \$6.8 million.

Perhaps the most vital and far reaching program this Command has initiated to date is "Project LIAN". Established on 10 July 1969, its objective is to reduce FY 70 OMA fund requirements for both the in-country and out-of-country budget without reducing effective combat support.

In the **final** analysis, efficient, effective, and responsive combat service support to the fighting man ultimately depends upon the individual. Realizing this, the Command introduced Project LIAN on 1 July 1969. This program focuses the attention of every member of the Command on getting the job done to the best of his ability, working as long as is necessary and doing so conscientiously. By instilling conscientiousness, pride in duty, and a desire for efficiency in all 1st Logistical Command personnel, Project Duty will significantly contribute to the overall effectiveness of the logistical effort in Vietnam.

As a tribute to the members of this Command who have given their lives in the line of duty, and as a means to reserve the spirit of fellowship among members of this Command, the 1st Logistical Command Association was formed. Association membership reached over 30,000 during the past quarter. The memorial and objectives of the Association are depicted below.



As the Command moves forward with LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE II in the coming months, even more logistical problems will be attached and solved. As we reach certain intermediate objectives we must move on by establishing higher standards which will continuously require us to reach beyond that already attained. This technique always leads to progress. 1st Logistical Command responsibility increases daily as does our challenge to meet it.

ANNEX A (U) COMMAND GROUP

1. (U) Distinguished visitors to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and Support Commands are indicated at Inclosure 1. The Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Logistics Review commenced operations on 3 May 1969, and the Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Special Projects was established on 18 May 1969. The responsibility for the functional control of T-Day Planning was transferred from the Command Group to the Assistant Chief of Staff, SP&O on 9 July 1969.

2. (U) Principal changes of key personnel during the quarter: Brigadier General Hugh A. Richeson, Deputy Commanding General replaced Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey; Colonel Oliver I. West, ACofS, Personnel replaced Colonel Robert L. Eaton; Colonel Herbert S. Lewis, ACofS, SP&O replaced Colonel Richard F. Amity; Colonel William T. Drumright, Special Assistant to the Commanding General for T-Day Planning replaced Colonel John F. Dennington; Colonel Michael Chessnoe, ACofS, Maintenance replaced Colonel William C. McMillan; Colonel Frank A. LaBoon, ACofS, Services replaced Colonel Bruce W. Jamison; Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Boyer, Staff Judge Advocate replaced Colonel Thomas H. Reese; Colonel Thomas E. Gray, ACofS, Ammunition replaced Colonel Joseph P. Swanick; Colonel Kenneth L. Stahl, Inspector General replaced Colonel Harold E. Maier; Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Carlson, Provost Marshal replaced Colonel Keith F. Dubois; Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Stone, Director of Food replaced Colonel William B. Levin; Colonel Alvin Hulsey, Commanding Officer, US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam replaced Colonel David D. Hulsey; Colonel Robert D. Worthen, Director, Supply Management, US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam replaced Lieutenant Colonel Spencer V. Halgren; Colonel William T. Drumright, Deputy ACofS, SP&O replaced Colonel Otto P. Scharth; Colonel Otto P. Scharth assumed duties as Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Special Projects; Colonel Clyde W. Woods, Jr., assumed duties as Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Logistics Review; Lieutenant Colonel Peter B. Petersen, Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Combat Security replaced Lieutenant Colonel Pennell J. Hickey.

ANNEX B (U) ACofS, Comntroller

1. (U) Management Analysis Division

a. Management Engineering Branch

(1) A management study of Red Ball Requisitions was undertaken to determine the reasons for Red Ball Requisitions being received at the Inventor, Control Center - Vietnam (ICCV) greater than 10 days in age. It was recommended that a policy be established to insure that each depot review requisition receipt methods and take action to correct those practices which are resulting in delayed receipt from Direct Support Units (DSU's). Also, all Red Ball requisitions are to be accepted unless items requested are illegible. For control purposes, a system of follow-ups must be established employing the "two man rule" to verify that all requisitions denied are for items definitely at zero balance. A warehouse denial performance record would be maintained. Other recommendations are: that the original document submitted by the DSU (AVCA Form 125R) be retained by the depot for at least 30 days; that the exception data be eliminated from Red Ball requisitions for items having standard federal stock numbers; that depots take greater care in ascertaining that correctly punched machine cards are prepared for passing to the ICCV; that close-out messages listing all batches transmitted be sent to the ICCV daily by each depot; that JC Reg 700-13 be reviewed and revised; that the ICCV develop a system to provide better evidence of the exact time and date that requisitions are received; and that the ICCV implement a daily Red Ball computer cycle.

(2) The In-Country Transit Mail System was studied to determine the responsibilities and deficiencies associated with the flow of mail. Recommendations are based upon the tracing of the flow of mail from Long Binh - 38th Base Post Office (BPO) to Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay to Nha Trang - 50th Army Post Office (APO). Mail should be scheduled to arrive at the Air Mail Terminal (AMT) at least two and one-half hours prior to dispatch time. This will optimize the number of dismatches from the AMT to the Aerial Port within the minimum amount of time. It is recommended that dedicated aircraft be assigned to the 1st Logistical Support Commands, as necessary, to operate on a regularly scheduled basis between an Aerial Port and the surrounding 1st Logistical Command postal units. Representatives of the Seventh Air Force and USARV Headquarters should review and establish firm priorities for air cargo and emphasize the need to upgrade the movement of aged mail, and that letter mail be defined as aged when it has been in an Aerial Port for 12 hours or more.

(3) A Management Survey of the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV)/Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS) Supply, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command was conducted to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of mission accomplishment. Intermediate objectives of this survey were to delineate lines of authority and responsibility, determine the organizational relationships between elements of the organization,

delineate staff functions and separate from operating functions to the maximum practical extent. On 4 May 1969, while this survey was being conducted, the Commanding General of the 1st Logistical Command directed that effective 5 May 1969, the ICCV would be a separate command reporting directly to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. As a result of this decision, the ICCV has the mission of providing centralized supply management to include the computation, requisition and maintenance of adequate levels of supply (Class II, IV, VII and IX). The Commanding Officer, ICCV will also act as a special staff officer providing information on matters concerned only with supply management. The ACofS, Supply will provide all policy and planning for the supply system in general and would provide centralized management for Class I and III (Bulk).

(4) The Class I (Reefer) Distribution System Study was undertaken to study the reefer ship operations at Saigon Port and the Class I perishable storage facilities. It was recommended that three refrigerated cargo ships be replaced due to inability to maintain proper temperatures. Stevedores should be supervised as to loading of pallets to prevent a mixture of different types of freeze commodities on one pallet. An even flow of CONEX containers to the storage areas in Saigon must be maintained. The new Class I perishable storage facility at Long Binh will begin operations in early FY 1970. Since reefer cargo must be transported a greater distance, it is imperative that the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS), Transportation, and Director of Subsistence, ACofS, Supply insure that a food storage and distribution system is being designed which will take full advantage of the potential of the new facility.


b. Review and Analysis Branch

(1) Reports Control Review Board. On 27 April, the Commanding General directed that a Reports Control Review Board be formed at this headquarters to review all 1st Logistical Command Reports. The board held its first meeting on 10 May with Col John J. Wren, ACofS, Comptroller, as chairman. As of 28 July 1969, the board has reviewed 95 reports. Of the 95 reports, the board has acted to rescind 57, revise 7, and approve 31. Each Support Command has an established Reports Review Board which submits to the 1st Log Board any reports that they feel are candidates for rescission. The goal for the board is to decrease the number of reports required by this headquarters to 70 reports by 1 September 1969. As of 1 August 1969, this headquarters requires 112 reports from its subordinate commands.

(2) To provide the Commanding General readily available statistics at his fingertips, 36 charts were designed to be placed in a chart rack on the Commanding General's wall. These charts cover the major critical areas requiring intensive management. The charts also provide a ready reference for the Commanding General in his conferences with members of the staff sections.

c. Cost Reduction Branch

(1) Cost Reduction Program Status - The FY 60 cost reduction goal for 1st Logistical Command was \$10 million. At the end of the fiscal year, 1st Logistical Command had validated seven actions worth \$20.8 million or 208% of its official goal. (See following chart)



The 4th quarter was highlighted by the validation of three actions:

(a) The reduction in the cost of War Hazard Insurance which saved \$4.1 million. The reduction in War Risk Insurance resulted from a thorough examination of premium rates versus claims by USARAV personnel. It was found that premium costs in FY 68 far exceeded dollars paid in settlement of war hazard related claims. USARAV internally originated a proposal for the contractors to self-insure their war hazard risk. (b) The implementation of a differential road testing procedure that saved \$207.0 thousand. The differential road testing procedure identifies by test those differentials actually needing repair. As a result, the 79th Maintenance Battalion's 533rd Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (CE) was able to identify the serviceable differentials. Instead of repairing each differential, the powertrain section is now repairing only the differentials that are determined to be unserviceable by test. (c) Discharge savings of the vessel USNS Shuyler Otis Bland at Qui Nhon and Vung Ro Bay which amounted to \$42.8 thousand. The partial discharge of the USNS Bland at Qui Nhon and Vung Ro Bay instead of complete discharge at Qui Nhon resulted in the saving 8 days of charter, four at each port. The action eliminated excessive shifting of cargo that would have otherwise been required.

(2) In July the Commanding General was briefed by ACoffS, Comptroller on the status of the cost reduction program in the command. Problem areas were discussed and recommendations were presented. In the 1st Quarter of FY 70 plans are being made to instruct the support commands on how to improve the quality of their submissions. In the past, submissions lacked adequate documentation; consequently it was difficult to obtain validation by the United States Army Audit Agency. Individual savings goals will be assigned to staff sections and support commands in an effort to stimulate active participation in the Army Cost Reduction Program.

2. (U) Budget Division

a. A reduction of \$1,095,600 was imposed on this command as a result of the USARV Program Budget Advisory Council (PPAC) action on 22 April 1969, thereby establishing a fund availability of \$127,027,000.

b. A further decrease of \$4,287,000 was received in June 1969 resulting in an Approved Operating Budget (AOB) of \$122,750,000 for FY 69. A thorough review of commitments was accomplished, and action initiated to decommit excesses for redistribution.

c. Final accounting records available to this command reflect an obligation of \$119,922,000 or an obligation rate of 97.69% of the fund availability.

d. Project "Liar". "Project Liar" was established on 10 July 1969 to promote actions by all elements of the command to increase effectiveness and reduce FY 70 OMA fund requirements for both the in-country and out-of-country budget without reducing combat support. The basic purpose

of the project is to make a liar out of budget estimates by providing better logistical support for less money than was forecast as the amount required. The project has since been expanded to include potential savings in MPA, PEMA and MOA in addition to OMA. Currently identified MPA, MCA and OMA potential savings are \$235 to \$253 million.

3. (U) Finance and Internal Review Division.

a. Finance Services Branch

(1) Technical Inspections were conducted at the Class B agent finance offices of the 64th Finance Section (Disbursing) at Phu Bai and Quang Tri, RVN, 13th Finance Section (Disbursing) at Qui Nhon and 7th Finance Section (Disbursing) in Saigon.

(2) Arrangements were made to pay all non-divisional troops in the 9th Division area after the Divisional move in conjunction with the announced redeployment of 25,000 troops.

(3) A monthly report was implemented for the total number of Reports of Survey processed by the Support Commands and this Headquarters. Report will also include total dollar value and net loss to the government.

(4) Revised LC Regulation 37-10 (Conversion of Military Payment Certificates) was issued and implementation of procedures of MACV Dir 37-10 and USARV Reg 37-10 was effected.

b. Internal Review Branch

(1) Auditors from Finance & Internal Review Division completed reviews and analyses in the following areas during the period 1 May - 31 July: Follow-up review to the Defense Contract Audit Agency's review of the Engineer Construction Material Yard at Long Binh Depot; review of ammunition accounting at Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, and Long Binh; review of Marine Maintenance activities at Cam Ranh Bay; reconciliation of accounts receivable and survey of contracts at Foreign Excess Sales Office, 1st Logistical Command; and a study of common Supply Support Activities was also completed. Internal review requested that all staff sections of 1st Logistical Command provide possible areas of review for FY 70. From suggestions submitted, a total of 30 reviews have been scheduled for FY 70.

(2) US Army Audit Agency (AAA) completed a review on Interservice Support during the period of 1 May - 31 July. AAA has submitted a report on this to USARV. Also the final report on Engineer, Construction, and Industrial Equipment was released by AAA for comments by this command. Command concurred in this report and completed corrective

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action. Another audit, Petroleum, Oil & Lubricants (POL), was started during this period but is not completed at this time. The report on POL should be released as soon as the audit is completed.

(3) US General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a review on Inventory Control Practices and Responsiveness of Supply Systems in Support of Demands in the Far East and continued work on a follow up review of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) cargo in Vietnam. A draft report requesting comments from this command has been released on the supply responsiveness review and this command has replied to it stating corrective action has been completed or is being completed. Reviews in progress at the end of the period were: Piaster Rate Utilized by Contractors and Balance of Payments and War Risk Insurance (Contractors). Two reviews - Survey of Transportation of Ammunition and Review of Transportation and Management of Sea Land Containers - previously suspended for 90 days, have been indefinitely suspended.

(4) Internal review continues to provide a monthly status report to USARV on the Defense Contract Audit Agency Review of Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc. (PA&E) conducted during FY 68 and 69. USARV's internal review staff completed reviews on Port Operations and general purpose vehicles during this last quarter. Reports have been issued on both of these subjects requesting this command's comments. A review was also conducted on mess hall operations on Long Binh Post but no report has been received.

(5) Non Appropriated Funds (NAF)

(a) Revision of IS Rep 26-75, dated 11 Jul 69 on NAF Audit Requirements and Programs.


(b) Audit performed on ICCV other Sundry Fund.

(c) Review of Monthly Minutes & Financial Statements of NAF's under our command.

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ANNEX C (C) ACoS, SP&O, Security Division

1. (C) Enemy activity directed against 1st Logistical Command installations and facilities during the period 1 May through 31 July 1969, showed a slight decrease (APPROX 10%) from the last 3 month period as indicated in chart below.



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GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 2500.10

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However, it is important to analyze the break out of types of incidents and the characteristics of each type. For example, attacks by fire remained the most numerous type of enemy initiated activity although there were 14% less than in the past reporting period. The important figure is that less than 25% of attacks involved 20 or more high explosive incoming rounds which indicates that although the attacks were numerous (94), their intensities were not sufficient to cause large amounts of casualties or damages. The same facts generally hold true for shipping incidents. The frequency of incidents was lower (by 16%), but the number of incidents which did occur, thus keeping the totals relatively high, were no more than a form of harassment consisting of a few rounds which did little or no damage. Pipeline incidents increased by 56%. These were characterized mainly by the enemy's use of small arms fire against large numbers of pipe sections. Considered together, these facts tend to show that the enemy is attempting to inflict a maximum amount of damage with a minimum amount of direct contact. This is a strategy significantly different from that exhibited previously in which the enemy considered the political significance of hitting certain targets more than he did the costs in casualties and losses of equipment. During this reporting period, it appeared as though the enemy had been conserving his strength and generally avoiding contact.

2. (C) Significant enemy incidents involving 1st Logistical Command during this period were of six types; attacks on shipping, attacks on convoys, interdiction of pipelines, ground/sapper attacks, harassments, and attacks by fire. Above is a chart which depicts the total number of incidents, stratified according to type, which have been directed at 1st Logistical Command during the past eight months. The obvious difference between numbers of incidents occurring in December and January and those shown for the remainder of the period may, in part, be attributed to an improved incident reporting and recording system in use since the first of February. The following represents a breakout by type of incident with comments and examples:

a. Attacks on shipping:

(1) Enemy initiated incidents involving shipping continued during this reporting period. However, a practice was instituted in June which may reduce enemy initiated activity against shipping on the Long Tau shipping channel which runs through the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) and connects Nha Be, Saigon, Cat Lai, and Cogido to the ocean. An arrangement has been made with the Navy whereby the Assistant Chief of Staff, Transportation 1st Logistical Command designates to MSTS two vessels each day as "Special Interest Vessels." The Navy then provides a Patrol Boat, River (PBR) escort for the "Special Interest Vessels". The PBR escort is in addition to the normal patrolling of the Long Tau channel by other PBR's.


(2) One vessel, the WELFARE was sunk near Nha Be; however, this incident is the only one during the reporting period where the enemy caused significant damage to shipping. There was one other incident which could

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have had a sizeable effect on shipping. On 7 May 1969, local nationals, employed by the 1st Logistical Command in the Saigon area port facilities, walked off the job. However, the work load was taken up by 1st Logistical Command personnel and logistical operations were not affected. The work stoppage ended 2½ hours later.

(3) Chart #2 shows enemy initiated incidents directed against shipping for a nine month period to include the three months covered by this report. The enemy has kept up the pressure he began in February; in fact, the May-June-July cycle is almost identical to the February-March-April cycle.



(4) Some examples of attacks on shipping were:

(a) on 5 May, 1969, 14 kilometers northwest of Saigon, LCM (Landing Craft, Medium) #8-133 was hit by three Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) which resulted in three 1st Logistical Command personnel wounded in action (WIA). Damage to the vessel was minor.

(b) On 21 June 1969, 10 kilometers southeast of Nha Be, the vessels PRESIDENT MONROE and USN PROVO were fired upon by an unknown size enemy force with eleven B-40 rockets (similar to RPG rounds). There were no hits; therefore, no casualties or damage resulted.

(c) On 6 July, 1969, the Panamanian vessel, WELFARE, while anchored at Nha Be, sustained heavy damage from an unknown type mine explosion which blew a four foot by ten foot hole in the starboard side. The vessel later capsized and her 200 ton cargo of rice was lost.


b. Attacks on Convoys:

(1) For statistical purposes, convoy incidents have been divided into ambushes, sniper fire, and mine incidents. Convoy incidents have decreased

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by 20%; however, the significance of this figure is that the decrease is not larger in view of the relatively low level of enemy activity. This highlights the enemy's continued interest in disrupting 1st Logistical Command's use of lines of communication (LOC).



(2) Road and bridge interdiction is a type of LOC interdiction, which seldom results in casualties, damages or significant convoy delays, so it has not been included in the statistical picture reflected in the chart. Also, because of improved road clearing and repair procedures, security, patrolling and reaction time by friendly forces, the frequency of this type of incident has been reduced considerably. Rail interdiction has not been included because rail use by the 1st Logistical Command is limited and has little effect upon operations.

(3) During the reporting period, convoys most often the object of enemy activity were those which traveled between Long Binh and Quan Loi in III Corps, and those which travelled between Qui Nhon and Pleiku in II Corps. Some examples of convoy ambushes were:

(a) On 12 May, 1969, a convoy from the 63rd Transportation Company, the 737th Transportation Company, and the 1018th Supply and Service Company traveling from Sa Huynh to Duc Pho was ambushed about 18 kilometers south-east of Duc Pho. Five US soldiers were wounded (2 from the 737th Transportation Company and 3 from the 63d Transportation Company). Three 5

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ton tractors, one stake and platform trailer, two 5000 gallon tankers, and two armored personnel carriers (APC) were destroyed.

(b) On 8 June, 1969, an 8th Transportation Group convoy traveling from Qui Nhon to An Khe was ambushed twice; once 17 kilometers east of An Khe and once 7 kilometers east of An Khe. There were 5 US soldiers wounded. Two tankers, 2 tractors and 1 guntruck was damaged.

(c) On 17 July 1969, a 53 vehicle convoy from the 48th Transportation Group, enroute from Long Binh to Quan Loi, was ambushed approximately 12 kilometers south of An Loc by an undetermined size enemy force. One US soldier and one Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldier were killed. Seven 1st Logistical Command soldiers, 4 other US soldiers and a Vietnamese civilian were wounded. Damages included two 5 ton tractors, two 5000 gallon tankers, 2 lowboys, and two APC's. Eight enemy soldiers were killed and one was captured.

(4) Mine incidents during the next reporting period will probably show a decrease in frequency because the convoy route from Long Binh to Tay Ninh has been completely paved. This route is one which the enemy has mined frequently, but the pavement, combined with frequent patrolling, should reduce the enemy's ability to lay mines. The following are some examples of convoy mine incidents reported during this period:

(a) On 7 May 1969, a truck from the 534th Transportation Company hit and detonated a mine ten kilometers north-northwest of Trang Bang. The vehicle was in the return convoy from Dau Tieng to Long Binh. The right wheel was blown off but there were no casualties.

(b) On 28 June 1969, 9 kilometers east-southeast of Tay Ninh, a 5 ton cargo truck from the 319th Transportation Company in the Long Binh to Tay Ninh convoy hit and detonated a mine. The rear duals of the vehicle were blown off, but there were no casualties.

(c) On 8 July, 1969, a 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck from the 54th Transportation Battalion in the Qui Nhon to Pleiku convoy hit and detonated a mine about 26 kilometers east of Pleiku. The vehicle driver received minor injuries and the rear axle of the vehicle was blown off.

(5) Enemy sniper incidents directed against vehicles significantly increased during this period, particularly during May and July. Some examples were:

(a) On 9 May 1969, a guntruck returning to the 240th Quartermaster Battalion area in Qui Nhon received an unknown amount of sniper fire. There were no casualties or damages.

(b) On 14 June 1969, a 134th Quartermaster Company guntruck traveling in Qui Nhon from Tank Farm #2 to Tank Farm #1 received 2 rounds of sniper fire. There were no casualties or damages.


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(c) on 14 July 1969, 18 kilometers south of Dalat, a hardened guntruck in the Bao Loc to Cam Ranh Bay convoy received 3 to 6 rounds of small arms fire. There were no casualties or damages.

c. Pipeline incidents:

(1) Enemy initiated incidents involving pipelines increased more than 60% in the last three months, demonstrating further the enemy's emphasis on denying 1st Logistical Command the use of this line of communication. As a reaction to the large number of incidents on the Qui Nhon to An Khe section of pipeline, that section in June began pumping water instead of POL products. The Qui Nhon to An Khe portion of the pipeline has had 60% of all incidents (particularly pilferage) that have occurred in the past. Some incidents involved loss of product as the result of pilferage. Work has been completed on burying part of this section of the pipeline and it is again being used to pump POL products. The burial should materially reduce the pilferage losses on the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline.



(2) The chart above depicts attacks on pump stations as well as pipeline incidents. Attacks on pump stations were less frequent this reporting period than during the last period which emphasizes the extent of enemy activity against the pipeline itself. Some examples of incidents directed against the pipeline were:

(a) On 5 May 1969, a pipeline repair crew discovered a large hole in the Tuy Hoa pipeline. As they were repairing the pipeline a sniper fired tracer rounds at them. The rounds ignited a pool of POL and resulted in two 1st Logistical Command casualties and 6 Vietnamese children injured by burns.

(b) On 8 June 1969, 12 kilometers west of Cha Rang, in the vicinity of valve #33, 42 sections of pipeline were damaged by small arms fire, while

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the pipeline repair crew was repairing a coupling at the valve, a booby trap was detonated wounding one 1st Logistical Command soldier.

(c) On 21 June 1969, 4 to 7 kilometers west of An Khe, pipeline repair crews found 150 sections of pipe damaged by small arms fire.

(d) On the night of 3-4 July 1969, 9 kilometers west of An Khe, 60 sections of pipe were damaged by small arms fire resulting in 24,800 gallons of POL product lost.

(3) On 11 May, 1969, pump station #8 received 10 rounds of mortar fire and an unknown amount of small arms fire. There were three US soldiers wounded. A day-room wall, two tires on a 25 ton semi-trailer, two tires on a 3/4 ton truck, a 600 gallon water tank, and a 5 ton tractor's fuel tank were damaged. A latrine and a 3/4 ton trailer were destroyed.


(b) On 14 June 1969, pump station #4 received three unknown type rocket or mortar rounds. There were no casualties, but there was light damage to one CONEX container and a 30 kilowatt generator.

(c) On 3 July 1969, pump station #4 received four unknown type rocket or mortar rounds. A generator was damaged; there were no casualties.

d. Ground/Sapper attacks:

(1) Enemy initiated ground/sapper attacks involving 1st Logistical Command remained at a relatively low level. The point to be noted here is that the enemy ground/sapper effort has changed substantially since TET 1968 in that the enemy no longer attacks with a large force attempting to take and hold position. Instead, he uses sapper tactics where a few highly trained enemy personnel attempt to penetrate the perimeter, destroy as much as possible, then withdraw. Recently, conventional attacks against fixed targets have been directed mostly toward small Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) outposts and small isolated tactical positions. It is noteworthy that more enemy units have received sapper training and that those existing sapper units have received more intensive training in recent months.

GROUND/SAPPER INCIDENTS 1968-1969



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(2) The above chart shows incidents per month frequency of ground/sapper attacks directed against 1st Logistical Command for the past 9 months. The following are examples of ground/sapper attacks which occurred during the reporting period:


(a) On 12 May 1969, Tank Farm #2 in Qui Nhon received B-40 rocket and unknown type mortar fire. An unknown type round hit the top of tank #6, exploded and buckled the tank, rendering it unserviceable. Three enemy personnel threw satchel charges over the perimeter fence but the charges did not explode. Five US personnel were wounded.

(b) On 6 June 1969, Camp Radcliffe at An Khe received 35 mortar rounds accompanied by a sapper attack. A satchel charge destroyed one 236,000 gallon POL tank in the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) power plant area. There were 4 US personnel wounded.

(c) On 11 July 1969, two enemy sappers penetrated the Ammunition Base Depot (ABD) in Qui Nhon and placed satchel charges on three ammunition storage pads. One charge exploded and destroyed one pallet of 30 caliber ammunition. One charge exploded in a 90mm ammunition pad, but did not set off any of the ammunition. The other charge did not detonate. There were no casualties.

e. Harassing incidents:

(1) There was a noticeable decrease in harassing incidents (35%) during the reporting period, thus the number of incidents remained small. Incidents involving harassment seem to occur in the Qui Nhon area more frequently than in other 1st Logistical Command areas. The following chart depicts the frequency of incidents since December 1968.



(2) The following are examples of harassing incidents which occurred during the reporting period:

(a) On 19 May 1969, the 86th Maintenance Battalion area in Cha Rang received 10 to 15 rounds of automatic weapons fire. There were no casualties or damages.

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
(b) On 15 June 1969, the 86th Maintenance Battalion compound in Cha Rang received approximately 30 rounds of small arms fire. There were no casualties or damages.

(c) On 13 July 1969, the Chu Lai base area received an unknown amount of small arms fire. There were no casualties or damages.

f. Attacks by fire

(1) Attacks by fire against 1st Logistical Command installations and facilities decreased by approximately 10%. Not only have the attacks decreased in number but they have also decreased in intensity. Less than 25% of all attacks by fire against 1st Logistical Command facilities consisted of 20 or more rounds of high explosive ordnance. The chart below reflects the numbers of attacks by fire on 1st Logistical Command installations for the past nine months.

ATTACKS - BY-FIRE 1968-1969



(2) The following are some examples of enemy attacks by fire which occurred during the reporting period:

(a) On 12 May 1969, Long Binh Post received approximately 22 rounds of 107mm rocket fire. One US soldier was killed and 16 more were wounded (3 were from the 1st Logistical Command). Three 55 gallon drums of fire-fighting foam, 67 drums of assorted bulk oil, and the tank farm pipeline were damaged; 1000 gallons of POL product were lost.

(b) On 12 May 1969, Camp Radcliffe at An Khe received approximately 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Two rounds impacted in the POL tank farm damaging tank #1 (which contained JP4 fuel) and tank #2 (which contained

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DF 2 fuel). An unknown amount of JP4 and DF2 fuel was lost. Two 1st Logistical Command personnel were wounded and damages included destruction of a pipeline manifold and total destruction of two 6 inch single stage pumps.

(c) On 6 June 1969, Tay Ninh Base Camp received 57 x 82mm mortar rounds and 15 x 107mm rocket rounds. One 2½ ton truck, one 5000 gallon tanker, and 3 Cobra helicopters were damaged. A 25th Infantry Division refueling point was destroyed and one Regional Force soldier was wounded.

(d) On 20 July 1969, the Bien Hoa Army/Air Force complex received 19 x 122mm rocket rounds. Two rockets landed in a bomb dump and ignited 16,000 illumination flares and destroyed a guard shack. Four Army personnel were wounded and one supply building was damaged.

3. (U) The following statistics reflect the number of personnel security actions completed during the period. The total number of personnel security actions processed decreased approximately 17% over the last reporting period.

	a. Clearances Validated	May	June	July	TOTAL
(1) Top Secret	136	95	49	280	
(2) Secret	163	105	124	392	
b. National Agency Check Requests	27	24	15	66	
c. Investigative Records Repository Checks	170	202	146	518	
d. Background Investigation Requests	6	8	8	22	
e. Clearances Granted					
(1) Interim Top Secret	34	36	21	91	
(2) Interim Secret	19	14	16	49	
(3) Secret	72	73	57	202	
(4) Confidential	7	13	2	22	

f. At the end of the period 55 clearance actions were pending.

4. (C) The following is a summary of the activities of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment during the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969:

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a. Assignment of key personnel.

(1) Captain Benjamin E. Holberg, Commanding Officer.

(2) CW4 Harry N. Fetter, Officer-in-Charge, Cam Ranh Bay Field Office.

b. Special Studies Conducted:

(1) 713 checks for possible outlets for Subversive and/or anti-American literature.

(2) 1456 checks on salvage facilities and document destruction facilities for complete and proper destruction of classified information.

c. Counterintelligence Services Conducted:

(1) 3 counterintelligence surveys.

(2) 42 announced counterintelligence inspections.

(3) 40 unannounced counterintelligence inspections.

(4) 84 after duty hours counterintelligence checks.

d. Personnel Security Investigations:

(1) Number conducted: 18

(2) Number of Agent Reports Submitted: 59

e. Incident Investigations (to include Subversion Directed Against the US Army):

(1) Number conducted: 24

(2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 84

f. The counterintelligence Personal and Impersonal Card File had a total of 11,053 personalities and 767 impersonal items on file at the end of the reporting period.

g. There were 77 contacts made with installations informants during the past 90 days which produced 19 IIR's for 25% production ratio.

h. An increased emphasis has been placed upon expanding the installation informant program to provide increased coverage of enemy activities against 1st Logistical Command installations and activities and for coverage of the indigenous labor force. As part of this program, all field offices have begun studies of their respective areas of responsibility to determine areas where additional informants would be of value. Arrangements have also been made with the Intelligence Branch, Office of the ACoS, SP&O,

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to provide evaluations of information obtained from informants to help establish the validity of the reported information.

i. New equipment received during the past quarter has given the Detachment the capability to conduct complete counterintelligence technical surveys and inspections. Thus far, technical inspections of the LOCC and ULOCC have been completed. The Duffel Bag Facility, Cam Ranh Bay, will be inspected upon completion of construction. Other new equipment received provides the capability to conduct polygraph examinations. This, of course will provide an additional investigative tool, as well as providing an additional means of checking the veracity of information provided by the installation informants.

5. (U) The transition from dry northeast flow to the moist southwest flow was completed over all the Republic of Vietnam by the end of May. Humidity increased and thunderstorms and rainshowers became the predominant feature over all the country. During June, the southern half of the Republic received an increase in precipitation reaching full monsoon proportions by July, while the northern half entered into the dry season. By July, summer climate patterns were set and will not change significantly until October.

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ANNEX D, (C) ACofS, SP&O, Plans Division

1. (C) T-Day. The test of two hydrojet pumps (reported as undergoing test in the previous ORLL report) has been completed. The concept of the cleaner is good, as it cleans large amounts of equipment expeditiously and effectively while using a minimum amount of water. A more durable piece of equipment is required, however, and has been requested on an ensure basis. It was determined during the test that this item of equipment has the following weaknesses:

- a. Not durable enough to withstand 20-hour per day operations.
- b. Pressure gauge and by-pass valve to pump frequently develop leaks.
- c. Transformer, part of the electrical assembly, was defective.
- d. Metal pin connecting cord to carburetor broke.
- e. Electrical switch shorted out.

2. (C) LC OPLAN 79-69. 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 79-69 (Continuity of Logistical Operations) (U) was published on 20 May 1969. This is one of the major plans for the 1st Logistical Command because it provides for continuity of logistical operations in the event of damage or destruction of a logistical complex.

a. Based on the 1st Log Comd OPLAN and draft OPLANs prepared by subordinate commands, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) was held at each of the support commands on dates listed below:

<u>Support Command</u>	<u>Date</u>
Saigon	3 June 1969
Da Nang	10 June 1969
Cam Ranh Bay	17 June 1969
Qui Nhon	8 July 1969

b. The purpose of this CPX was twofold. First, it tested the OPLAN and concepts employed, and determined that they were feasible and that the plan could be executed. Second, the CPX provided for coordination of the plan at both HQ 1st Log Comd and support command level simultaneously and provided for training of operations personnel who would eventually be responsible for executing the plan.

c. Based on the CPX results, it was determined that the plan effectively provided for continuity of logistical operations. The CPX was an outstanding success both from the standpoint of testing the plan and training personnel. Due to the rate of turn-over of personnel in RVN the training aspect is considered very important since operations personnel must know the ramifications of a plan before it can be properly executed.

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ANNEX E (C) ACofS, SP&O, Operations Division

1. (U) General: During the 92 days (1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969) of the reporting period, 1st Logistical Command continued its support to the Free World Military Forces throughout Vietnam. Highlighting the reporting period was Project Keystone Eagle; the closing of some ASI's; the study of Naval Support Activity at Da Nang; and the move of the 2/1 Cav from II Corps North to II Corps South.

2. (C) Highlights of Logistical Support Changes:

a. Reassignment of Graves Registration Detachments. On 20 May 1969 the 198th QM Detachment GREGG JA was reassigned to Saigon Support Command for further assignment to the Saigon Mortuary. The reassignment is the result of a recent command wide study of graves registration assets and requirements. This study also resulted in the release of a six man graves registration detachment from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command to Da Nang Support Command on 20 May 1969.

b. Reassignment of a Transportation Company. On 5 June 1969 the 666th Transportation Company (Lt Truck) (2½ ton) was assigned to the Da Nang Support Command from Qui Nhon Support Command. The unit moved at eighty per cent personnel strength and with thirty 2½ ton trucks, and all other on hand TOE equipment. The move provided Da Nang Support Command with sufficient vehicular assets to provide additional support to the 101st Airborne Division.

c. Naval Support Activity-Da Nang Study. In June a study was initiated to determine the impact on 1st Logistical Command if it assumed the logistical support mission now being performed by the Naval Support Activity in Da Nang. The purpose of the study is to determine the functions involved and estimate the resources required upon assumption of the logistical support mission in I Corps.

d. Move of 2/1 Cav from II Corps North to II Corps South. In early June the 2/1 Armored Cavalry Squadron moved from the Pleiku area to II Corp South with the mission of securing WI. 1 from Phan Rang to Phan Thiet. A study was made on the possibility of establishing a new LSA at Song Mao where the headquarters and D troops were to be located. However, because of the requirement for the unit to move from one location to another in 8 hours, it was decided to support the 2/1 Cav from the existing LSAs at Phan Rang and Phan Thiet. Additional men and equipment were positioned at the Phan Thiet LSA to provide the necessary support for the armored cavalry squadron.

e. Bao Loc ASP-Because of the small amount of Class I being issued, the ASP operation was phased out on 1 July 1969. The units in Bao Loc will be supported by through-put from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

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f. Tuy Hoa ASP. Since March 1969 a study has been made analyzing possibilities for the close-out or reduction of support operations in the Tuy Hoa/Phu Hiep area. Among other problems the ASP was isolated from support facilities at Phu Hiep, thus causing a manpower drain for security requirements. On 15 June 1969 the ASP was closed with the units being supported by through-put from Qui Nhon Support Command

3. (C) Special Airlift Missions

During the reporting period, one emergency resupply and 21 Combat Essential Missions were flown. A total of 186 short tons of supplies were airlifted by special mission; 12 missions carried Class V supplies, and the remaining missions carried other items such as generators, litters, parts, Class I and Class III. The chart below gives a more detailed breakdown of amount and type of tonnage hauled.

SPECIAL AIRLIFT MISSIONS

	<u>Total Missions</u>	<u>Total Tonnage</u>	<u>Class V Missions</u>	<u>Class V Tonnage</u>	<u>Other Missions</u>	<u>Other Tonnage</u>
May	9	82	6	55	3	27
June	5	51	3	37	2	14
July	8	53	3	15	5	38

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4. (U) Airdrop Operations:

a. Airdrop activity during the period May-July 1969 was limited to four re-supply missions. Three missions were executed during May. Approximately 312 short tons of Class III and V supplies were delivered in 21 sorties by C-130 aircraft. The drops were made at Tra Bong in I CTZ and at Ben Het in II CTZ, all to U.S. artillery units.

b. All airdrops during May were made using the container delivery system. A total of 302 A-22 containers were dropped with only six being lost. Four of these were caused by containers rupturing in the air upon opening shock of the parachutes. The other two containers were damaged on ground impact when parachutes did not fully deploy.

c. The fourth mission, also using the container delivery system, was executed in July. Approximately 130 short tons of peneprime were delivered in eight sorties by C-130 aircraft. The drops were made at Ba To in southern I CTZ to III MAF Sea Bee's. A total of 128 A-22 containers were airdropped with four being lost due to the parachutes not having sufficient time to properly deploy.

d. The four A-22 containers that ruptured in the air are attributed to equipment failure. The containers all had the appearance of being in good serviceable condition prior to the drop. No human error was involved. The six containers damaged when parachutes did not fully deploy can probably be attributed to one of several conditions: Congestion of parachutes, which does not allow sufficient air space to fully deploy at the proper altitude; improper parachute packing; or navigational errors in computing the proper drop altitude.

e. This period has shown a need for increased airdrop training missions when emergency missions are not required. Constant or frequent training for parachute riggers, Air Force ground and air crews is desireable if they are to maintain proficiency in airdrop methods and procedures.

5. (C) Project Duffel Bag: During May through July 1969, the sensor processing facility at CRB grew from its original size as conceived and established in July of 1968 to the capacity needed to process a 400% increase in volume assigned by USARV to 1st Logistical Command in late February 1969.

a. Facilities: The physical plant is complete except for black-topping the hardstand. Operations began in the new building on 15 July 1969. The air conditioning unit has been troublesome since installation. It is operational and is providing some environmental control. An additional 10 tons of cooling capacity is being sought to provide proper environmental conditions of 75 F and 40-60% relative humidity.

b. Personnel: Key personnel, i.e., officers, NCO's and technical personnel required for the increase in mission were assigned in mid-May 1969. They received intensive OJT because no CONUS schools teach the

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required skills. All were fully trained by the end of June.

c. Equipment and Personnel Authorization: A proposed TDA was forwarded by this headquarters to USARV on 25 June 1969, and to USARPAC by USARV on 24 July 1969. In the meantime, a provisional company has been formed at CRB to cover personnel assigned to perform the Duffel Bag mission. Temporary loans for equipment on the proposed TDA have been submitted because of lack of requisitioning authority. A forklift and two 2½ ton trucks have been obtained in this manner. A loan for the balance of the equipment required is being processed by Hqs, USARV at this time. Special purpose Duffel Bag test equipment was requested by message from Defense Communications Planning Group, Washington, D.C. on 28 June 1969. A reply that this equipment is being procured was received O/A 20 July 1969.

6. (C) Keystone Eagle: The announced reduction of US Forces in RVN by 25,000 personnel for completion by 31 August 1969 affected this command by the redeployment of 10 TCE units to CONUS and the relocation of five units to USASUPCOM-Da Nang. Realignment of a portion of logistical support was necessary in order to fill the void left by the redeployment/re-location actions.

a. Discussion:

(1) Planning for a redeployment requirement such as called for in Keystone Eagle was conducted on a very strict close-hold basis. The policies, guidance and units involved developed by this close-hold group still required further staff actions when permission was given to lift the close-hold restrictions. At this time and as a result of each staff's review of the requirement, it was necessary to publish detailed guidance in a piecemeal fashion in order to provide immediate instructions to subordinate units for action. Timeliness dictated this type dissemination rather than delay the information by the time it takes to staff a complete document.

(2) The effect that Keystone Eagle had on the 1st Logistical Command was the redeployment of 10 TOE units to CONUS with a total of 1306 personnel spaces. Operational control of the 6/56 Arty Bn (AD) (HAWK) was transferred from the CDR, 7th Air Force to this command effective 1 July 1969. The purpose of this change was only to provide assistance to the battalion in its redeployment actions.

(3) The redeployment of a major portion of the 9th Infantry Division with no replacement in position resulted in special assistance being provided to them in their preparation and movement for embarkation. This task was assigned to the USASUPCOM-Saigon.

b. Action Taken:

(1) The selection and identification of 1st Logistical Command units

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to be affected by the Keystone Eagle project was promulgated in a series of messages to the appropriate SUPCOMs. The information was later consolidated with the publication of the 1st Logistical Command's OPORD 182-69. After it was determined that the redeploying units would be reserve component units, a realignment of residual forces was required.

(2) Realignment of combat service support provided by the affected SUFCOMs had to be accomplished without any interruption of support. Phasing the relief of missions permitted an overlap between the redeploying and relocating units. On the agreed upon date, the relocating unit assumed the mission and the redeploying unit began to standdown in preparation to move.

(3) The redeployment of major portion of the 9th Infantry Division has not significantly reduced the support required throughout Saigon Support Command's area of responsibility. This slightly reduced mission situation contributed to the overall capability of Saigon Support Command to perform its support mission even if three units each were redeployed and relocated. Because of no reduction in the combat service support required in Da Nang Support Command's area of responsibility, specific type units were nominated to be relocated to Da Nang. Even with this action, a shortfall existed between what had been the capabilities versus the capabilities of the units provided for replacements.

(4) Progress thus far attained as scheduled in the implementation of the Keystone Eagle OPORD indicates that its objectives will be accomplished without any degradation of logistical support.

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ANNEX F (C) ACofS, SP&C, Training Division

1. (C) Operation BUDDY is an on-the-job training (OJT) program for ARVN personnel with 1st Logistical Command units. The program is designed to assist in the improvement and modernization of the ARVN logistical forces and system. OJT programs have been conducted in marine and signal maintenance, tug, medium and heavy boat operations, drivers training, and floating crane, convoy, 5 ton tractor, and Material Handling equipment operations. Approximately 240 ARVN soldiers have been trained in these areas. Currently it is planned to conduct a pilot program in the Saigon area utilizing small, skilled 1st Logistical Command instructor teams to instruct in the ARVN Base depots and III Area Logistical Commands (ALC's). MACV is attempting to determine what are ARVN's requirements so that full implementation of the program can be initiated.

2. (C) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Improvement and Modernization Program is designed to upgrade the military capabilities of RVNAF both in quality and quantity. 1st Logistical Command has been charged with providing supply, maintenance, and technical inspection assistance to the program. So far, two Artillery Battalions have transferred their equipment to ARVN on a unit-to-unit basis. Currently the equipment is being formulated by a drawdown of depot and USA RV Engineer troop assets for two ARVN Engineer Construction Battalions and one ARVN Engineer Heavy Equipment Company. Also equipment is being formulated by a 1st Logistical Command unit drawdown for two RVN Ordnance Direct Support Companies. The equipment of two transportation companies (medium boat) is being prepared for turnover to ARVN.

3. (U) The 1st Logistical Command SKILLS I Program was implemented on 15 February 1969 to orient command personnel on policies, procedures and management programs, to train specialists and supervisors and to give MOS training in areas where shortages existed. The program was expanded in early March to include US combat units and Free World Military Assistance Forces personnel. The program is multi-phased and consists of ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE phases. ALPHA is concerned with giving newly assigned personnel an overview of 1st Logistical Command operations, BRAVO with training specialists and supervisors, and CHARLIE will provide formal on-the-job training to personnel. The results of the program show that command wide personnel trained during the reported period in ALPHA to be 1399, BRAVO 4735, and CHARLIE 2192.

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ANNEX G (C) ACoFS, SP&O, Force Development Division

1. (U) Program 6 Civilianization was completed on 31 May 1969. A total of 5654 military spaces were civilianized by their deletion from the 1st Logistical Command requisitioning base. Of the military spaces lost, 3445 were withdrawn by substitution, 1597 by inactivation (851 replaced by contracts), and 630 by conversion to type b units. (See charts 1 and 2 below)

CHART 1

PROGRAM 6 CIVILIANIZATION

Military Space Reduction:

Line by Line Substitution _____ (166 Units) _____ 3445

Inactivation With Contract Replacement _____ (7 Units) _____ 851

Inactivation Without Replacement _____ (5 Units) _____ 728

Military Space Reduction by Conversion to Type B Units _____ (3 Units) 630

CHART 2

PROGRAM 6 CIVILIANIZATION

CONTRACTS

<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>SPACES</u>	<u>EST ANNUAL COST</u>
POL	QNH	170	\$833,183
116 TC Co TS	CRB	329	340,000
2 Tug Dets	CRB	32	102,235
2 Crane Dets	CRB	28	100,000
135 HEM Co	CRB	292 851	900,000 \$2,275,418

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2. (C) On 15 July 1969, a Retrograde Augmentation Group arrived in theater, and was assigned to 1st Logistical Command. The Group consisted of the 604th CS Maint Company (Equipment Processing), the 402d Transportation Detachment (Port Assistance), the 166th Aviation Maint Detachment (Staging Area). These units have the capability of providing technical assistance for augmentation of retrograde activities. The Group was assigned to USASUPCOM, Saigon. The Group OIC was assigned to HQ, 1st Logistical Command, ACofS, SP&O, with both staff and command responsibility for operations conducted by the units.

3. (U) A total of five Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) TDAs were staffed at this headquarters between 1 May and 31 July 1969. TDAs for Duffel Bag Facility, Augmentation 48th GS Group, Augmentation 45th GS Group, Augmentation 593d GS Group, and MMDA for USASUPCOM, Da Nang, USA Marine Maintenance Activity, and USA Mortuary Da Nang were submitted to USARV during this period.

4. (U) MTOE affecting 10 1st Logistical Command units were prepared and submitted to USARV between 1 May 1969 and 31 July 1969. MTOE were submitted to increase unit strengths, realign capabilities and add equipment to Support unit requirements. MTOE submitted are at Inclosure 11.

5. (U) On 7 July 1969, staff responsibility for developing and processing tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) was transferred from ACofS, Personnel, to Force Development Division, ACofS, SP&O. This action consolidated all TAADS functions in one staff section.

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ANNEX H (U) ACofS, SP&O, Presentations and Publications Division

1. (U) The 92 day period was characterized by an increased emphasis on the currently assigned tasks and a significant expansion into other areas. The major areas of responsibilities for the division had been the preparation of the quarterly Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the headquarters, 1st Logistical Command; the staff processing and forwarding of Operational Reports-Lessons Learned from sixty-five subordinate organizations; preparation of the monthly Logistics Summary Report (LOGSUM); staff processing and annotation of the monthly USARV Commander's notes prior to submission to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command; preparation and publication of the Weekly Activities Report covering significant activities of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations; preparation and editing of individual awards for members of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations; development of the plan and organization for the HQ, USARV directed Review and Analysis of the US Army Logistics System in Vietnam; preparation and presentation of the broad scope Command Briefing; coordination and stage direction of specialized briefings presented to selected distinguished visitors to the Command; and finally monitorship of the Command Historical Program. Added during the reporting period, to the major responsibilities noted above, were the coordination of the newly initiated Monthly Support Command Commander's Report; compilation of the Daily Significant Actions Report covering the daily operations of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations; and the compilation of the Weekly Dollar Significant Actions Report covering significant monetary savings derived or anticipated by actions taken by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Security, Plans and Operations.
2. (U) During the month of May 1969, the responsibility for the conduct of the HQ, USARV directed Review and Analysis of the US Army Logistics System in Vietnam was phased out of the division and passed to the Special Assistant for Logistics Review, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. During the transition, however, much time was consumed and effort expended in orientating new personnel in that which had transpired previously and in providing direct assistance in the composition and formation of Logistics Advisory Committees and in the convening of the Logistics Review Board, chaired by MG Heiser, on 9 May 1969. Significant assistance continued to be rendered to all elements of the staff in the conduct of research in the endeavor to include recall from the Federal Records Center of considerable documentation of past history of the 1st Logistical Command.
3. (U) Additional emphasis was placed on the historical program with the conducting of exit interviews with Major General Leo B.


Jones, Chief of Staff, Headquarters, US Army Vietnam on 30 April (not previously reported), Colonel J.F. Dennington, Special Assistant for T-Day Planning, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command on 5 May 1969, and Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey, Deputy Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command on 27 May 1969. As part of a special project to historically document the manner of performance of 1st Logistical Command units deploying to CONUS under Keystone Eagle, the following individuals were interviewed: Captain Robert McCormick, 950th Army Postal Unit (USAR, Lexington, Kentucky) at Can Tho on 16 July 1969; Major George Lassett, 336 OD Bn, HMC (USAR, Little Rock, Arkansas) at Da Nang on 22 July 1969; Captain John Looney, 173d Petroleum Company (Operating) (USAR, Greenwood, Miss) at Phu Bai on 24 July 1969; Captain David Ehle, 630th Medium Truck Company (USAR, Washington, Pennsylvania) at Phu Bai on 24 July 1969; Captain Donald Keil, 126th S&S Co (DS) (NG, Quincy, Illinois) at Chu Lai on 25 July 1969; Captain Raymond La Beau, 737th Trans Co (Med Trk) (Petrl) (USAR, Yakima, Washington) at Chu Lai on 25 July 1969; LTC Charles Ediston, 57th Trans Bn (regarding the 126th S&S Co and the 737th Trans Co) at Chu Lai on 25 July 1969; Captain Melvin McKenzie, Staff Postal Officer, Da Nang Support Command (regarding the 978th Army Postal Unit, USAR, Ft. Smith, Arkansas) at Da Nang on 26 July 1969; Captain Elroy H. Schwirtz, 452d General Supply Company (GS) (USAR, Winthrop, Minn) at Da Nang on 27 July; Captain Joseph McClelland and Captain Phillip Melrose, 1011th S&S Co (DS) (USAR, Independence, Kansas) at Bearcat on 28 July 1969; and Captain Paul Troxler, 319th Trans Co (USAR, Augusta, Ga.) at Long Binh on 31 July 1969. Additionally, a tape recording was taken of remarks made by Major General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command to the Skills I Alpha Orientation and Indoctrination (for newly arrived personnel) session at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command at Long Binh on 5 May 1969.

4. (U) PROJECT CLARION which had been initiated in a previous reporting period continued to be given added emphasis. The activity within this project which encompasses those major responsibilities dealing with reports to and communication with collateral, subordinate and superior staff elements and headquarters is noted on the graphic's own below. Finally, two visitors to the command were handled solely under the auspices of the Division. LTC Hugh Peter Trueman, Assistant Defense Attaché and Head of Chief of Staff, Joint Warfare Team, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom visited the command on 21 May 1969 and received the Command, ICCV, Aerial Resupply and ACoS, Transportation Briefings as well as a tour of the facilities at USADLB. He also visited the command on 9 June and later on 15 July 1969. The purpose of these visits was for orientation on the US Logistics System in RVN. Each visited was sponsored by the MACV J-2. LTC Starkey, MACV Deputy Historian, visited the command on 7 July 1969. He received the command briefing, the ICCV briefing and tour and visited the 79th Maintenance Battalion, 3d Ordnance Battalion and the Newport Complex.

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PROJECT CLARION



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ANNEX I (C) ACofS, Supply

1. (U) This report outlines the operations of ACofS, Supply, 1st Logistical Command for the months of May, June, and July. Various projects have been initiated to improve overall effectiveness of Logistics in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and continuing emphasis is being placed on projects of previous months. These and other significant areas will be discussed in this report.

2. (C) The May country-wide enemy "high-point" caused damage to petroleum facilities at Qui Nhon, An Khe and Long Binh. Despite vastly improved security measures, including cyclone fencing, the last remaining 10,000 barrel steel tank at Tank Farm #2 in Qui Nhon was destroyed by a RPG round. Replacement tanks will not be constructed on the same sites but at key pump stations in the form of 3,000 barrel tanks, supplementing the 259,000 barrels of storage at Tank Farms 1 and 3. Enemy 82mm mortar rounds destroyed two 10,000 barrel tanks, 334,000 gallons of JP-4 and 414,000 gallons of diesel fuel at An Khe. Only one of the tanks will be replaced as a result of a re-evaluation of storage requirements. POL damage at Long Binh was limited to the loss of several drums of packaged products. June and July petroleum damage generally consisted of small arms and satchel charge attacks on pipelines and ambushes of 5,000 gallon POL tankers.

3. (C) During June, repairs were completed on the T-2 tanker Jetty breasting dolphins at Cam Ranh Bay. Three welded 50,000 barrels storage tanks at the Cam Ranh Bay Air Base were completed, significantly increasing Air Force storage capacity as well as total Cam Ranh Bay storage capacity. Based on a decision by Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam (USARV) to reduce the Phu Hiep installation, Qui Nhon Support Command decided to abandon the 13,000 barrel Phu Hiep Tank Farm and offer the tanks to the Air Force at the adjacent Tuy Hoa Air Force Base.

4. (C) The withdrawal of 25,000 troops from the Republic of Vietnam will have a significant impact on petroleum operations. Packaged POL requirements are estimated to be reduced by 3%, and Saigon Support Command bulk POL requirements will decrease approximately 3,600,000 gallons monthly. Four logistical units with a petroleum capability are part of the deployed force: an S&S POL Platoon in both Saigon Support Command and Da Nang Support Command, and a Petroleum Operation Company and a Medium Truck Company (POL) from Da Nang Support Command. A Petroleum Supply Company has been deployed from Vung Tau to northern I CTZ to meet the shortage created by the withdrawing I CTZ units.

5. (U) Effective 1 July 1969, the 1st Logistical Command Directorate of Petroleum assumed the manual management of packaged Class

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III items. It was determined that the computerized inventory accounting records maintained by the U.S. Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam did not provide data needed for the efficient management of POL packaged products. The new manual system will provide better interface with the records and procedures of the petroleum battalions' packaged POL depots.

6. (C) Pipeline fuel losses on the four Qui Nhon Support Command pipelines increased significantly during recent months as reflected below:

Average Loss Percentages by CY Qtrs

	<u>4 Qtr 68</u>	<u>1 Qtr 69</u>	<u>2 Qtr 69</u>
QNH - PHC	2.5%	7.0%	19.8%
QNH - ANK	12.6%	21.1%	26.1%
ANK - FLK	20.4%	38.3%	20.9%
VRB - THY	13.9%	11.0%	26.2%

a. As these four pipelines are the only ones of the 11 major Vietnam pipelines which are incurring major losses, this problem has received continuous command interest. It has been determined that pilferage by Vietnamese Civilians and military is the primary cause of fuel loss on the Qui Nhon - Phu Cat, Qui Nhon - An Khe and Vung Ro Bay - Tuy Hoa lines, and that enemy action is the major cause of fuel losses on the An Khe - Pleiku pipeline.

b. In June 1969, the Qui Nhon - An Khe pipeline was filled with water for a period of approximately one month to discourage fuel pilferage by local Vietnamese. Maximum engineering effort was also directed on a high priority basis for the burial of critical segments of the Vung Ro Bay - Tuy Hoa, Qui Nhon - An Khe and Qui Nhon - Phu Cat lines in order to remove the pipelines from easy access by civilians in densely populated areas.

c. Progress in the burial project is proceeding rapidly; two portions of the line are almost completed and two others are approaching 50% completion. As the Qui Nhon - An Khe pipeline is now filled with water, pilferage has increased substantially on the adjacent Qui Nhon - Phu Cat and An Khe - Pleiku lines.

7. (U) Thanksgiving and Christmas Class I requisitions were reviewed, and downward adjustments were based upon reduction of troop strength. Cancellations were forwarded to Defense Personnel Supply Center (DPSC), Alameda, California. A review of troop feeding reports revealed a need to reduce the strength requisitioning factor. Action was taken and requisitions adjusted.

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8. (U) One section of the new refrigerated warehouse was completed at Qui Nhon Depot on 26 June 1969. Sufficient time to plan and mark the storage areas within the warehouse was not available, and Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc. (PA&E) did not have an opportunity to train personnel in the operation of refrigeration equipment before the warehouse was placed in operation. Discharge of the reefer ship S/S Hibueras into the new warehouse started 27 June 1969 and was completed on 29 June 1969. This action released the S/S Hibueras from static reefer storage.

9. (U) The 33,000 cubic feet static storage Army barge #6668, located at Vung Tau was removed from service in June 1969 because of constant breakdowns. The barge is of World War II vintage and parts are hard to find. The loss of this barge reduced Vung Tau's capability to receive and store refrigerated subsistence and provide depot support to Can Tho. Action was taken during the month of June to phase out Vung Tau as a depot storage location. The depot support mission was assigned to US Army Depot, Long Binh (USAD LB), for Vung Tau and Can Tho, and Vung Tau ceased being a port of call for CONUS reefer ships.

10. (U) The USARV Master Menu Board changed the 28 day cyclic menu to improve the variety of items served. The new menu was forwarded through USARV to the US Army Food Service Center, Chicago, Illinois, for approval. Effective date is scheduled for mid-August 1969.

11. (U) The subsistence Authorized Stockage List (ASL) was reviewed. Restrictions were lifted on items coded for hospitals and special issues making them available to the Navy and charge sales customers. This provides a wider variety to the customer without increasing the number of lines carried by the depots and supply points.

12. (U) PROJECT CARE and PRESERVATION I. The aim of project Care and Preservation I is to develop a care and preservation program which will maintain or return all materiel to a ready for issue condition and which will be responsive to the needs of the theater. The ultimate program is to determine the true condition of all items in depot stock and record the condition on Depot and USAICCV ABF. The USAICCV will match unserviceable assets against theater requirements and designate priorities for care and preservation, maintenance, and recuperage. Priority requirements for the theater will be compared with depot assets and capabilities to develop a theater wide program.

a. On 19 June 1969, message AVCA GL DO #9095 was sent to Support Commands and Depots over General Heiser's signature, requesting positive command action be taken at all levels to reduce damage due to mishandling during off-loading and loading. This message emphasizes

the need for proper use of materials handling equipment to eliminate needless damage due to negligence. This message also advised that prompt action would be taken to report damages (DD Form 6) in order to fix responsibility so that action can be initiated to prevent recurrences.

b. Instructions on Priorities for Performing Care and Preservation and In-Storage Maintenance was updated by 1st Log Message AVCA GL-DO #9602 22 June 1969. This gives the depots more definitive guidance on what items to process in order of priority.

c. New instructions were issued by 1st Log message AVCA GL-DO #11250 8 July 1969 requiring additional elements of data reported on C&P accomplished. This involves line item and dollar value so that the overall C&P program can be more effectively monitored and evaluated.

d. A bulletin has been published, Care and Preservation Bulletin #69-1, dated 24 July 1969 on Requirements for Identification Markings on Exterior Containers. Additional bulletins will be published as required.

e. Additional command guidance is being furnished to require a more intense effort to determine the true condition of material in stock and record the true condition on the Depot and USAICCV ABF. This will permit USAICCV to screen asset listings and determine priorities for C&P based on theater requirements.

13. (U) Project Count

a. Project COUNT I, the first perimeter-to-perimeter inventory conducted under combat conditions, was conducted during the period from September 1968 through 14 January 1969. All command depots and DSU's/GSU's actually completed their counts 28 Dec 68. The project picked up 85,000 line items previously recorded at zero balance or unrecorded on the ABF, recorded previously unregistered assets of 331.3 million dollars, and increased the reliability of the data base as indicated in the subsequent reductions in material release denials and increased demand satisfaction.

b. Realizing that a continuing inventory and locator effort was necessary to maintain and further improve the results of COUNT I, Project COUNT II was initiated on 1 February 1969. COUNT II, an accelerated cyclic inventory, is currently being conducted at all depots and DSU's/GSU within the command. The main goal is to further improve the existing data base. Through 16 July 1969, 187,000 lines had been counted in the DSU/GSU inventory, while through 24 July 1969, 384,000 lines have been counted by depots.

c. Scheduled to begin 1 September 1969 is Project COUNT ALWAYS. This will be the third of the command wide inventories, and will use the experience gained in the first two to implement the 3S inventory procedures. The 3S inventory procedures use a single count method without freeze of the stock records or material. This program was tested at US Army Depot, Qui Nhon in July 1969. A meeting has been set up in early August 1969 at US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay to discuss the procedures for Project COUNT ALWAYS.

14. (U) Project Condition

a. During Project COUNT it was ascertained that a large percentage of the stock on hand at depots of the 1st Logistical Command was in a less than ready-for-issue condition, i.e. condition code A. Due to Project COUNT, the command's logistical intelligence regarding quantities on hand has been greatly improved, but the need still existed for more systematic emphasis on the condition coding of those supplies. The intent of Project CONDITION is to purify data of material assets at each depot. This includes both the material itself and the ABF records reflecting such condition.

b. Phase I of the program was implemented with the initiation of Project COUNT II in February. The task involved the separation of all stocks in storage into two distinct categories: those obviously code A and all other (then classified as "J"). During this phase also, all incoming stocks were classified, at receiving, into one of two categories ("A" or "K" - meaning "other"). The categorization, in both cases, was accomplished by receiving yard personnel and warehousemen.

c. Phase II of the project consists of the reclassification of all J and K stocks by quality control technicians and technical inspectors. Material thus inspected and coded will be reviewed by stock control personnel to determine requirements and to recommend priorities for care and preservation. Material not immediately required by depot customers will be reported to the USAICCV. The USAICCV will collate all data thus received and make determination of priorities for the theater wide care and preservation program.

15. (U) Project Orange Ball. There are currently more than 80 types of dry batteries used in USARV. The design tropical shelf life of these batteries varies from eight to eighteen months, depending upon the type. The lack of adequate refrigerated storage for batteries in Vietnam, on-hand stocks of old batteries, the uncompromising environment, coupled with an unwieldy distribution system has resulted in the use of substantially deteriorated batteries in the field. Consequently, using units have lost confidence in all dry batteries, and the usage of dry batteries is currently 1/3 to 1/5

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of their designed life. The ORANGE BALL concept has been developed which envisions the distribution of frozen dry batteries from manufacturers through Japan, and to Vietnam. Upon arrival in South Vietnam, dry batteries will be handled, processed, issued, and transported in a manner paralleling that for Class I perishables and below depot level will be handled through Class I channels. So long as dry batteries remain in cold storage (0°F) the shelf life can be significantly extended. Units will requisition batteries from their supporting Class I Supply Points. Supply points will replenish stocks as necessary to insure that batteries will be available for the unit's next cyclic ration pick up. A safety level (15 days of supply) will be maintained in frozen storage at depot level storage facilities only. Distinctive ORANGE BALL markings will be applied to identify dry batteries and to indicate the remaining shelf life. Implementation of Project ORANGE BALL began 15 July 1969.

16. (U) The Directorate of Depot Operations is responsible for the processing of Purchase Request and Commitments (DA Form 14-115) related to contractual requirements for depot functions and subsequent monitoring of each activity. Several significant changes are in process that will result in substantial savings and increased management control. The Vung Tau CNY is being phased out with the mission to be taken over by USAD, Long Binh. Target date is 31 October 1969. This will generate a savings estimated at \$300,000 for the fiscal year. The Care and Reservation activities at Long Binh and Cam Ranh Bay are being expanded to facilitate increases in processing of Class II, VII (Less vehicles) and IX items. Total value of items programmed to be recovered during the next 3 months is \$72,000,000. The estimated cost to recover these items, including materials, is \$2,160,000 or 3% of the acquisition cost. The PA&E operated Non-Standard Repair Parts warehouse was moved from Saigon to Long Binh and the contract was terminated on 30 June 1969. The non-standard repair parts warehouse is now being operated by US Army Depot, Long Binh.

17. (U) During June 1969, the ACofS, Supply and the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam became separate entities. The Logistics Management Division, consisting of the Management and Budget Branch and the Plans and Policy Branch was established within the ACofS, Supply.

18. (U) Project SEE/MOVE was established command wide on 17 July 1969. SEE/MOVE operates in the opposite manner of Project STOP/SME, in that immediate action will be taken by the USAICCV to give disposition instructions to depots for nominated bulk excess of high dollar value. In order to expedite the materials, all communications are accomplished telephonically or by high priority message. Stocks nominated for SEE/MOVE may be those that show long standing weather wear and for which no issue has been made. Also, the stock may be a suspected excess as

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determined by the size or quantity involved.

19. (U) Support Command Commanders have been given the prerogative to authorize MREs to conduct depot searches. Further, each commander has been sent a draft of the USARV regulation governing MREs, which commanders will coordinate with each of their CCIL customers. Upon receipt of the commanders comments, a recommendation concerning the conduct of MREs will be submitted to USARV.

20. (U) On or about 31 July 1969, the first 16 man increment of supply oriented Signal Officers for the 1st Logistical Command will arrive. These personnel are PCS assigned to 1st Logistical Command for use in storage and stock control within the communications-electronics field. USARV G4 indicates that USAhCOM will begin another 5 week training course to provide 16 additional replacements in approximately 6 months.

21. (C) T-Day Planning Care and Preservation Program. The care and preservation program for Freighter Cargo operations consists of two parts: (1) acquisition and storage of preservation, packing and packaging (PP&P) supplies at predesigned location in amounts specified by T-Day planning directives, and (2) acquisition and prepositioning of the tools and equipment necessary to support T-Day operations. The required PP&P supplies are to be acquired from in-country excesses, excesses that are available from 2nd Logistical Command and PURA, and by requisitions submitted to CONUS. A 30-day increment will be requisitioned from CONUS and stored in RVN. Another 30-day increment will be stored in Okinawa. Additional reserves will be set aside by selected NICPs. The 2nd Logistical Command has initiated shipment of supplies to RVN that will partially fill the first 30-day increment. As required, the reserves will be brought forward to RVN and issued to units in accordance with 1st Logistical Command OPLAN 69-69 and appropriate SOPs. An initial increment of loading and lashing will also be stored in RVN SUPCOMs and the balance reserved at 2nd Logistical Command and CONUS until T-Day. All reserve programs are being carefully and objectively scrutinized to keep their levels commensurate with the tonnage to be withdrawn.


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APPENDIX J (C) ACoS, MAINTENANCE


1. (U) During the 92 day period from 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, certain items such as tanks, personnel carriers, self-propelled and towed artillery achieved a very high level of operational readiness (See graphs in Section I, part 1). However, the operational readiness rates of some items of equipment did not attain this same level of excellence. Below are charts depicting the operational readiness rates for tactical wheeled vehicles, full tracked tractors, 20 ton cranes, rough terrain material handling equipment and radio sets.




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TRACTOR, TRACKED (D7E)



TRACTOR, WHEELED




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
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TRUCK, 2 - $\frac{1}{2}$ TON



TRUCK, 5 TON CARGO AND TRACTOR




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
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TRUCK, 5 TON DUMP



ROUGH TERRAIN & TRUCK MOUNTED CRANE, 20 TON




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
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RADIO SET, AN/GRC-106



RATT (AN/GRC-26 AND AN/GRC-46)



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2. (C) Repair and Return (R&R) Maintenance Support for M107/110 Artillery Weapons:

a. The R&R concept calls for the evacuation of a weapon to one of the 12 R&R centers for one (1) week of intensified maintenance on a quarterly basis. The artillery crew will accompany the weapon and perform the service. Direct support unit personnel will advise, assist and train the weapon crew. All necessary support maintenance will also be performed during this week.

b. During the past quarter, 53 weapons were serviced under the R&R program.

c. Cumulative totals of production in the R&R program show that since the program was initiated in November 1968, 184 weapons have been serviced (See chart on following page). Each time a weapon receives R&R maintenance, the crew is given training in the quarterly maintenance procedures in accordance with TM 9-23C0-216-1C.

d. The table below gives the progress of the R&R program for the last quarter by support command:

<u>SUPPORT COMMAND</u>	<u>WEAPONS COMPLETED</u>	<u>WEAPONS ON HAND</u>
Qui Nhon	20	36
Saigon	7	48
Da Nang	14	52
Cam Ranh Bay	3	16

3. (C) M107/110 Phase II Improvement Program:

a. The Phase II program consists of 23 modifications to the existing M107/110 configuration. Included in these modifications are a new access door to the fuel filters, an improved air filter access door, a surge tank for the coolant system and a positive ramming modification on the loader rammer.


b. During the past quarter, 32 weapons were modified under the Phase II Improvement Program.

c. Cumulative totals of modification under the Phase II program show that since the program was initiated in April 1969, 34 weapons have been modified as of 25 July 1969.

d. The table below gives the progress of the Phase II Product Improvement Program as of 25 July 1969 by support command:

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<u>Support Command</u>	<u>No. Wpns Mod May-Jul 1969</u>	<u>Cum Tot Wpns Modified</u>	<u>No. Wpns OH</u>	<u>% Modified</u>
Qui Nhon	8	8	36	22
Saigon	5	7	48	15
Da Nang	15	15	52	29
Cam Ranh Bay	4	4	16	25

e. Forty-six (46) modification kits arrived in-country during the past quarter. Current plans call for this command to modify approximately half of the M107/110 vehicles in-country. The remaining vehicles will be modified during CONUS rebuild.

4. (C) Operational Report Lesson Learned M551 Sheridan:

a. The M551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle, completed its US Army Vietnam evaluation phase in May 1969, and further shipments were accepted for deployment to Vietnam.

b. There are presently 57 M551 Sheridans tactically employed in units within the III Corps tactical zone. This vehicle has performed extremely well tactically but requires thorough organizational maintenance in order to maintain a satisfactory operational readiness rate. The engine life has an average of 500 to 700 miles. This inadequate engine performance is due primarily to operating conditions and failure to perform scheduled maintenance and services.

c. The vehicle has demonstrated both good and bad qualities under combat conditions. There are negligible reports of thrown track or track breaking while operating under the most severe conditions. In addition, there are a number of reports of damage to the transmission caused by the loss of the drain plugs in the bottom deck.

d. The practice of using a combat loaded M551 Sheridan as a recovery vehicle for combat damage or disabled vehicles has resulted in early transmission and engine failure. In some instances, these vehicles are required to tow two (2) disabled vehicles several miles, which can result in the failure of the vehicles power train.

e. Much difficulty has been experienced in the electrical turret trouble-shooting. This is due primarily to inadequate organizational and field maintenance turret mechanic training. Because of the complexity of this equipment, intensive training in trouble-shooting of the turret electrical power mode should be given to the crew, organizational and direct support maintenance personnel supporting this vehicle.

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f. There appears to be a lack of quality control on recoil seals. Many of these seals have been replaced within the first three (3) months of use, with a second change now being required. The project manager's office has initiated more stringent quality control measures and will attempt to expedite newly manufactured seal rings to RVN.

5. (U) Daily Status Reporting of D7E Full Tracked Tractor

a. For several months the D7E tractor has maintained a high deadline rate. Due to critical requirements to maintain a high operational readiness rate on this item, intensive monitorship of the deadlining tractors and repair parts assets was required.

b. A daily report was established on the D7E full tracked tractor to monitor deadline rates and parts requirements. Repair parts, assets and assemblies are being sent to resolve critical deadlining areas. This has been especially helpful in reducing down-time by placing emphasis on the D7E.

c. A reduction has been noted in the number of engines required. Furthermore, parts requirements have been identified for local purchase to reduce down-time for supply in some instances. Detailed reporting procedures should be established when critical items maintain high non-operational readiness rates. Reports should be terminated after an acceptable deadline rate is achieved.

6. (U) Command Maintenance Management Inspections (CMMI) and Roadside Spot Check Inspections

a. A total of 68 Command Maintenance Management Inspections were conducted. Satisfactory ratings were attained by 35 units or 51%. Unsatisfactory ratings were given to 33 units or 49%. Roadside Spot Check Inspections totalled 251. Satisfactory ratings were awarded to 150 vehicles or 43%. Unsatisfactory preventive maintenance was found on 201 vehicles or 57%.

b. The most significant factor causing unsatisfactory ratings on CMMIs is the area of maintenance management and operations. Units are not using available publications pertinent to the operation of maintenance facilities. Prescribed Load Lists are found to be improperly computed or nonexistent for some types of equipment. Safety requirements are not being met and numerous hazards exist within many motor pools. These deficiencies are causing substantial loss in scoring points and contribute significantly to the low scores received.

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Annex K (C), ACoFS, Transportation

1. (U) During the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, 1st Logistical Command transportation units, augmented by commercial contractors, handled an average of 1,423,403 short tons of cargo per month. At the same time, major improvements were made in the movements management program. Rail service for local nationals was initiated between Saigon and Long Binh, and a rail segment was opened between Hue and Dong Ha. The Saigon Support Command truck units were deactivated and a truck unit deployed to CONUS from Da Nang. 1st Logistical Command highway and terminal units supported Keystone Eagle redeployment activities during July.

2. (U) Port Operations. Tonnage handled by 1st Logistical Command ports during the period 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969 was 2,102,098 short tons of cargo. This figure includes military and Sea-Land discharge and onload and USAID cargo.

a. During the reporting period, emphasis was placed on the throughput capability of the Cat Lai ammunition system. At the beginning of the period a "bottle neck" of vessels began to form in the Cat Lai system, due to the large number of ammo laden vessels arriving in RVN. Intensive management was directed toward holding to a minimum or reducing "hold time" completely. This effort was facilitated by an increase in MHE resources at Cat Lai, completion of necessary construction projects thereat, and the diversion of vessels to other ports.

b. Several port construction projects were completed during the period as follows:

(1) The first and second buoy berths to be renovated at Cat Lai were completed on 13 and 17 May 1969. Two barge buoys were installed and one existing barge buoy was renovated on 15 July 1969. The emplacement of buoys for a fourth ammunition ship anchorage at Cat Lai was completed on 4 June 1969. This allows the positioning of an additional ship ready to begin discharge as soon as any one of the three ships being worked at any given time completes discharge. The additional anchorage insures optimum availability of ammunition tonnage for discharge, eliminating the time previously lost in shifting ships after the completion of discharge operations.

(2) A 240 feet quay wall, creating a third barge discharge site, was completed at Cogido on 25 May 1969, increasing the transfer capacity (barge to truck) of Cogido to approximately 1800 S/T per day.

(3) Maintenance and turning basin dredging was completed at Newport on 17 July 1969. Newport now has the capability of handling C/4 type

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
vessels up to 600 feet long. This capability reduces the requirement for berthing such vessels at Saigon commercial port. Roll on roll off operations were transferred to Newport with the completion of dredging and installation of a RO/RO pier on 21 June 1969.

(4) Reefer vessels continued to account for the majority of ships in port over ten days because of limited consignee reception capability. Completion of four refrigerated cargo warehouse sections at Long Binh during the July - September period, will assist in reducing average reefer ship turnaround time. The first section of the reefer warehouse will become operational on 24 July, with the remaining sections to become available between that date and 21 September 1969. An additional 35 7-ton vans have been released by IV-AMECCM on a conditional basis and are scheduled to arrive in August 1969.

c. Intensive management practices enabled the port of Cam Ranh Bay to retain a low vessel turnaround time. An average of 2.7 days was experienced in the last quarter (February to April 1969), as compared to an average of 2.2 during this quarterly report.

d. The chart below shows the tonnages through 1st Logistical Command ports from August 1968 through July 1969.

Total Cargo Handled by 1st Logistical Ports




3. (U) Highway

a. A total of 1,283,708 STONs of cargo was hauled by 1st Logistical Command military truck units during the reporting period. Contractor vehicles hauled 871,404 STONs during the same period. Of total dry cargo hauled by military units, 42.6% was port and beach clearance, 30.6% was in local haul and 26.8% was in line haul operations. Contractor operated vehicles hauled 40.8% of their total tonnages in port and beach clearance, 54.9% in local haul and 4.3% in line haul.

b. Average monthly highway performance during this period was:

722,704 STONs
43,372 PAX
278,726,525 Gallons POL

c. Total performance for the past 12 months is as follows:



White space indicates commercial.
Figures indicates thousands of short tons.

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d. The 87th Transportation Company (Light Truck), and the 151st Transportation Company (Light Truck) were inactivated during the reporting period. Both units were assigned to the 48th Transportation Group, a Saigon Support Command unit.

e. The 630th Transportation Company (Medium Truck), a Da Nang Support Command unit, was deployed to CONUS without equipment. The equipment and mission of the 630th was assumed by the 805th Transportation Company (Light Truck). The 805th was deployed from Saigon Support Command without equipment.

f. The 666th Transportation Company (Light Truck) was moved from Qui Nhon to Da Nang, where it assumed the mission of providing support to the 101st Airborne Division. Any excess trucking capability of the 630th Transportation Company will be used to augment the Common User Land Transportation System in I Corps Tactical Zone.

4. (C) Rail.

a. The Vietnam Railway System (VNRS) transported 139,027.7 STONS of military cargo in support of US and FWMAF during the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969. The Chop Chai/Tuy Hoa passenger service transported a monthly average of 93,200 passengers in support of Tuy Hoa AFB. The Saigon to Thu Duc passenger service, initiated 5 May 1969, transported a monthly average of 50,179 passengers in support of RVN at the Thu Duc Island. The Saigon to Ho Nai passenger service, initiated 1 June 1969, transported an average of 12,717 passengers per month in support of Long Binh Post.

b. The major rail restoration effort has been in the I CTZ. The line between Hue and Dong Ha has progressed significantly by completion of the An Hoa bridge and by 18% completion of the Song Bo bridge. The estimated date of completion for this line is 7 April 1970. There were no other major restoration projects during this reporting period; however, 158 working days of a possible 276 were spent repairing damage caused by enemy interdiction. (There are three working days per 24 hour day - one per each rail division). A total of 52 incidents occurred during the reporting period, compared to 53 in the last reporting period. There was an increase from 24 to 29 incidents in the large tonnage division from the Qui Nhon to Tuy Hoa/Phu Hiep area. POL pipe line fire incidents adjacent to the Qui Nhon/Phu Cat Line decreased to five during the period. These however, closed this segment of the line for 33 days. The closing of the line caused tonnage to Phu Cat AFB to remain relatively stable in comparison to the last reporting period and prevented an anticipated increase in tonnage.

c. ARVN Rail Security Battalions experienced a reduction in strength since the last reporting period. The combined strength of the four

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Railway Security Battalions at the end of June was 1773, or 81% of authorized strength, as compared to 2078 or 95% at last reporting period. These losses are, in most cases, the result of the reassignment of enlisted personnel age 33 or over into non-combat units. To compensate for these losses, 310 new individuals have been recruited, 157 of whom are presently undergoing training. All Rail Security Battalions have now received training, although not extensively on the M-60 machine gun, which became part of the Railway Security Battalion's TOE during the first quarter of this year. Among major changes in command during the month of June, were the appointments of a new Deputy Director of Defense Transportation for Railway Security, and a new commander of the 5th Rail Security Battalion.

d. Passenger service between Saigon and Long Binh Post (Ho Nai Rail Head) began on 1 June 1969, and facilitated the elimination of 17 of the buses required for transportation of passengers. With expansion of this service scheduled 4 and 18 August 1969, an additional 22 buses will be released for other services. The rail passenger service was initiated to reduce traffic and accident exposure on main highways, reduce the number of compensation claims from the high number of home-to-work type accidents, and release buses for other local requirements.

5. (U) Sea-Land.

a. An increase in the number of containers being damaged during stuffing/unstuffing operations was a problem during the first part of this quarter. Containers were damaged due to careless operation of MHE at an average cost of \$50.00 per damaged van. This has noticeably decreased in the last month due to command emphasis on this problem. Another problem area resulted from the shipment of 55 gallon drums of POL products from Saigon to Cam Ranh Bay. This will be eliminated by using an alternate and more efficient method of transporting this particular type of cargo on LSTs or deep draft vessels and palletizing the drums whenever possible.

b. The following is a summary of the number of containers and tonnage received during this period, along with the subsequent container distribution to the three support commands.

<u>TOTAL CONTAINER INPUT</u>	<u>AVG PER SAILING</u>	<u>TOTAL SHORT TONS</u>	<u>AVG STON PER SAILING</u>
5237 (941)	654.6 (117.6)	82,771	10,346.4

DISTRIBUTION

SGN	3230 (517)	403.75 (64.5)
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CRB	1039 (212)	120.0 (26.5)
QNH	968 (212)	121.0 (26.5)

() Indicates number of reefer vans.

c. Additional Sea-Land service to Qui Nhon and Da Nang will begin in July 1969 by four T-3 container ships. These vessels carry a total of 476 containers, with a capacity for 97 reefers. With one vessel sailing every 12 days, this will represent approximately 22,500 short tons of cargo shipped per month. There are still four C-4J vessels serving Cam Ranh Bay, with a proposal to add a fifth in October 1969.

d. MTMTS awarded a new container service contract to Sea-Land, effective 7 July 1969. The two amendments discussed in the last quarterly report (extended delivery service beyond the 30 statute mile limit from the containership pier and restuffing of inbound containers) were incorporated into the contract. The contract continues the previously allowed free time for unstuffing containers in RVN (15 days for reefer and 30 days for all others).

6. (U) RO/RO Service. The Roll on Roll off (RO/RO) service between Okinawa and RVN continues to be hampered by the slow return of trailers to the system. At the present, Okinawa does not have enough vans available to continue unbroken service. This problem has been brought to the attention of support command commanders. In the last quarterly report, it was suggested that a regularly scheduled RO/RO service would be advantageous to all concerned. This was discussed at a command RO/RO conference on 13 May 1969 and determined infeasible at the present time however, due to insufficient cargo at Okinawa destined for RVN. Areas receiving close supervision are:

a. Control of trailers and vans in RVN, by maintenance of an accurate inventory.

b. Maintenance of trailers and vans.

c. The fluctuation of trailers in-country. Intent is to control trailers on a one for one trade basis.

7. (U) CONEX Control Program. All objectives of the CONEX Operating Level for Essential Storage (COLES) Program have not been met. Increased command attention to the program to decrease the number of CONEX used for essential storage is necessary. The program is being continued however, with additional emphasis during the forthcoming quarter. The program for stockpiling CONEX has fallen behind established levels because of the large number of containers being salvaged, the requirement for sending a significant number to CONUS, and to some extent, the requirement to support units redeploying to CONUS. Continued and increased command emphasis on

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control of CONEX is necessary to insure the continued growth of the stockpile in RVN.

8. (C) MILVAN. This new Military Containership Service which is similar to the commercial containership service, has been postponed from July 1969 implementation in RVN to August or early September of this year. There has also been a delay in the receipt of supply and maintenance manuals, repair parts kits, and trailers for training local personnel in use of the vans prior to arrival of the first vans. Further, construction of staging areas to handle the vans at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay is incomplete. The areas are cleared, but the asphalt hardstands have not been laid. 1st Logistical Command Regulation 55-50, governing the MILVAN operation, has been drafted and will be distributed to the support commands prior to the arrival of the first vans.

9. (U) Air. During the reporting period, this Command continued to utilize Special Assigned Airlift Missions (SAAM) for retrograde to CONUS. with aircraft from the 34th General Support Group at Ton Son Nhut AFB. Thirteen SAAM's transported 325,915 pounds of retrograde to CONUS.

10. (C) Troop Movement. During the period, no US Army personnel arrived by ship at 1st Logistical Command ports, however, 1,320 ROK replacements arrived in July aboard the USNS Geiger and 442 US troops arrived by air as part of unit advance parties, main bodies and rear detachments.

11. (U) Retrograde. The increasing retrograde program has caused a re-evaluation of certain procedures. (See para 12e, below).

12. (U) Movements Management Program.

a. Project LOGMOVE. MTOE's for Movement Control Centers cannot be processed until "trade off" spaces are identified to finance the requirement. Upon identification of spaces MTOE's will be forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. A valid requisition base will be established 60 days subsequent to USARV approval and forwarding of MTOE's to DA.

b. Project FLOW. Efforts continue to provide earliest possible visibility of enroute tonnages, by class of supply and destination. WAMTMTS has agreed to minor program changes to WAMTMTS automated cargo and analysis systems. The changes will result in improved and more timely information. A similar agreement by EAMTMTS is anticipated.

c. Project INTRANSIT. Efforts continue to monitor cargo awaiting shipment in order to insure that responsive transportation service is provided throughout the 1st Logistic Command. ACofS, Transportation in conjunction with MACV, USARV, and the Air Force and Navy component

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commands, has conducted an in-country evaluation of order-ship time (OST). Results shown below indicated some reduction in the OST prescribed by MACV Directive 55-4.

<u>MILSTAMP PRIORITY</u>	<u>MACV 55-4 STANDARD</u>	<u>CURRENT PERFORMANCE</u>
1	5 days	4
2	3	6
3	20	14
4	30	16

d. Project CHALLENGE. This program challenges tonnage priorities of cargo shipped in-country. Of 645,612 STONs offered for shipment during the past quarter, 43,112 STONs were challenged, resulting in 22,282 STONs being downgraded in priority and 7,81 STONs stopped.

e. Project RETRO-RIGHT.

(1) This project was initiated in July 1969 as part of Logistics Offensive II. It's purpose is to eliminate deficiencies associated with the identification, inspection, packaging, documentation (supply and transportation), and shipment of retrograde cargo. To facilitate the total retrograde effort, the ACofS, Transportation has appointed an officer as a single source of information and policy on retrograde. He will monitor project RETRO-RIGHT, which was introduced to the field on 3 July 1969. Retrograde policy and information pertaining to ACofS, Ammo, ACofS, Supply, and ACofS, Maintenance is being compiled and will be published in a comprehensive retrograde regulation.

(2) A system of RETRO coding of CONEX containers was initiated in July 1969. The system is designed to inform the consignee of the condition or classification of retrograde in containers and thus enable the rapid processing of retrograde shipments. It will be used in conjunction with existing procedures for marking and documenting CONEX containers. CONEX containers will be marked to indicate the contents are in one of four conditions:

- (a) Retro A - Properly stuffed, serviceable, identified, and properly documented (DD 1348) contents.
- (b) Retro AU - Properly stuffed, unserviceable (repairable), identified and properly documented contents.
- (c) Retro B - Unidentifiable, but serviceable items which are partially documented.

(d) Retro C - Unidentifiable, undocumented and/or unserviceable items.

(3) The standards of cleanliness for retrograde cargo has been a matter of concern. A team of advisors from the US Department of Agriculture and US Public Health Service, visited the command recently to assist with instructing personnel responsible for cleaning and certification of retrograde cargo. Concern is with conditions of the container as well as contents.

(4) Retrograde goals and performance were as follows during the period (STONs):

	<u>GOAL</u>	<u>PERFORMANCE</u>
MAY	101,587	62,476
JUN	60,000	55,475
JUL	59,000	37,123

f. Supply Manifest. USARPAC, after meeting with 1st Logistical Command on 4-5 August 1969, agreed to send systems people to RVN to finalize output requirements for the USARPAC 35 MILSTAMP/MILSTRIP interface program. In the meantime, ACofS, Transportation continues to publish a weekly (with mid-week supplements) listing of IMI items enroute to RVN. An automated version is now being test-run at 4th Transportation Command.

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ANNEX L (C) ACofS, AMMUNITION

1. (C) Ammunition Activity -- General: The report period was characterized by a reduced level of combat intensity from the previous quarter, which was reflected in ammunition issues. Issues for July were the lowest since October 1968. On the other hand, 104,400 STON were received in June, reflecting the quantities requisitioned in March to offset the heavy issues and combat losses experienced in the February-March post-TET offensive. As a result, the end of quarter balance on hand was near the management level of 175,000 STON. The challenge now is to maintain the balance on hand at the management level, which will require extremely intensive management should the lessened combat intensity continue. This is in consonance with the inventory in motion concept which features less than the stockage objective actually in country, as explained in the previous two Operational Reports--Lessons Learned (ORLL), and thereby reduces the risk of losing large quantities of ammunition due to enemy action.

2. (U) Surveillance Activities

a. At the request of the support commands, another course for Ammunition Technical Inspectors, MOS 55X was presented 7-17 July 1969. Originally, three courses were programmed and presented during January-February 1969 as a result of the new TOE 9-17G authorizing two Surveillance Maintenance Sections which required a total of 68 personnel. The fourth class was presented to fill rotation gaps. A total of 24 students graduated and were trained in ammunition handling, identification, inspection and maintenance techniques. It is planned to conduct at least one course each quarter.

b. Headquarters, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) requested a plan to eliminate operations in the South Beach Ammunition offloading area at Cam Ranh Bay. Closeout of this area is not possible at the present time. Ammunition load/unload operations are currently conducted in two areas at Cam Ranh Bay--South Beach and North Beach (Ammunition Pier # 5). The South Beach operations include the mooring sites for three deep draft vessels and "on the beach" sites for shallow draft vessels. Due to insufficient separation distances, ammunition operations in this area require a waiver. The "on the beach" operation is especially hazardous because of its close proximity to a contonement area and other facilities. This hazard can be eliminated upon the completion of additional construction in the North Beach area. The North Beach area currently lacks the facilities to meet the operational requirements for shallow draft operations. Shallow draft operations at Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) have increased because the Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD) now has the mission of providing back-up ammunition support to

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
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both Qui Nhon and Da Nang Support Commands. The current waiver is approved only through 29 August 1969. After careful study, it was determined that only by enlarging the North Beach facilities can South Beach be closed out. A work order to this effect was initiated and extension to the waiver was requested.

3. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Activities

a. EOD personnel responded to 6,478 incidents throughout Vietnam, made 1,543 liaison visits to supported units and trained a total of 18,630 personnel during 303 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance classes. A graphic representation of CY68 and CY69 EOD incidents is shown below.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES



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b. On 5 June 1969, an enemy terrorist device incorporating anti-disturbance fuzing was recovered in Saigon. Although the device did not function as intended, an EOD specialist was slightly injured before the device was completely neutralized. The device consisted of an explosive-packed tin can with a 9-volt battery as the initiation for the electric blasting cap. The device was constructed so that the electrical circuit was completed when movement of the package caused a metal rod to slide in either of two directions. On 11 June a similar device utilizing a non-electric blasting cap was discovered by ARVN EOD in Saigon. These are the first known instances of a terrorist device utilizing only an anti-disturbance device to detonate the charge.

c. The 269th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) was reassigned from Saigon Support Command to Da Nang Support Command, effective 23 July 1969, by General Order 592, HQ, 1st Logistical Command. The move was due to the redeployment of HHC, 336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) (DS/GS) which resulted in the loss of 10 EOD slots. The 269th was available to relocate due to the planned closeout of the Dong Tam ASP in late August. A four-man team is remaining on site in Dong Tam until closeout is terminated.

4. (C) Supply Activities

a. Total issues for the period of 24 April through 24 July 1969 were 225,660 STON versus receipts of 256,323 STON. Total issues, receipts, and balances on hand were as follows:

	<u>RECEIPTS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>	<u>BALANCE ON HAND</u>
MAY	76,512	77,300	137,512
JUNE	104,23	78,143	166,506
JULY	75,18	70,217	176,195

The balance on hand consists of serviceable stocks and does not include intransit assets or receipts from suspended to serviceable assets through condition code changes. This accounts for the obvious discrepancy of balance on hand figures.

b. Total issues, receipts and dollar values for FY 69 were:


	<u>STON</u>	<u>BALANCE ON HAND</u>
RECEIPTS	878,865	\$ 1,757,730,000
ISSUES	921,855	\$ 1,843,710,000

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The chart below shows ammunition receipt and issue activity for FY 69.

**CLASS V
RECEIPT AND ISSUE ACTIVITY**




c. Enemy action of 11 July 1969 resulted in the loss of 2.23 STOW Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD), dollar value \$ 3,334.28. This brings the total theater losses for CY 1969 to 12,628.81 STOW, equal to \$ 17,578,386.58.

d. The Class V Retrograde Program was instituted at 1st Logistical Command Headquarters to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition which is beyond in-country repair capability. The program was divided into phases and progress except for Phase IV is portrayed on the next page. The objectives for the phases are as stated.

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CLASS V RETROGRADE



(1) Phase I was to retrograde 14,800 STON from 1 September to 31 December 1968. This objective was exceeded by 1,167 STON for a total of 15,967 STON.

(2) Phase II began on 1 January 1969 with an objective of 35,000 STON to be retrograded by 28 February 1969. A total of 33,568 STON were credited to this program, for 96 percent accomplishment of the objective.

(3) Phase III covered the period 1 March to 30 June 1969. The objective of Phase III was to retrograde 2,500 STON per month for a total of 10,000 STON. A total of 13,997 STON were retrograded exceeding the goal by 3,997 STON.

(4) Phase IV covers the period 1 July to 31 December 1969. The objective of this phase is to retrograde 1,000 STON per month for a total of 6,000 STON for the period. A total of 1,745 STON were retrograded during July, exceeding the goal by 745 STON.

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e. There are currently twelve Class V Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA). Prior to 31 July 1969, there were six ISSA that did not have codes to record transactions. Code 15 was the code for Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and ARVN transactions. It was used as a "catch all" for separate customers under MACV, such as MACV Combined Studies Division. ISSA requires documentation to USARPAC, Central Finance Management Agency (CFMA), for reimbursement action. In the past, the Air Force was the only customer that had receipt and issue transactions reconciled and billing information sent to CFMA by 1st Logistical Command. To facilitate better accounting control of ISSA, the ACofS, Ammunition established a monthly reconciliation procedure for each customer and requested codes from USARPAC for the six unidentified ISSA. These codes were assigned on 31 July 1969.

5. (U) Ammunition Maintenance

a. There are three TO&E 9-500 Ammunition Renovation Detachments assigned in Vietnam located at Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. Ammunition renovation buildings in each of the locations are incomplete.

- (1) Long Binh: Lacks electricity, air power, and blast proof doors.
- (2) Cam Ranh Bay: Work scheduled to begin in May, but not yet begun.
- (3) Qui Nhon: Lacks electricity, air power, and blast proof doors.

The Renovation Detachments have been almost exclusively utilized for routine care and preservation work, and preparation of unserviceable/suspended ammunition for retrograde. However, with the reduction of retrograde tonnage, emphasis is being shifted to more extensive maintenance of condition code "E" ammunition in high demand for issue. Packing material requisitioned from CONUS and Okinawa to support this program has begun to arrive. Additional emphasis is being placed on return of packing and components by supported units. As the program moves underway, minor renovation of condition code "F" stocks will begin. Completion of renovation buildings is essential for a comprehensive renovation program and emphasis is being exerted to complete the facilities.

6. (C) Ammunition Operations

a. Enemy sappers entered the Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot on 11 July 1969 and placed satchel charges on three pads. One pad

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contained 105mm, HE (C445), another had 90mm HEAT and a third pad contained small arms. The charge placed on the 105mm pad detonated low order and consequently did not initiate the 105mm ammunition; nor was damage sustained on the pad. Fire fighting personnel responded quickly to the other two charges that detonated. Damage was minimal (27,600 rounds of small arms, 30 rounds of 90mm HEAT, Recoilless Rifle and 2 rounds of 90mm HE--Tracer). Depot personnel reacted according to plans and procedures that resulted from lessons learned during attacks in February and March and it is felt that the minimum losses can be attributed to the diligent application of those lessons learned.

b. A conference was held at II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Headquarters on 12 June for the purpose of exchanging ideas concerning ways and means to prevent losses of ammunition and other materiel. A representative from the Assistant Chief of Staff, Ammunition briefed tactical unit representatives on lessons learned from attacks on ammunition installations. Pointers on safety, handling, fire fighting, storing and hazards of ammunition were discussed. The presentation was pitched towards informing field soldiers of possible solutions to problems experienced under more austere conditions than found in a logistical support area.

c. Four Class V installations closed out and two new ASPs were opened during the period:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>OPEN/CLOSED</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Cu Chi ASP	III CTZ	OPENED	1 May 69
Lai Khe ASP	III CTZ	OPENED	1 May 69
Tuy Hoa ASI	II CTZ	CLOSED	15 Jun 69
Boa Loc ASP	II CTZ	CLOSED	1 Jul 69
Ban Me Thuot ASP	II CTZ	CLOSED	16 Jul 69
Tan Son Nhut ASP	III CTZ	CLOSED	28 Jul 69

The above closeouts were due to relocation of major supported units and decreased the number of active Class V installations to 26 as of 31 July 1969.

d. Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Regulation 755-26, captured Enemy Equipment and Other Foreign Materiel, was published on 1 July 1969. This regulation specifies responsibilities and procedures for the handling and disposition of captured enemy ammunition by ammunition installations.

e. The Department of the Army Training Program requirements for captured enemy ammunition have been cancelled as of 17 July 1969.

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Requirements from the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) are continuing for virtually every type of enemy ammunition. Many uncovered caches are reported practically daily; however, all that is reported does not reach 1st Logistical Command Collection Points. Continued emphasis is being placed on expediting fills of serviceable enemy ammunition requirements. Approval has been granted to allow Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) units to turn in items recovered to 1st Logistical Command Collection Points. In the past there was no logistical evacuation chain for Navy units and any ammunition recovered by these units was either destroyed or turned over to government units. With the inception of this new source of captured enemy ammunition, it is expected that more requirements may be filled.

f. As reported in the last Operational Report--Lessons Learned, there was some indication that nose plugs of 105mm, HE, projectiles when exposed to intense heat were melting and exuding explosive filler. The Munitions Command (MUCOM), Liaison Officer, USARV was apprised on this possibility and requested to coordinate with appropriate agencies in CONUS to determine differences in melting points of various type nose plugs to verify in-country investigations. Information received from Commanding General, United States Army Munitions Command, revealed that no tests have been conducted with 105mm HE rounds in the past; however, Picatinny Arsenal will conduct an investigation to assess relative merits of aluminum versus steel nose plugs exposed to fire.

g. The Han Jin Contract for Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot was terminated on 31 July with the arrival of six 5-ton rough terrain forklifts in country. The termination of the contract and use of the new equipment will result in a savings to the government of approximately \$710.00 per day. New equipment training is currently in process, supervised by a Mobility and Equipment Command (MECOM) representative.

h. Seventeen ammunition installations were inspected by the 1st Logistical Command Technical Inspection team. In addition the ACofS, Ammunition performed staff liaison visits to 27 locations. Indicators are that the new storage policies disseminated are being followed and significant improvements in storage and police have been evident.

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ANNEX M (C) ACoFS, SERVICES

1. (U) The Direct Support Division is now organized under a TDA authorizing one lieutenant colonel, two majors, one E-8, one E-7 and one E-4. To date only two majors and one E-8 have been assigned. This division has concentrated the majority of its effort in the area of Self Service Supplies. The major problem was the lack of expendables available in the theater. An intensive review was made of the requisitioning procedures from the Self Service Supply Centers (SSSC) to Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV) and from ICCV to CONUS. In October 1968, project STOP/SEE was initiated to preclude excessive general supplies from coming into country. In May of this year, this division advised ICCV that 177 lines or 44% of the SSSC lines were on STOP/SEE and in need of review. In July of this year, ICCV ordered all lines on 02 and 05 priorities to again achieve a suitable supply posture. To further assist in the achievement of 90% customer-fill SSSC's, a list of suitable substitutes has been incorporated in the Interchangeability and Substitutability File (I&S file) provided depots by ICCV. The I&S file provides data for the computer to review when a line requisitioned is at zero balance, thus making more than one line available to the customer to satisfy his requirement. The conclusion is that, while project STOP/SEE did, in fact, achieve its designed purpose, it needs constant review.

2. (U) On 14 July 1969, ACoFS, Services eliminated the Installation Management Division. This division had the mission of monitoring functions and formulating plans and policies for installation coordination, installation management, and internal operations of 1st Logistical Command organizations and facilities. It was eliminated because the function of monitoring installation management and internal operations of 1st Logistical Command units was being duplicated by the Inspector General, Instruct and Assist Teams (I and A) of ACoFS, Supply, and I&A and CMMI teams of ACoFS, Maintenance. Monitoring the functions involved in installation coordination and facilities was determined suitable for addition to the mission of the Engineering Services Division, General Services Division and Direct Support Supply Division.

3. (U) During the quarter, the Engineering Services Division of ACoFS, Services assumed several of the functions of the Installations Management Division upon its deactivation. These added functions were the allocation and control of house/trailer assets within the command, staff supervision of fire protection and prevention, and the monitoring of facilities engineering (formerly R&U) support provided to 1st Logistical Command units. To carry out these functions, the position of Installation Engineer was added to the Engineering Services Division.

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4. (U) Continuing losses of fuel from pipelines resulting from enemy action and theft, caused the command to request burial of several lines. The pipeline from Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hoa was buried from the edge of Tuy Hoa for a distance of 21 miles south to stop the thefts and resulting fire hazards from spilled fuel in the area. As the result of a study initiated during the previous quarter, the section of pipeline between tank farms 1 and 2 at Qui Nhon were scheduled for burial for the same reason, while sections in the Cha Rang Valley and west of An Khe were buried to protect them from enemy action.

5. (U) A number of problems concerning port facilities continued to occur. Twice during the period, the end of the submarine POL line at Vung Ro Bay was dropped into the water, and divers from the 497th Engineer Company (Port Construction) had to be called to retrieve it since no divers were available in the Qui Nhon area. A tanker destroyed the protective dolphins at the Qui Nhon POL jetty and slightly damaged the jetty itself. Operational support was requested to replace the dolphins since further damage to the jetty by another ship could have resulted in losing the only POL unloading facility in the Qui Nhon area, thus seriously imperiling the delivery of class III products. The seawall at the Vinnell-operated marine maintenance facility at Cam Ranh Bay failed, requiring emergency repairs to prevent further failure and the addition of the failed section to the scope of the project to extend the wall. Another failure occurred between piers 1 and 2 which also required emergency repairs. A project to repair this and the other failed seawalls in the pier area of Cam Ranh Bay was submitted to USARV for approval.

6. (U) A number of projects in Cam Ranh Bay required horizontal effort not available through the contractor working there. These projects included upgrading roads and berms in ammunition area Yankee, construction of a road between Yankee and Charlie ammunition areas, enlargement of the PDO yard, and construction of a number of hardstand areas, including the MILVAN facility. The 595th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) was attached to the 35th Engineer Group at Cam Ranh Bay until 1 November 1969 to accomplish part of these projects. Efforts to obtain more contractor effort on waterfront projects at Cam Ranh Bay continued, and USARV was requested to direct movement of the 497th Engineer Company (Port Construction) to the area to reduce the existing backlog of projects.

7. (C) Protective fences around POL tanks were built at Qui Nhon, An Khe, and Pleiku. However, it was decided that the protection which they offered was minimal and a study of the problem was ordered. It has not been completed by USAECAV.

8. (C) The upgrading of the Cat Lai deep draft and barge anchorages was completed, giving the port a greater capacity and decreasing the time for ammunition ships to await unloading. Construction was com-

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pleted three months earlier than scheduled, at a savings of over a million dollars. After the facility was completed, it was discovered that one of the anchorages was not properly placed in relation to the current of the river, and ships anchored there had a tendency to break mooring lines during tidal changes. It now appears that it will be necessary to move one buoy to another position to gain full use of the anchorage.

9. (U) Completion of the Duffel Bag facility at Cam Ranh Bay was delayed due to long lead time items which had not arrived. The new completion date was scheduled for 12 July 1969 and occupancy occurred on that date.

10. (U) The redeployment of the 25,000-man Keystone Eagle packet resulted in the curtailment of operations at Vung Tau. This allowed cancellation of projects supporting classes II, IV and V activities, resulting in a savings of \$1,530,000 by cancellation of funded projects, and \$688,900 by cancellation of proposed projects. Projects connected with operation of the airfield and POL facility were continued.

11. (U) Due to the high cost of temporary construction, a study was instituted to determine if a savings could be made by using concrete blocks for building walls. USAECAV found that more than \$2 per square foot of wall could be saved by using concrete-filled blocks in the place of wood walls and revetments of sandbags. A study has been requested to test the effectiveness of this type of construction for revetments.

12. (U) In order to reduce the number of sandbags being used in Vietnam, more effective controls were ordered. Units were directed to use sandbags for only combat essential field fortifications. For permanent type bunkers and fortifications, alternate materials such as earth-filled asphalt or salvage POL drums should be used when feasible. Use of sandbags for other nonessential purposes was forbidden.

13. (U) During the past quarter, the Property Disposal Program has continued toward its goal of reducing the tonnage of the on-hand foreign excess personal property in Vietnam. During the reporting period, the Foreign Excess Sales Office conducted 13 sales of usable property with an acquisition cost of \$8.8 million. Also, 3.7 thousand short tons of scrap and waste were sold in five other sales. Total proceeds to the US Government during the quarter amounted to \$.8 million. The command-wide inventory dropped for the third consecutive quarter from 59.7 thousand short tons at the end of April to 46.4 thousand short tons currently on hand.

14. (U) Major factors contributing to the current backlog accumulating at the property disposal yards are the failure of a major contractor at Qui Nhon to remove purchased property and the interference of GVN

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customs officials with removal of property by contractors. In addition, the port of Da Nang was blocked to shipping during part of the past quarter. The major contractor at Qui Nhon sold his tonnage to the Government of Singapore and removals will begin on 1 August 1969. Smaller vessels were temporarily leased by the contractor at Da Nang to circumvent the commercial pier blockage. Interference with contractor removal of property by GVN customs officials was resolved at Da Nang, a major trouble area; however, solution to this lingering problem throughout RVN is being sought through the assistance of American Embassy personnel.

15. (U) About 75% of the total on-hand tonnage is scrap. The command-wide total of useable property amounts of \$26.0 million. Increased emphasis on reduction of inactive useable property on hand continues. Inactive inventory includes inventory not already earmarked as sold, pending removal, reported for sale, reported for re-utilization screening, or frozen for authorized recipient, such as MAP or USAID. The goal in this area is to have no more than 20% of the ending useable inventory in an inactive status.

16. (U) The percentage of inactive inventory as of the end of July is 43 per cent. Continuing emphasis is placed on the Military Assistance Program Excesses (MAPEX) to reduce the on-hand tonnages. Since the beginning of May, 3.4 thousand short tons of foreign excess personal property have been released under MAPEX as compared to 4.4 thousand short tons released during the previous quarter. In an attempt to alleviate the problems involved with OICC excesses and to make full use of the MAPEX program, these excesses are being offered to the MAPEX participants after PACOM screening. In an attempt to help solve the lack of property disposal trained personnel, a Property Disposal Assistance Team, consisting of one officer and six enlisted men, was trained in-country and sent to the field on 15 June to provide OJT to property disposal personnel throughout Vietnam. As of 31 July, visits have been made to the Vung Tau and Cam Ranh Bay disposal yards. On 4 August the team began working with the personnel at Ho Nai PDO.

17. (U) Ninety-four (94) percent of the specialized scrap handling equipment on order has been received by the disposal facilities, while 20% of it has been installed and is operational. Work orders have been submitted and installation of the remaining equipment is scheduled to be completed within the next two months. The list of specialized equipment includes: truck scales, alligator shears, magnetic crane, cable strippers, textile and paper baler.

18. (U) A program to sell garbage and scrap lumber in Vietnam was initiated during the past quarter. The contracts awarded in this program have totaled \$136,530. Prior to this time garbage and scrap lumber were either given away or the US Government paid for the services of a garbage contractor.

1. (U) Army Education Program

a. The Command Education Program of General Education Development (GED) faced many problems and challenges when it was first conceived and authorized within the Command. For the first time in the history of the United States Army, a complete GED program was to be attempted within a combat environment. The beginning was slow and the program suffered because of low priorities for construction of education centers and educational equipment. Recruitment of qualified DAC Education Services Officers proved difficult because of the long recruitment lead-time needed and the reluctance on the part of civilians to leave their families, communities, and positions of employment to enter a combat environment. However, with command support the rudiments of the program soon gave way to a firm, overall program designed to educate. During the next two years, the GED Program grew command-wide with the establishment of ten Army Education Centers and recruitment of thirteen DAC Education Services Officers. The facilities were greatly enlarged during the third quarter of FY-69 with the erection of two to five portable classrooms at each Education Center, purchased through non-appropriated funds. Classroom furniture, language laboratory equipment, and educational supplies were purchased in like manner and distributed to each location. Despite a reduction in the number of Education Centers and DAC Education Services Officers, the scope of the program has more than doubled during the past fiscal year.

b. The educational goals of the GED Program are designed to give every man in the Army an opportunity to progress from his present educational level and elevate him, at his own speed and selection, from where he is to where he would like to be. This includes completion of grade school, improvement of reading ability, acquisition of skills for use in his MOS, completion of high school, administration of college entrance tests, opportunity to do college residence work, completion of college degrees, and testing for entrance into graduate studies.

c. The GED Program has proved to be a good and worthwhile morale-building activity. It has made a real and long-lasting contribution to the improvement of the educational level of Army personnel and has done much to assist thousands of men with becoming better qualified for employment upon return to civilian life. It has been shown that education is necessary, even in this combat environment, for it:

(1) Enables men to perform their military assignments more effectively.

(2) Prepares them for advancement and retention.

(3) Gives them the opportunity and stimulates them to continue their education.

(4) Increases their value to the society in which they will live upon discharge.

d. Each Education Services Officer establishes goals for his Army Education Center in consonance with the objectives set by higher headquarters and the provisions of AR 621-5. Instruction and services call for increased emphasis on certain areas peculiar to the 1st Logistical Command:

(1) Participation by enlisted personnel without high school diplomas or with GT scores below 90.

(2) MOS-related training for military personnel by means of group study classes.

(3) Remedial courses for personnel who have failed part of the high school GED battery of tests.

(4) Effective counseling for all incoming personnel concerning their plans for utilizing the Education Center facilities.

a. Although the above are the critical areas that call for immediate action by all Army Education Centers, the GED Program covers a much broader spectrum. Dependent upon availability of classroom space and equipment, each Center offers a varied program to meet other educational needs such as:

(1) A foreign language program. A capability in this regard is a distinct advantage for military personnel assigned to Vietnam. Education Centers, equipped with language-instruction equipment, are conducting a vigorous language program, the objective of which is to give each man oral proficiency in the language. A total of 453 officers and enlisted men were instructed in language courses during this reporting period.

(2) High school academic subjects generally available in civilian schools. These are offered during off-duty hours. The courses are designed to prepare personnel for completion of their high school requirements and for remedial work prior to taking high school equivalency tests. Some of the courses now being offered are English, social studies, general mathematics, general science, reading improvement, business law, algebra, and government. A total of 428 students participated in this program with 420 completions.

(3) Courses in support of MOS-related programs. These are taught at most Army Education Centers and have had a real impact on the increase in skills acquired by military personnel. Courses are being offered in typing, mathematics, computer science, auto mechanics, and fundamentals

of radio. A total of 472 students participated in MOS related courses with 288 completions.

(4) The college-resident course program. This includes classwork designed to enable military personnel to complete two-year college requirements or to work toward or possibly finish requirements for the baccalaureate degree. Courses are offered through the special overseas branch of the University of Maryland and include: business administration, economics, English government and politics, history, foreign language, mathematics, psychology, sociology, and speech. A total of 132 officers and enlisted men enrolled in University of Maryland courses with 95 of them completing the courses successfully.

2. (U) Project Duty.

a. Project Duty was announced on 1 July 1969 in the 1st Logistical Command Commander's Letter 7-1. It is directed toward attainment of overall logistics efficiency and effectiveness.

b. The project focuses the attention of every member of the command on getting the job done to the best of his ability, working as long as is necessary to do the job, and doing so conscientiously. Further, it is a concentrated effort to insure that a maximum workload of the highest attainable quality is achieved by the minimum number of people.

c. Current Projects Overhead, Align, and Smart II, the first step, are invaluable sources for measuring manpower requirements. In Project Overhead, personnel are physically observed on the job in order to ascertain whether a particular individual is doing his assigned job and if he is required full time in order to get the job done. Project Align is directed at achieving a more equitable balance and more efficient distribution of command assets to actual requirements. Project Smart II is directed at measuring and identifying excess overhead labor. The end result of these projects is to insure that only the resources and personnel absolutely necessary to accomplish the mission are assigned to each unit, provided each individual conscientiously performs his assigned task. Excesses are eliminated by transfer to units requiring additional manpower. Excess personnel are those individuals whose assigned duties do not require that they work the minimum 60 hour week, as required by LC Reg 1-2.

d. The second step is the application of leadership principles and instruction to reach the desired level of efficiency and conscientiousness.

e. Instruction directed at the improvement of military personnel within the command is implemented under the Skills I Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie projects. These orientation and training programs are directed at making each member of the command a better logistical fighter.

f. In the leadership field there are several command programs directed at making each soldier more conscientious and a better American. The Know Your Man program is directed toward knowing the capabilities and limitations of subordinates and the subordinates knowing their responsibilities, leaders and that they are cared for. The Pride 1st Program is directed toward making each soldier a more conscientious person who will think before committing a foolish act and one who takes pride in his duty, his unit, and his mission.

g. Weekly commander's calls are held at all levels, with emphasis on the battalion and company level, where the senior officer imparts his experience and leadership techniques to subordinates, who in turn impart their knowledge downward, reaching all levels.

h. All of these programs, functioning concurrently, are Project Duty. Command letters directed at the overall ends of this program are published to give guidance in desired direction or special emphasis within the program. Project Duty Bulletin # 1 Lessons Learned was published and distributed on 6 August 1969. These bulletins will be published as required to assist in preventing a mistake from being repeated in other commands.

i. The first Project Duty poster will be published and distributed to the unit level in the very near future. This initial poster is a quote from the Commanding General's explanation of the purposes and goals of Project Duty as stated in the 24 July 1969 LOCC Notes and includes his signature on the poster. The posters will also be published periodically to serve as a reminder to all members of this command to strive to meet the work standards set forth above.

j. The next quarter will see a careful scrutiny by commanders on all levels in order to carefully evaluate every position and achieve the most efficient distribution of manpower resources where they are required. Additionally, the support material distributed in the coming months will encourage each man to adopt the basic philosophy of Project Duty--that of dedication to his job and pride in his job accomplishments.

1. (U) The civil affairs activities of 1st Logistical Command are designed to provide technical and material support to the Government of South Vietnam in its effort to rebuild the nation. Civil affairs activities are designed to improve the living conditions of the population and to assist the GVN in gaining and maintaining the loyalty of the populace. The 1st Logistical Commands civil affairs activities include both civic action and community relations type programs. These programs are long-term in nature and consequently results can't be measured on a periodic basis to show an exact degree of achievement. Primarily, these programs are designed to encourage Vietnamese people to "help themselves". Special civil affairs programs developed by this command are listed below.

2. (U) The scouting program, developed to support Vietnamese Scouting, is continuing to develop slowly. While a larger number of Vietnamese youths are being reached, there is still a hesitance on the part of the scout leaders to become identified with any governmental agency. The program objectives are: to promote development of leadership, national identity, and social consciousness among the Vietnamese youths; to encourage cooperation and mutual understanding between the Government of Vietnam and the nations youths; and to assist in development and strengthening of the Vietnamese Boy Scout Association while encouraging its participation in construction, social action, and nation building activities. The Vietnamese Boy Scout Association provides an excellent opportunity to assist the Vietnamese in developing a stable future through development of their youths. At present there are 42 Explorer, Boy, Girl, and Cub Scout Troops being assisted by this command. Support of scouting, as well as other youth activities, is an activity in which this command is well suited due to the nature of the commands activities, the permanently located logistical base areas, and the number of military personnel with scouting and youth activity backgrounds.

3. (U) A second program which this command has developed is one of providing support for the Vietnamese Animal Husbandry Program. In the past, when foodstuff was condemned by the veterinary food inspectors, it was taken to a sanitary fill and destroyed. In many instances the condemned food was fit for human consumption, however due to its storage, the taste and/or appearance had deteriorated to a point where it no longer met the standards established by AR 40-656. The program designed to assist the Vietnamese Animal Husbandry Program consists of donating condemned foodstuffs from ports and edible waste from mess halls to the Vietnamese for animal consumption. The Vietnamese Army has established military farms for the purpose of developing protein which can be used to supplement the soldiers diet. The success and growth of this program is attributed to the fact that the logistical base areas have a continuous supply of condemned foodstuffs as well as large quantities of edible garbage from its numerous

mess halls. Due to the stabilization of the command it is in a position to contribute significantly to the development of the Vietnamese Animal Husbandry Program. In addition to the military farms, there are numerous small farm cooperatives and institutions engaged in small scale animal raising in the vicinity of the logistical base areas.

4. (U) The Long Binh Post People-to-People Program, which was implemented in September 1967, continues to progress. While the original program initiated by USARV has been discontinued, this command has continued its civil affairs activities which developed from the original program. The US Army Support Command, Saigon is responsible for 48 hamlets within the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area. These hamlets have a population of about 153,000 people, many of whom are refugees forced into the area due to enemy activities. The program, designed to create a friendly buffer around the Long Binh area, involves weekly hamlet visits and the conduct of an intensive civic action program in the districts adjacent to the Long Binh area.

5. (U) Due to the success of the Long Binh People-to-People Program, this headquarters developed similar programs for the major logistical base areas throughout the country. The logistical base areas develop civic action programs in areas adjacent to support commands, sub-area commands, and contiguous population centers within a minimum radius of 6,000 meters of US installations or troops units. This program was put into effect in May 1968 and has progressed well. It has reduced duplication of effort and waste of resources, two of the major problem areas of the past.

6. (U) Project "Better Relations" was developed to improve the image and relationship between the Vietnamese populace and 1st Logistical Command Personnel. It is characterized by the development of programs which will help improve the sanitation conditions of the cities in which the support commands are located; by developing a safety program that will affect both US and Vietnamese personnel; by initiating a program which will educate US personnel on the culture, customs, and traditions of Vietnam; and through the establishment of a program which will improve the Vietnamese recreational areas, playgrounds, school yards, and parks.

7. (U) Due to the increase of US and third country military and civilian personnel within the country, there arose the need for better community relations programs throughout the command. Community relations plays a paramount role in the accomplishment of US objectives within the Republic of Vietnam. The impact of the increased number of personnel has placed an overriding effect upon the Vietnamese economic, sociological, psychological, and political environment. In order to minimize the adverse effects that such a large force has produced, a comprehensive community relations program has been developed by this command.

8. (U) The command civil affairs statistics for the period are as follows:

a. Total number of man-days (10 hr days) personnel of this command devoted to civic action activities: 8,273.

b. Cost of civic action projects:

(1) Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action projects: 18,141,159 \$VN.

(2) Expenditures from the US/FWMAF Civic Action PSYWAR Fund: 702,131 \$VN

c. Voluntary contributions:

(1) Collections: 1,538,006 \$VN.

(2) Expenditures in support of civic action: 1,843,665 \$VN.

d. Percent of US Military civic action activities conducted jointly with:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Other FWMAF	16.1%	60%	15%	0
RVNAF	15.0%	30%	36.1%	3%
US Civilian Voluntary Agencies	5.0%	10%	8.0%	3%

e. Average percent of self-help contributed by the people:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Self-help Labor	85.0%	58.0%	82.0%	90.0%
Materials furnished	13.0%	21.1%	6.1%	5.0%

f. Major civic action programs:

	<u>MAN-DAYS</u>	<u>VNS</u>
Economic	1,095	6,310,998
Education	899	1,265,361
Social Welfare	4,169	6,820,686
Transportation	863	620,265

Refugee Assistance Support	<u>1,247</u>	<u>2,609,654</u>
TOTAL	8,273	17,626,964 \$VN

g. Number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period:

(1) Schools	112
(2) Hospitals/Dispensaries	68
(3) Orphanages	78
(4) Market Place	3
(5) Playground	2
(6) Church	11
(7) Seminary	3
(8) Bridge Construction	5
(9) Village Officer	3
(10) Boy Scout Troop	3
(11) Roads (Km)	<u>31</u>
TOTALS	319

h. Educational efforts:

(1) Classes:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>NO. OF CLASSES</u>	<u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u>
English	136	1,635
Vietnamese	1	10
First Aid	1	20

(2) Training:

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u>
Nurses Aides	18

04 86

Machine Operator	30
Husbandry	51
Mechanic	19
Health Technician	6
Forklift Operators	3
MHE Operators	47
Basic Typing	68
Advance Typing	7
Basic Stevedoring	34

i. Out of the 175 construction projects completed during the reporting period, 69 of them were joint US/FWMAF projects.

j. Commodities distributed:

(1) Building materials:

(a) Cement (lbs)	899,211
(b) Tin Sheets (ea)	27,580
(c) Lumber (bd ft)	709,302
(d) Paint (gal)	1,728
(e) Fire Wood (lbs)	5,850
(f) Bricks (ea)	51,600
(g) Sand (mtr)	82
(h) Nails (lbs)	625
(i) Ribar (ft)	4,620
(j) Diesel Fuel (gal)	110
(k) Rope (ft)	200
(l) Heavy Metal (lbs)	300

(m)	Electrical Wire (mtrs)	500
(n)	Pipe (ft)	210
(o)	Plywood (shts)	250
(p)	Film (6MM rls)	4
(2)	Kits distributed (Health, school, refugee)	713
(3)	Food (lbs)	174,249
(4)	Clothing (lbs)	25,875
(5)	Agricultural Tools (ea)	1
(6)	Edible Garbage (lbs)	2,158,000

1. (U) Noncommissioned Officers Logistics Program (NCOLP)

Continuing emphasis is being placed on designation of Noncommissioned Officers Logistics Program (NCOLP) positions and to encourage eligible noncommissioned officers to apply for entrance into the NCOLP. All commanders and staff officers have been directed to review key positions within their commands or staff sections to ensure that all noncommissioned officer positions which meet the basic Department of the Army requirements are recommended for designation as NCOLP positions. This command has 108 NCOLP positions approved by the Department of the Army. There are 166 positions presently pending approval for entrance into this program. The Adjutant General has and will continue to requisition personnel for the approved NCOLP positions.

2. (U) Project Overhead

The Project Overhead concept paper was approved for implementation by the Chief of Staff 1st Logistical Command on 10 July 1969. Units within Saigon Support Command are being visited by Project Overhead Teams to obtain the data necessary to implement a control system which will allow headquarters inspecting officers, as well as commanders of 1st Logistical Command units, to evaluate unit overhead posture. The last unit scheduled for visit will be on 12 August 1969, with a final report submitted to the Commanding General by 29 August 1969.

3. (U) Accident Reduction.

a. The Army motor vehicle accident rate for the 4th Quarter, FY 69, increased 7% over the 3d quarter. The primary causes of Army motor vehicle accidents during the 4th quarter were excessive speed, unsafe acts of other drivers, following too close, and mechanical failure. The command's frequency rate of 9.3 accidents per million miles driven is below the expectancy rate of 10 established by Headquarters, USARV.

b. The military disabling injury rate for the 4th quarter, FY 69, is 10.6% higher than the rate for the 3d quarter. The primary injury causes for the 4th quarter were improper operation of Army motor vehicles, mishandling of individual weapons, falls, and sports activities. The command's frequency rate of 43.8 injuries per million mandays exposure is below the expectancy rate of 45.0 established by Headquarters, USARV.

c. The following actions are being taken to meet the 1st Logistical Command's objective of reducing accident losses to an absolute minimum.

(1) Safety bulletins (lessons learned) covering the more serious accidents are being published. The bulletins describe the accident causative factors and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

(2) Safety newsletters are to be published to provide commanders with information pertinent to recent developments in accident prevention and ideas to minimize accidents.

(3) Accident prevention is a major topic of discussion at command and staff conferences.

(4) The chain of command is being used to fix responsibility for all accidents.

(5) Serious incident reports and reports of corrective action are being personally reviewed by the Commanding General.

(6) Command safety regulations are being revised to provide current and more comprehensive guidance in safety program administration.

(7) Safety management reviews are to be published monthly to assist commanders in evaluating safety performance.

(8) Accident reports are reviewed through the chain of command for accuracy, completeness and the propriety of corrective action.


(9) Special safety instructional and promotional materials are being developed for use in training and indoctrinating personnel in safe practices and procedures. The materials are being aimed at specific accident problem areas such as the improper operation of motor vehicles and mishandling of weapons.

(10) Letters and messages from the Commanding General covering specific safety program deficiencies are frequently dispatched to subordinate commanders directing corrective action. Reports of corrective action are reviewed by the Commanding General.

AN EX in (U) ACofS, Procurement

1. (U) Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&Cs) received.

PR&Cs for both FY 69 and FY 70 were received during the current reporting period. On 1 May 1969, PR&Cs for FY 69 numbered 1,580 and were valued at \$299.1 million. By 30 June 1969, the total number of PR&Cs received for FY 69 had increased to 1,901, valued at \$303.0 million. On 1 May 1969, PR&Cs for FY 70 numbered 64, with a value of \$84.9 million. On 31 July 1969, FY 70 PR&Cs totaling 413 had been received, with a combined dollar value of \$259.8 million. Analysis revealed that 321 FY 69 PR&Cs valued at \$3.9 million were received during this period, while FY 70 PR&Cs increased by 349, with a combined dollar value of \$14.9 million. The following chart shows PR&C received activity for FY 67-FY70 (Chart #1).



2. (U) Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C) Distribution.

a. The 321 FY 69 PR&Cs valued at \$3.9 million received during this reporting period were distributed by this Agency as follows:

(1) 69 PR&Cs valued at \$891,000 were forwarded to other WESTPAC Agencies towards the purchase of tug, barge and bus services.

(2) 69 PR&Cs valued at \$215,000 were forwarded to CONUS, to be used in the purchase of small dollar value supply items.

(3) 183 PR&Cs valued at \$2.8 million were retained by this Agency and applied to satisfy requirements concerning repairs and utilities, stevedoring, trucking and maintenance services.

b. The 413 FY 70 PR&Cs valued at \$259.8 million received to date are distributed as follows:


(1) 73 PR&Cs valued at \$5.6 million were forwarded to other WESTPAC Agencies.

(2) 118 PR&Cs valued at \$0.2 million were forwarded to CONUS.

(3) 222 PR&Cs valued at \$254.0 million were retained by this Agency.


(4) The following chart shows the PR&C distribution for FY 69-FY 70 (Chart #2).

PURCHASE REQUEST & COMMITMENT DISTRIBUTION



3. (U) Distribution of requirements. The value of FY 70 requirements received is \$259.8 million and is distributed as follows:

- a. Repairs and Utilities required \$125.7 million.
- b. Transportation - \$64.3 million required.
- c. Supplies - Needed \$16.3 million.
- d. Subsistence - Requirements were \$26.6 million.
- e. Maintenance - Required \$12.5 million.
- f. Services - Required \$9.8 million.
- g. POL - Required \$1.9 million.
- h. Miscellaneous - \$2.7 million. The distribution of requirements for FY 70 is graphically represented in the following chart (Chart #3).





4. (U) Contracts under Administration.

a. Total contracts presently under administration number 258, with a value of \$764.6 million.

b. Of the 258 contracts presently under administration, 149 valued at \$312.4 million are classified as active, with the remaining 129 valued at \$452.2 million considered inactive. Inactive contracts are those where the contractor has completed performance but the contract has not been closed out because of some pending administrative action such as payment of final invoices or negotiation of final overhead or settlement of disputes.


c. Those active contracts presently under administration consist of five types: firm fixed price, fixed price, fixed price indefinite quantity, cost plus fixed fee, cost plus incentive fee, and cost plus award fee. Net active firm fixed price contracts under administration total 50 this reporting period, valued at \$8.0 million, while net active firm fixed price indefinite quantity contracts total 68, valued at \$106.4 million. The number of active cost plus fixed fee contracts totals 9, with a value of \$90.3 million. One CPIF contract valued at \$7.0 million has been executed for operation and maintenance of Electric Power Generating Facilities. One CPAF contract valued at \$100.7 million has been executed for repair and Utilities Service in RVN. Contract administration activity is shown graphically in the following charts (Charts #4 and #5).





5. (U) Decommitments.

Decommitments during the reporting period totaled \$30.4 million, bringing FY 69 totals to \$48.7 million, and FY 70 total to \$17.4 million. FY 70 decommitments are presented graphically on the following chart (Chart #6).



Annex S (U) Adjutant General

1. (U) A checklist designed to standardize the inspection of postal facilities and to be utilized as a training device for operating personnel was developed (Inclosure 1). Each postal facility inspected is graded on each item listed. Deficiencies in excess of 15% of the total number of items on the checklist results in the award of an unsatisfactory rating. Once the desired level of excellence is obtained in a given area that item is dropped from the list and a new item requiring additional emphasis is added to the list. This form has proved to be an effective tool in standardization of postal inspection and a valid basis for applying satisfactory or unsatisfactory ratings to the facilities inspected.
2. (U) Seventeen postal units received technical inspections. A roster of units inspected, dates of inspection, and rating awarded is attached at Inclosure 2.
3. (U) Department of the Army goals for reenlistment were exceeded each month during the quarter as indicated in Inclosure 3.
4. (U) The strength of the command remained relatively stable. Although the command strength dropped to 94.5% of authorized in June, by the end of July the command was at 97.7% of authorized strength (Inclosures 4&5). However, critical shortages did exist in various MOS areas as indicated in Inclosure 6.
5. (U) A total of 2950 enlisted promotion allocations for all grades were received and utilized by the command. Statistical data pertaining to promotion is attached at Inclosure 7.
6. (U) The command suffered 13 hostile and 31 nonhostile deaths. Additionally, 159 personnel were injured because of hostile action and 130 nonhostile injuries occurred (Inclosure 8).
7. (U) A total of 4301 awards were approved by the command (Inclosure 9).
8. (U) The command received a total of 408 in-country R&R allocations and utilized a total of 372. Out-of-Country R&R allocations totaled 9078 and 7951, were utilized (Inclosure 10).

ANNEX T (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. (U) Inspector General assistance was extended to 620 members of the command. Approximately 61% of the complaints and request for assistance received concerned assignment, reassignment and transfer; unit administration; promotions, and working conditions. Of the 94 complaints processed, 50 were justified. There were 94 Annual General Inspections conducted. Only one unit received a rating of unsatisfactory. Maintenance, training and security continue to be major areas of interest.

2. (U) Annual General Inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

IG, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
124th Transportation Command, Headquarters Company	9-11 Apr 69
159th Transportation Battalion, Headquarters Detachment	16-17 Apr 69
64th Quartermaster Battalion, Hq and Hq Det. (Petrol Ops)	22 Apr 69
512 Quartermaster Company (Petroleum Operating)	23 Apr 69
538th Transportation Company (Med Trk) (Petroleum)	24 Apr 69
US Army Depot, Long Binh	6-10 May 69
US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay	20-24 May 69
US Army Depot, Qui Nhon	3-7 Jun 69
US Army Inventory Control Center-Vietnam & Hq and Hq Co	18-20 Jun 69
38th Base Post Office	24 Jun 69
524th Military Intelligence Detachment	26 Jun 69
553rd Heavy Equipment Maintenance Co	23 Jul 69
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS)	24 Jul 69
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 53rd General Support Group	25 Jul 69

IG, USASUPCOM, DA NANG

173rd Quartermaster Company	7 Apr 69
630th Transportation Company	8 Apr 69
Hq and Main Support Company	21 Apr 69
Hq, 515th GS Battalion	21 Apr 69
HHC, 259th Quartermaster Battalion	22 Apr 69
Hq, 259th Quartermaster Battalion	22 Apr 69
57th Transportation Company	5 May 69
64th Finance Section (Disb)	12 May 69
413th Finance Section	14 May 69
237th GS Company (Maint) (DS)	19 May 69
Quarterly Complaint Session	19 May 69
842nd QM Company (PET)	20 May 69
295th Ord Company (Ammo) (DS-GS)	26 May 69
Quarterly Complaint Session	26 May 69
63rd Trans Company	27 May 69
124th AG Personnel Services Company	2 Jun 69
1002d CS Company (S&S)	9 Jun 69
Quarterly Complaint Session	9 Jun 69
1018th CS Company (S&S)	16 Jun 69
Det 126th S&S	23 Jun 69
363d Transportation Company	7 Jul 69
403d Transportation Company	14 Jul 69
USA Mortuary, Da Nang	28 Jul 69

IG, USASUPCOM, CAM RANH BAY

US Army Depot	14-18 Apr 69
128th Signal Company	6 May 69
377th Light Maintenance Company	7 May 69
557th Light Maintenance Company	8 May 69
Consolidated Technical Supply, 69th Maintenance Battalion	9 May 69
Hq, USAMMAV	16 May 69
Hq & Service Detachment, USAMMAV	16 May 69
50th Army Postal Unit	4 Jun 69
Cam Ranh Special Troops	16-17 Jun 69
HHD, Cam Ranh Special Troops	16-17 Jun 69
39th Base Post Office	18 Jun 69
92d Finance Section	19 Jun 69
518th Personnel Service Company	20 Jun 69
61st Transportation Company	7 Jul 69

IG, USASUPCOM, SAIGON

54th Ordnance Company (Ammo)	1-2 Apr 69
47th Transportation Company (Med Trk)	4-5 Apr 69
Headquarters, 71st Transportation Battalion (TS)	7 Apr 69
Headquarters Detachment, 71st Transportation Battalion	7 Apr 69
154th Transportation Company (TS)	8-9 Apr 69
368th Transportation Company (TS)	9-10 Apr 69
402d Transportation Company (TT)	11-10 Apr 69
551st Transportation Company (TS)	14-15 Apr 69

372 Transportation Company (TT)	15-16 Apr 69
567th Transportation Company (TS)	17-18 Apr 69
624th Supply and Service Company	21-22 Apr 69
534th Transportation Company (Med Trk)	24-25 Apr 69
483d Field Service Company (GS)	28-29 Apr 69
140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	1-2 May 69
543d Transportation Company	6-7 May 69
Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion	12-13 May 69
Headquarters Detachment, 6th Trans Bn	12-13 May 69
71st Ordnance Company	15-16 May 69
Headquarters, Troop Command, USADLB	19 May 69
Company A (Prov), Troop Command, USADLB	20 May 69
Company B (Prov), Troop Command, USADLB	21 May 69
Bearcat Logistical Support Activity	23-24 May 69
1011th Supply and Service Company	23-24 May 69
91st Composite Service Battalion (Headquarters)	26 May 69
Headquarters Detachment, 91st CS Battalion	26 May 69
574th Supply and Service Company	27-28 May 69
238th Maintenance Company	30-31 May 69
60th Ordnance Company (Ammo)	3-4 Jun 69
826th Ordnance Company (Ammo)	5-6 Jun 69
Hq, 48th Transportation Group	9-10 Jun 69
632d Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company	13-14 Jun 69
556th Transportation Company	23-24 Jun 69
228th Supply and Service Battalion (Reinspection)	26 Jun 69

Hq, 277th Supply and Service Battalion	27 Jun 69
Headquarters Company, 277th S&S Bn	27 Jun 69
261st Transportation	1-2 Jul 69
551st Light Equipment Maintenance Company	7-8 Jul 69
549th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	10-11 Jul 69
572d Transportation Company	14-15 Jul 69
379th Transportation Company	17-18 Jul 69
Security Guard Company, Troop Command	21-22 Jul 69
3d Maintenance Company	28-29 Jul 69
548th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	31 Jul 69

IG, USASUPCOM, QUI NHON

Company A, Troop Command	2 Apr 69
Company B, Troop Command	3 Apr 69
264th Transportation Company	4 Apr 69
Troop Command Headquarters	8 Apr 69
523d Transportation Company	16 Apr 69
512d Transportation Company	17 Apr 69
448th Army Postal Unit	18 Apr 69
Company C, Troop Command	1 May 69
Company D, Troop Command	2 May 69
628th Maintenance Company	14 May 69
563d Transportation Company	15 May 69
149th Maintenance Company	16 May 69
387th Transportation Company	28 May 69
Company E, Troop Command	29 May 69
Security Guard Company, Troop Command	30 May 69

HMC, 88th S&S Battalion	11 Jun 69
566th Army Postal Unit	12 Jun 69
541st Transportation Company	13 Jun 69
845th Transportation Company	17 Jun 69
1st Army Postal Unit	26 Jun 69
HHD, 54th Transportation Battalion	27 Jun 69
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 124 Transportation Battalion	10 Jul 69
573rd Supply and Service Company	11 Jul 69
Provisional Guard Company	15 Jul 69
88th Transportation Company	17 Jul 69
258th Transportation Company	25 Jul 69

3. (U) Complaints and Request for Assistance. The following is a summary of complaints and request for assistance received by Inspector General, 1st Logistical Command, during the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969, computed on the basis of the rate per 1,000 troops per month.

UNIT	COMPLAINTS		REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE
	JUSTIFIABLE	UNJUSTIFIABLE	
Hq, 1st Logistical Command	0.0	0.5	3.0
USASC, Saigon	0.3	0.3	3.2
USASC, Qui Nhon	0.2	0.2	4.0
USASC, Da Nang	0.3	0.5	1.1
USASC, Cam Ranh Bay	0.1	0.1	4.2
Command Wide	0.2	0.2	3.5

ANNEX U (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. (U) There were 128 personal property claims of U.S. military and civilian personnel, totaling \$22,193.46, processed and paid through the Judge Advocate offices of this command during the past quarter. This was a decrease of 16 claims and \$6,207.94 from the preceding quarter. In addition, judge advocates throughout the command handled 4,533 legal assistance cases, including the preparation of correspondence and legal instruments.

2. (U) Court-martial rates (per 1000) were as follows for the period 1 May to 31 July: Summary courts-martial rate increased from 1.14 to 1.49; special courts-martial rate increased from 3.41 to 3.71; and general courts-martial rate increased from .06 to .16. Article 15 rate increased from 25.84 to 26.78. The number of 1st Logistical Command (1st Log Comd) personnel in confinement decreased from the last quarter over the previous quarter, from 44 in confinement on 30 April 1969 to 26 in confinement on 30 July 1969.

3. (U) Nonjudicial punishment: The following figures represent the number of Article 15 actions imposed by 1st Logistical Command commanders during the period 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969.

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	11	15	13	39
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	606	530	462	1598
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	248	245	241	734
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	343	336	445	1124
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>147</u>	<u>206</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>496</u>
Totals	1355	1332	1304	3991

4. (U) Supervisory review of inferior courts-martial: There was a decrease in the number of inferior courts-martial cases reviewed by this office for legal sufficiency during the quarter. This was due to the fact that the Saigon and Qui Nhon Support Commands assumed general courts-martial jurisdiction on 1 June 1969 and, therefore assumed the responsibility for reviewing the inferior courts-martial from their own jurisdiction and attached units. The quarterly figures for this headquarters are:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Special Courts-Martial	178	131	29	338
Summary Courts-Martial	<u>46</u> 224	<u>33</u> 164	<u>11</u> 40	<u>90</u> 428

5. (U) Courts-Martial: The following is a breakdown for the past quarter of cases tried by courts-martial based upon the organizations to which the accused were assigned:

a. <u>General Courts-Martial</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	7	3	5	15
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	0	3	0	3
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	1	0	2	3
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>
Totals	10	6	8	24
b. <u>Special Courts-Martial</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	2	0	0	2
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	61	67	46	174
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	35	21	14	70
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	106	85	51	242
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>12</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>66</u>
Totals	216	196	142	554
c. <u>Summary Courts-Martial</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ, 1ST LOG COMD	2	1	1	4
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	46	46	36	128
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	7	8	5	20

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
USASUPCOM - QUI NAM	6	20	36	62
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>
Totals	62	80	80	222

6. (U) Courts-Martial rates per 1000 military personnel are furnished for the fiscal year as indicated:

	<u>1st Log Comd</u> (4th qtr, FY 69)	<u>USARV</u> (4th qtr, FY 69)	<u>Army Wide</u> (3d qtr, FY 69)
General Courts-Martial	.15	.10	.12
Special Courts-Martial	4.11	2.07	3.17
Summary Courts-Martial	1.30	.60	.82

7. (U) The following figures represent claims paid to members of this command for property lost, destroyed, or damaged incident to service under the provisions of AR 27-21 and AR 27-29:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Number of Claims Paid	36	59	33	128
Amounts Claimed	\$7,174.59	\$12,047.48	\$6,458.51	\$25,680.58
Amount Paid	\$6,606.79	\$10,374.54	\$5,212.13	\$22,193.46

8. (U) Legal Assistance: The following is a breakdown of legal assistance problems handled by judge advocates within this command during the period 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969.

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Adoption and Change of Name	114	4	118
Citizenship, Immigration & Passport	167	23	190
Civil Rights	126	2	128
Domestic Relations and Paternity	862	126	988
Non-Support	56	4	60

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Personal Finances & Debts	371	113	484
Personal Property, Auto, Etc.	153	37	190
Powers of Attorney	656	701	1,357
Real Property, Sales, Lease, Etc.	64	12	76
Taxation	414	101	515
Torts	10	4	14
Wills and Estates	133	143	276
Miscellaneous	<u>1,407</u>	<u>576</u>	<u>1,983</u>
	4,533	1,846	6,379

ANNEX V (U) PROVOST MARSHAL

- 1.(U) On 4 May 1969, (C) LC Cir 190-13, Critical and Key Installations (U) was published. It lists the facilities/installations which this headquarters has designated as "critical and key."
- 2.(U) On 5 May 1969, Physical Security Bulletin 69-3, "The Conical Hat Caper", was published to expose one method by which pilfered items may be removed from our installations.
- 3.(U) On 13 May 1969, LC Reg 335-2, Serious Incident Reports, was revised.
- 4.(U) 16 May 1969, LC Reg 190-1, The Employment of Military Police in Direct Support of the 1st Logistical Command, was revised.
- 5.(U) On 1 June 1969, Physical Security Bulletin 69-4, "The Trash Truck Theft Threat", was published to illustrate techniques of smuggling pilfered items on vehicles exiting our installations.
- 6.(U) On 7 June 1969, LC Reg 190-11, Carrying, Possession, Registration, Control and Use of Government and Privately-Owned Weapons, was revised.
- 7.(U) On 9 June 1969, LC Reg 190-20, Identification and Control of Personnel, was published to establish procedures governing access to facilities/installations and operational activities of this command.
- 8.(U) On 9 June 1969, LC Reg 190-25, Security of Government Vehicles, was published to prescribe policies, procedures and responsibilities for safeguarding government vehicles.
- 9.(U) On 9 June 1969, LC Reg 190-30, Physical Security, was published to establish an effective physical security program within 1st Logistical Command.
- 10.(U) On 9 June 1969, (C) LC Reg 190-36, Security Against Underwater Swimmer Attack (U), was published to provide port commanders and port security forces specific guidance as to defense against swimmer sappers at 1st Logistical Command ports and waterfront facilities.

ANNEX V (U) PROVOST MARSHAL

11.(U) On 1 July 1969, Physical Security Bulletin 69-5, The Wicked Wickerbasket, was published to illustrate that searches of personnel entering areas occupied by US troops may sometimes be worth the effort.

12.(U) On 21 July 1969, Physical Security Bulletin 69-6, The Case of the Careless Cashier, was published to demonstrate how disregard of common sense type physical security measures can result in human tragedy.

13.(U) Due to the success of the initial voluntary turn-in of unauthorized weapons on 7 April 1969 which produced 995 weapons, the Commanding General directed that a second voluntary turn-in program be conducted 1-3 June 1969. One hundred and eighteen (118) weapons were voluntarily turned in during this second effort. On 11 July 1969, a letter was dispatched from this headquarters requiring subordinate commanders to conduct programs of voluntary turn-ins of unauthorized weapons in the hands of their personnel. Reports as to the results of monthly shake-down inspections and voluntary weapons turn-in programs will be forwarded to this headquarters quarterly. LC Reg 190-11, was revised and encouraged commanders to establish unit voluntary turn-in programs on a local basis.

ANNEX W (U) STAFF CHAPLAIN

1. (U) Religious Services:

a. Attendance at religious services throughout 1st Logistical Command totaled 191,187. This is an increase of 26% over the previous reporting period. The percentage of the command attending services was 31.2%, which exceeded the command goal of 30% to be met by the end of June, with 40% to be met by the end of September.

b. The overall increase in attendance this quarter continues to reflect the success of Project "Chit Chat" and Project "Street Corner." Chaplains are continuing to find new ways to contact their troops during duty hours and commanders are cooperating to release their men when work schedules permit.

c. Each chaplain in this command conducted an average of 9.9 services per week and at least 60% of his time was spent outside his office in areas where troops were working. Project "Prayer" continues to bear good results and each chaplain realizes the importance of the "Know Your Man" Project as a factor in boosting church attendance.

2. (U) Personnel: As of 31 .., this command had 74 authorized TOE/TD spaces for chaplains. Seventy-one (71) chaplains were present for duty, of which one was Jewish, fourteen (14) were Catholic and fifty-six (56) were Protestant. Eighty-one (81) chaplain assistants were present for duty.

3. (U) Training of Chaplains: In addition to the normal monthly chaplain training conference held in the Support Commands there was the quarterly Support Command Staff Chaplains conference. And on 28 May, at the International Servicemen's Center in Saigon, a Protestant chaplains' retreat was held to acquaint the chaplains with the work of Protestant missionary activity in Vietnam. The guest speaker was the Rev. Garth Hunt, a missionary of the Christian and Missionary Church in Vietnam for the last 12 years. This was a profitable venture and provided the chaplains with valuable information that can be used throughout their tours in Vietnam. There was also a monthly "Prayer Breakfast" held for the chaplains of the Saigon Support Command.

4. (U) Civic Action: Chapel offerings to community relations projects amounted to 2,938,669 RVN\$. The following breakdown is submitted:

	<u>Churches</u>	<u>Schools & Orphanages</u>	<u>Misc</u>	<u>Total</u>
May	494,799	423,801	210,914	1,129,514
June	261,714	351,409	455,264	1,068,387
July	<u>263,425</u>	<u>286,759</u>	<u>190,584</u>	<u>740,768</u>
Total	1,019,938	1,061,969	856,762	2,938,669

ANNEX X (U) INFORMATION OFFICE

1. (U) A total of 265 news stories and 80 photo captions were released to more than 60 news media. (Significant general news photo captions are included in paragraph 10). Selective distribution techniques insure that news finds its way to appropriate media. To insure quality and comprehensiveness of news and photo coverage, this headquarters monitors all releases from subordinate information offices. Continued emphasis is placed on the information offices of the subordinate commands to seek out, write and photograph news in depth throughout their areas of responsibility.

2. (U) Press support continues to be a major aspect of the information program. Press queries have resulted in direct contact with the news media to include television, radio and film. This command constantly keeps news representatives aware of current events and helps the civilian media in every possible way

3. (U) The Special Projects Section was responsible for revising and reorganizing the 35mm color slide file which consists of more than 2,000 slides. It was necessary to categorize this file in order to eliminate needless time required locating slides. Each slide was cross indexed according to tactical zone and specific logistical operation and can now be found with relative ease. While categorizing the slides, it was discovered that many were missing due to improper management. This instituted a policy whereby slides must first be duplicated when they are desired for use out of this office and applies when there is only one copy on hand.

4. (U) Special Projects Section completed the slide presentations on all the reserve units within the 1st Logistical Command. These 24 presentations will be used as hometown television releases. This section is currently involved in a project which will be used at the Quartermaster, Transportation and Ordnance schools. These slide presentations will provide the 2nd and 1st lieutenants with information concerning the various jobs they may expect to receive during their tour in Vietnam. Accompanied by a proposed outline, the slides will be forwarded to the appropriate school.

5. (U) Command slide briefings continue to orient newly arrived personnel, and other interested groups to the numerous 1st Logistical Command activities. This briefing has been presented fifteen times and is constantly being updated in order to keep pace with the changing logistical situation.

6. (U) The Command Information Section has published two newsletters for all 1st Logistical Command Vietnamese employees. The newsletter, Ban Tin, has a 1:5 distribution of 3,000 copies.

7. (U) Two fact sheet/troop topic publications were generated by the command Information Section. (These appear in paragraph 11). The publications will be distributed down to the company level with a 1:10 distribution ratio or 5,000 copies.

8. (U) Subordinate units continue to publish four weekly or bi-weekly mimeographed or multilith newspapers and two magazines. The 1st Log Vietnam Review is still printed on a monthly basis with plans proposing a bi-monthly publication. The printing of 17,000 copies permits a distribution ratio of approximately one copy for every 3 military personnel in 1st Logistical Command. In addition, nearly 200 copies are mailed to other military information offices, military logistics organizations and VIPs including medic executives.

9. (U) The 1st Logistical Command Magazine is tentatively scheduled for publication in late October with an increased distribution from 50,000 to 80,000 copies. Previously an annual publication with a 1:1 distribution ratio, the 1st Logistical Command Magazine will now be printed quarterly with a 1:2 1/2 distribution ratio or 20,000 copies.

13. (U) Significant News/Photo Releases		SYNOPSIS	ORIGINATOR
TITLE	TYPE		
40th Ord Supplies I Corps	Feature	40th Ord receives and supplies all the ammunition for the northern I Corps tactical zone	DN IO
Goodwill Scholarship Fund	Feature	Thanks to two chaplains from Qui Nhon the Holy Family Nursing School will be able to double its enrollment	QN IO
170th Ord Awarded Meritorious Unit Commendation	Feature	170th Ord received the MUC for providing sabotage protection and explosive disposal in Saigon area	SSC IO
Log Steps Up Vegetable Buying	Feature with Photos	Produce from Con Son is inspected HQ IO and purchased by 1st Log for American bases throughout the Republic of Vietnam	X3
Vietnamese Learn New Skills	Feature and Photos	A stevedore school for local nationals is taught by the 10th Transportation Battalion	CRB IO
You Can See for Miles--From A Gun Truck	Feature with Photos	Feature on a 1st Log soldier who is a machine gunner on a gun truck which leads truck convoys	QN IO
Overturf Makes Largest Contribution to Log Association	Feature	Sp/5 Martin Overturf contributed \$100 in memory of CMO John Koob	DN IO

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TITLE	TYPE	SYNOPSIS	ORIGINATOR
1st Log Receives Meritorious Unit Commendation	Feature with Photos	HHQ and HQ Detachments were awarded the MJC for service in Vietnam	HQ IO
29th Group Helps Rebuild Hamlet	Feature	Members of the 29th Group's 266th Supply and Service Bn. volunteered to re-build the village of Tan Hiep	SSC IO
New LOG DCG	Feature	Brigadier General Hugh A. Richeson is appointed new Deputy commanding general	114 IO
Mississippi Reservists run Fire Department in Vietnam	Feature	Reserve unit from Greenwood, Miss., operates 2½-ton fire engines that smother petroleum fires	DI IO
First American Baby Born at 95th Evac	Feature with photos	Rob Drummond became the 1st American baby born at the Army's 95th Evac Hospital	DI IO
The "ROK" Island Line	Feature with Photos	A LARC loaded with 2 water tanks CRB IO and supplies makes a trip to Can Tho to supply ROK forces	115
548th Keeps Hondas Roaring	Feature with Photo	Men of the 548th Maintenance Co. SSC IO repair Honda 175's used by the 25th Infantry Division	CRB IO
Big Gun Repairmen	Feature with Photos	Maintenance is performed on the 175mm guns by men of the Direct Support Maintenance Detachment.	CRB IO

TITLE	TYPE	SYNOPSIS	ORIGINATOR
Anchorage Rehabilitated at Cat Lai	Feature	Four new deep draft vessel anchorages and five buoys were installed at Cat Lai	SSC IO
The 1st Log Insignia	Feature	Story of the 1st Log insignia, its history and how and where it may be worn	HQ IO
"INDY 500" held at Depot	Feature with Photos	A test of skills using fork-lifts was held at the Long Binh Depot.	SSC IO
Service at Sea	Feature with Photos	Chaplain (captain) Rhodes conducts religious ceremonies on LCMs in Cam Ranh Bay.	CRB IO
Mad Snake	Feature	A Cobra snake made an unauthorized entrance into Bunker 316 discharging a fluid into a guards eyes	SSC IO
Pizza for Patients at Phu Bai Hospital	Feature	Chaplain (Major) Anderson and the 34th S&S BN. bakery made pizza for men in the hospital	DN IO
545th Breaks Own Tonnage Record	Feature	The Bomb-hauling truck drivers of the 545th Trans. Co. set a new tonnage record for one day	DN IO
Specialist Serves Country, Helps sponsor Orphanage	Feature with Photos	Sp5 John Snyder became a liaison CRB IO representative for a charity and a sponsor for a Vietnamese orphanage	X5

TITLE	TYPE	SYNOPSIS	ORIGINATOR
Pipeline Repair Team	Feature with Photos	Members of the 21 S&S CO. repair CRB 10 pipe lines containing jet fuel which run from Phan Rang to Air Base	SSC IO
Turning Basin at Newport	Feature	Newport Army Terminal can now turn a 600-ft ship around in their harbor	SSC IO
Vietnamese Trained on LCUs	Feature	329th Trans. Co. started new program that is training RVN to function as captain and crew of LCUs	SSC IO
Civic Action Raises Tower	Feature with Photo	124th Trans. Command members helped the village of Vinh Cam raise its large tower and ancient bell	CRB IO
The 1st Log Education Program	Feature with Photos	1st Log Education Program which maintains 10 education centers from DMZ to the Delta	HQ IO
1st Rebuilds Orphanage	Feature	1st Trans. Bn. rebuilt the Blessed Virgin Mary Orphanage in Ho Nai	SSC IO
500th Trans achieves 100% in 1st Log Association	Feature	500th Trans becomes the 1st major unit of the command to achieve 100% membership	HQ IO

TITLE	TYPE	SYNOPSIS	ORIGINATOR
Demolished Buildings Rebuilt	Feature	Sgt. Coletta of the Tuy Hoa Civil Affairs Office helped in constructing buildings	QW TC
The Age of Aquarius-on the Long Tan	Feature with Photos	LBN "Aquarius" makes a once-a-day HQ to trip from Vung Tau to Saigon on the Long Tan channel	
Stand Down for Maintenance	Feature with Photos	29th Group provides personnel and equipment to repair convoy trucks to keep them operational	SEC 10

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11. (U) The Command Information Section published the following fact sheets:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>
The G.I. Bill	An explanation of benefits which soldiers can receive after military service such as education, loans, medical and employment.
Change to Social Security	Informs soldiers of the change from the service number to the social security number which will be the single identifier used by the Federal Government.

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ANNEX Y (C) Signal Office

1. (C) The Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) terminals at USASUPCOM, Da Nang and Qui Nhon were activated during the reporting period. AUTOSEVOCOM terminals are now operating at HQ, 1st Logistical Command and USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. The AUTOSEVOCOM terminal for USASUPCOM, Saigon is being included in Phase II, AUTOSEVOCOM, but the requirement has not yet been validated. AUTOSEVOCOM provides secure voice communications throughout Vietnam and the worldwide network.

2. (C) Over the past several months, the 101st Radio Research Company has monitored 1st Logistical Command telephone circuits and radio nets. This monitoring indicated a growing awareness of the need for transmission security. However, several transmission security violations were noted. Violations disclosed were:

a. Disclosing unit strengths and capabilities, and the discussion of visiting official's itineraries over unsecure telephone systems.

b. Disclosing frequencies, call signs, designators, and locations over radio.

Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command continues an active program to remind all personnel of this command of their responsibility to enforce communications discipline and reduce violations of this type.

3. (U) Radio equipment received by Saigon Support Command during July has given them the capability to enter the 1st Logistical Command Radio Telephone Net. The net is now complete with stations at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and at all Support Commands. This radio net gives 1st Logistical Command an alternate means of communications, via phone patch, to all Support Commands.

4. (U) The traffic volume in the 1st Logistical Command Communications Center has remained relatively constant during the reporting period (9,200 messages a month). A study has been initiated to determine the feasibility of deactivating the dedicated teletype circuits to the Support Commands and routing all traffic through the common-user AUTO-DIN System. Results of the study will be available during August 1969 and will be reported in the next Operational Report - Lessons Learned.

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ANNEX Z (U) LOGISTICS REVIEW

1. (U) US Army Vietnam in a letter, AVHGD-P0, dated 3 January 1969, tasked Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command with conducting a comprehensive, documented, and analytical review of the US Army logistic system in Vietnam. The purpose of the study is to determine the effectiveness, identify the weaknesses, and develop recommended changes in doctrine, organization, systems, and procedures. It will include the documentation of the evaluation of the Army logistic structure and system in Vietnam, identification of the shortfalls, and evaluation of "lessons learned." Although this is to be a separate study of logistic support in Vietnam, it is also envisioned that it will provide valuable input for the Joint Logistics Review Board established by the Secretary of Defense in Washington under the chairmanship of General F. S. Besson.

2. (U) The proposed scope of organization, and time phasing schedule were presented to Headquarters, US Army Vietnam on 15 February 1969 and approved by that headquarters on 3 March 1969. High level guidance for the project is provided by a Logistical Review Advisory Council composed of senior officers and commanders of all services in Vietnam. Supervision of the study effort itself is provided by a Logistical Review Board consisting of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, as chairman, and high ranking commanders and staff officers more directly concerned with the direction and supervision of Army logistical support in Vietnam. A small Logistical Review Working Group provides full-time supervision and coordination of the day to day work of the study and gives continuity to the effort. The approved organization for the working group provides a total of 13 personnel headed by a colonel as chief. The actual gathering and compiling of input data for the study is to be accomplished by specialized advisory committees formed within the various functional/commodity areas composing the US Army logistic system in Vietnam. Each of these advisory committees is tasked to make a complete monographic study within its specialized area of interest.

3. (U) With the arrival in-country of the colonel designated to be its chief, the Logistics Review Working Group was activated on 1 May 1969, with its chief, an administrative officer, administrative NCO, and one clerk typist, comprising the initial group. The advisory committees were established on 3 May 1969 and an initial orientation meeting for the chairmen was held on 8 May 1969.

4. (U) A detailed study directive containing instructions and guidance and covering methodology to be used for the study was published and distributed to the advisory committees on 28 May 1969. This directive also established an outline for the final report and specified a format to be used for the sections and annexes of the report. With the receipt of

this directive, the various functional/commodity advisory committees commenced work on preparation of the monographs within their respective areas of interest. Subsequently, on 5 June 1969, time phasing instructions were issued. This time phasing provided suspense dates for the submission of input for the various phases of the report and established 31 December 1969 as the date on which the final draft of the report was to be completed, with the completed report to be reproduced and distributed by 16 February 1970. First input from the functional/commodity advisory committees is not due until 28 August 1969.

5. (U) A table of authorization for the personnel of the Logistics Review Working Group was developed and approved on 23 May 1969. In addition to the colonel designated as chief, it provided for two civilian contract operations research analysts, four majors to be action officers, one each in the fields of supply, maintenance, transportation, and engineering, one captain administrative officer, one E-7 administrative supervisor, and four clerk typists. At the close of the reporting period, the Logistics Review Working Group had received all of its personnel with the exception of one major in the field of transportation, two clerk typists, and one civilian operations research analyst, who is scheduled to arrive about 9 August 1969.

ANNEX AA (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR DATA SYSTEMS

During the period 1 May through 31 July 1969, significant events occurred in the Data Systems area as follows:

1. (U) At the direction of Headquarters USARV, the 1st Logistical Command is to provide ADPE support for the USARV Medical Supply System at the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Data Processing Installations. The system is currently under study and preparations are being made for integration into the 3SVN Cycle at Cam Ranh Bay.
2. (U) 1st Logistical Command Regulation 18-1 (Army Information and Data Systems) and Memorandum 18-1 (Army Information and Data Systems) were published to provide policy on Data Systems efforts throughout the command, including the headquarters staff.
3. (U) 1st Logistical Command hosted the Senior Executive ADP Orientation Course presented by the Adjutant General School. Forty six (46) students attended the course at Vung Tau during the periods 1 through 5 and 7 through 11 July 1969.
4. (U) This command recommended the placing of NCR 500 Mechanized Stock Control Systems in nine (9) supply and service units. The 624th S&S Company will be the first unit of this type in Vietnam to be mechanized.
5. (U) The ADP Watch Committee met on 28 July 1969 to review the input, file content, and output of various ADP systems as they impact on procedures, requirements, and priorities within the command. The committee will make recommendations to the Commanding General, this command, regarding solution of systems problems as discovered.

ANNEX BB (U) SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR COMBAT SECURITY

Since April 1969, when experienced combat commanders were initially assigned to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, and the Support Commands as Special Assistants to the Commanding General for Combat Security, extensive improvements have been made in the security of logistical installations and activities. The following report is an assessment of the security of logistical installations in Vietnam, and the progress made to improve this security.

The Defense of Logistical Installations

1. During World War II and the Korean War few problems existed relating to the combat security of logistical installations, for most of these facilities were tucked safely away in rear areas secure from enemy attacks. Such is not the case today where in Vietnam, there are no front lines, no safe areas, no totally secure zones. Logistical installations are virtually as susceptible to enemy attacks as forward firebases. In fact, the inviting and lucrative nature of the target presented by most logistical sites frequently results in them being the primary objective of enemy combat efforts.

2. As in every war, there are never enough troops to go around and Vietnam is no exception to this adage. While combat troops are engaged in tracking down the enemy in his jungle hideouts, our logistical bases, for the most part, have been left to fend for themselves. In itself this is not so different from the past, but because of the stabilized nature of rear areas in previous wars the matter of defending logistical facilities could be and was ignored with no dilatory effects. Today, our logistical units are struggling with the problems of defending themselves in the face of continuous enemy pressure. Working with TOE's not providing the manpower or equipment to perform both support and self-defense missions, logistical unit commanders nevertheless are doing a magnificent job in both respects. The excellence of support to combat units is unequalled in our history and our logistical bases have withstood every enemy offensive. Our purpose here is to relate some of the more important lessons learned in securing pipelines and convoys and in developing base defenses. One should remember that these lessons apply to the current situation in Vietnam and might not be appropriate in a different environment.

3. Site Selection.

a. Tactical vs practical considerations: The tendency is to select sites for logistical bases affording the conveniences of proximity to road and rail nets, availability of LN labor, good hardstand and drainage, etc. Frequently a need exists to compromise these practical matters in favor of certain tactical considerations. In selecting sites, where possible we must avoid built-up areas and areas dominated by commanding terrain. In many places in Vietnam today we are faced with the problem of trying to defend a logistical complex established at the base of a mountain that is not controlled by our

forces for lack of manpower to hold all vital terrain features. From a tactical viewpoint, sites can be defended more easily when on dominant, open terrain permitting use of free fire zones and the extensive use of claymore mines, AP mines, barbed wire, anti-intrusion devices, etc. Locating troops at reasonable distances from population centers also tends to reduce the number of civilian-military problems normally existing in such situations.

b. Select clear areas where possible, or areas that can be cleared without excessive engineer effort. Desirably, the terrain within 300-500 meters of the perimeter should be completely open with no covered avenues of approach available to the enemy. In populated areas, consider erecting a stand-off fence 300-500 meters outside of the perimeter to preclude LN's from encroaching too near the base. Arrange beforehand with local magistrates to move LN's away from base areas and seek their cooperation in preventing any build-up in areas proximate to the base, for once LN's move into an area and get established they are virtually impossible to displace.

4. Perimeter Line.

a. Where feasible have the outer perimeter circular or rectangular in shape as this affords the greatest opportunity for developing a line of mutually supporting bunkers. Avoid star-shaped perimeters or those with protruding sections as they are most vulnerable to enemy ground probes.

b. In establishing the bunker line, first select positions blocking the most dangerous avenues of approach and those offering the best fields of fire. Employ machine guns and M79 grenade launchers at these positions. Develop the rest of the perimeter around these positions spacing bunkers every 25-100 meters depending upon the terrain and the availability of troops. Consider erecting some dummy positions. Consistent with the terrain it may be necessary to construct towers in lieu of bunkers to improve observation and fields of fire. (In built-up areas, towers generally are preferable as they provide better observation to compensate for restricted fields of fire.) Prepare 2-3 man foxhole fighting positions between bunkers. These positions will be manned during periods of increased alert status and they also provide positions to which reaction forces may be deployed. These positions generally are preferred to bunkers and towers during actual combat as they are not as vulnerable to direct fire weapons and afford the soldier better vision and more freedom of movement.

c. Desirably, perimeters should be fully illuminated with lights placed forward of bunkers/towers to preclude their being silhouetted. Searchlights should be made available at those sites covering the more dangerous avenues of approach into perimeters.

d. The bunker line should be about 35 meters inside the closest row of barbed wire to provide safety from thrown satchel charges and grenades. A chain link fence screen should be erected 3-5 meters in front of and around

the flanks of each bunker to serve as a stand-off against weapons using the shaped charge principle. If erected on an angle of 10-15 degrees off the vertical they sometimes will deflect all of the shaped charge into the ground. Rifles and automatic weapons may be fired through the screen from the bunkers with no particular problem; however, normally it will be necessary to move out of the bunker in order to fire M79's and throw hand grenades. At least three rows of wire should be employed around the perimeter. This should be added to as time and terrain permit. Tangle-foot wire between rows is effective to a degree but it takes considerable time to emplace. Initial efforts should be directed at putting up concertina and double apron fencing. Before any wire is put in, clear the area of all high grass, bushes, and undergrowth. Use of a dozer, grader, or Rome Plow is recommended. Sometimes vegetation can be burned off, particularly if the area previously was sprayed with defoliants. During the monsoon season constant attention must be given to clearing fields of fire. Wire must be covered by fire and observation to be effective and it should be inspected daily. The enemy frequently cuts lanes in the wire prior to attacking, leaving the wire in place until the time of attack. Many cases have been recorded where enemy sappers have penetrated 5-8 rows of fencing before being repulsed, so there is no such thing as too much wire.

e. Make maximum use of trip flares, claymore mines, E8 CS dispensers, minefields, fougasse and anti-intrusion devices.

(1) Trip flares should be employed in depth all around the perimeter. The enemy is unbelievably adept at neutralizing these devices without tripping them but even then they serve to harass him and make his approach more slow and cautious. These devices should be inspected daily to be sure they have not been tampered with and are in good operating condition.

(2) Claymore mines can be very effective in blunting an enemy attack. They should be employed to cover the entire perimeter. Claymores should be emplaced within the rows of barbed wire to lessen the chances of the enemy disarming them or turning them around so they are used against friendly positions. When time permits they may be imbedded in cement filled containers buried in the ground to prevent them being turned around. The back of the mines facing the bunker line also may be painted white as an easy means of detecting if they have been turned. Again, claymores should be inspected daily and the electrical circuitry tested at least weekly. During the monsoon season when electrical storms are more frequent, claymore mines should be grounded as detonation of the devices resulting from a build-up of static electricity is not uncommon.

(3) E8 CS dispensers can be used to generate a dense cloud of gas out to ranges of 300 meters from the device. They are most effective when used in conjunction with supporting fires. They provide an excellent means of defense in built-up areas where friendly fires would endanger the lives of LN's. The dispensers should be set up inside of friendly wire.

(4) Before installing any anti-personnel mine fields local directives should be checked to insure their use is authorized. Unless proper supervision is exercised, mine fields have a habit of not being installed "by the book" and thus cause more trouble than they are worth. However, a properly laid mine field, when covered by fire and observation, is a very effective defensive barrier. The use of unserviceable munitions (hand grenades, artillery and mortar rounds) as command detonated mines can be most effective although their use generally must be restricted to isolated areas. Care must be taken to insure that minefield locations are recorded.

(5) Fougasse devices placed around the perimeter to cover main avenues of approach can be highly effective from both tactical and psychological aspects. Akin to fougasse is the use of small napalm containers to mark the outer perimeter in the event AC-47 aircraft or helicopter gunships are needed for fire support during periods of darkness.

(6) A number of anti-intrusion devices have been developed and designed to give early warning of the approach of the enemy. This equipment runs from sophisticated electronic gear to simple trip wire type mechanisms that actuate alarm systems. Coordination should be made with intelligence/security personnel to determine which of these items are available and best satisfy local requirements. In relatively flat open areas consideration should be given to employment of the AN/PPS-4 radar. The Starlight scope is an unusually fine piece of equipment and is a tremendous asset on the bunker line. Under ideal conditions, enemy movement can be detected out to ranges of 1000 meters. It is seldom possible to obtain the number of Starlight scopes desired so they must be placed carefully to cover the most likely avenues of approach and/or sections of the perimeter that may not be illuminated. Field glasses, though not as effective as the Starlight scope, provide improved vision both during periods of darkness and during daylight hours. They should be made available in ample numbers all around the perimeter.

5. Bunkers/Towers.

a. Consistent with the terrain, fields of fire, vegetation, etc., it frequently is practical to adopt standard design bunkers/towers for use in a given area. Whatever the design, several principles should be adhered to:

(1) The front, sides and tops of bunkers should be of at least four sandbag thicknesses (36"-48"). Generally, this will provide adequate protection even in the event of direct hits by mortar and light artillery rounds. In conjunction with chain link stand-off fences previously discussed, bunker walls of this thickness will defeat RPG (shaped charge) rounds. Chicken wire screening should be placed over bunker/tower openings, particularly when they are located in built-up areas, to prevent hand grenades being thrown into them.

(2) Plastic sandbags should not be used when constructing load-bearing bunker walls as the bags fail to adhere to one another and walls tend to crumble. Where possible, walls should be constructed out of sand filled 55-gallon drums, or retaining walls of lumber or tin roofing material should be built around the sandbags.

(3) Bunker firing ports should be constructed so as to insure overlapping fields of fire (with no blind spots) from the ports. Ports should be 6-12 inches in height to permit good vision and easy sighting of weapons, even during periods of darkness. Interlocking fields of fire between mutually supporting bunkers are a must. Each bunker also should be capable of conducting a 360° defense in the event of an enemy penetration of the perimeter.

(4) Bunkers/towers should be provided with range cards and azimuth indicators and guard personnel must be properly trained to use them. Final protective fires should be indicated on range cards. Engineer stakes with the back sides painted white can be driven into the ground forward of bunker positions to indicate sectors of fire and final protective fires. Pre-planned artillery and mortar concentrations should be numbered and plotted on range cards to improve the responsiveness of supporting fires.

(5) Basic loads of ammunition should be prescribed for weapons employed on the bunker line. Guideline figures are: 400 rounds/rifle; 4000 rounds/machinegun; 48 rounds/M79. A minimum of three claymore mines should be employed per bunker/tower depending upon distances between positions, but 10-15 claymores per bunker is not excessive. Two E8 CS dispensers per bunker generally will provide the degree of intensity of CS required to be effective. About 15 hand grenades, six hand held illumination flares and several star cluster flares for signalling purposes should be maintained in bunkers. Each bunker should have an ammunition inventory sheet posted to insure all munitions are accounted for daily.

b. In gathering intelligence of our defenses, the enemy attempts to determine which bunkers/towers are equipped with machineguns (particularly .50 caliber machineguns) and recoilless rifle weapons. During the attack he will direct efforts at neutralizing these positions. Therefore, where fields of fire permit, these weapons should be moved daily to different positions. During hours of daylight, these weapons should be kept ready for use but out of sight below firing parapets. Similarly Dusters, APC's, tanks, and other hardened vehicles used in defense of the perimeter, should frequently move to alternate firing positions around the perimeter during hours of daylight and never occupy the same night defensive positions on consecutive nights.

c. Bunker/tower guards should report for duty with the following equipment: individual weapon, steel helmet, flak vest, and gas mask. Ammunition starlight scopes, communications equipment, crew served weapons and field glasses preferably are made available at the perimeter line and are maintained under control of the perimeter defense commander. Desirably, they should be removed from bunkers during periods of absence of personnel (in keeping with

security requirements) with strict accountability maintained through use of daily inventory check lists. Reading and writing matter are not allowed in bunkers at any time. Radios are permissible during daytime (may assist in keeping guards alert) but not at night when sound may be more important than sight in detecting enemy movement.

d. In order to develop and maintain defenses, it is mandatory that close daily command supervision be given to the task. Logistical unit commanders invariably find it difficult to devote the time necessary to adequately supervise their defenses. Frequently this results in less than satisfactory conditions unless an officer or NCO (depending on the size of the installation) is assigned the primary duty of installation defense. Preferably this person would be from one of the combat arms or have combat arms experience. A daily program of inspections of the bunker line to include frequent inspections by field grade officers assists in improving defenses and insures interest and support for the program at all levels of command. Within the 1st Logistical Command one infantry lieutenant colonel with combat experience has been assigned to each Support Command to serve as a special assistant to commanders on all aspects of combat security. Their expertise has been of considerable value to logistical unit commanders having little experience or training in installation defense.

6. Training.

a. As most troops in logistical units are specialists of some sort and not experienced in combat operations, repetitive training programs must be conducted to prepare them for combat contingencies. Familiarization firing courses for personnel on rifles, M79 grenade launchers, and M60 machineguns (and .50 caliber machineguns) must be conducted weekly for those assigned guard duty on the perimeter. Too frequently, guards are assigned to bunkers having machineguns and the personnel are not qualified to operate the weapons.

b. In the absence of tactical units, it is mandatory that logistical units conduct patrols and sweeps around their perimeter as well as establish ambush positions covering likely avenues of approach. Depending on the extent of the threat, two sweeps per day should be made around the perimeter, one in the morning shortly after first light and the other in the late afternoon. Care must be taken to avoid establishing a standard pattern of times and patrol routes. Patrols should range out to distances of five kilometers from the perimeter, depending on the tactical situation. Ambushes normally should be of at least 6-10 man strength. Ambush patrols, though generally dispatched during daylight, should never move into night ambush positions until after dark. The site should be selected and reconnoitered during daylight hours as the ambush force patrols through the area. A minimum of one claymore mine per man on the ambush is standard equipment, with these devices being used to spring the ambush when possible. Supporting artillery and mortar fires must be planned to cover the ambush, it frequently being able to fire some of these concentrations as part of the night fire program. Again, care must be taken

not to establish routine patterns for ambushes, and never to occupy the same ambush position on consecutive nights. Classes on map reading, fire adjustment, and patrolling techniques should be a part of an orientation program to prepare personnel for these missions.

c. Classes on defense against sapper attacks should be conducted regularly to insure that personnel going on guard duty are aware of the enemy's tactics and of the best methods of countering enemy attacks. Numerous After Action and Lessons Learned reports are available for use as classroom background material. Classes can be made more effective by having them presented by personnel from combat units who speak from first hand experience.

d. During periods when enemy operations against logistical installations are at a standstill, practice alerts and tests of defense and procedures should be conducted periodically. An aggressor force composed of personnel from logistical units should be used to conduct a walk through attack against defenses. The scenario should include penetration of the bunker line so that reaction forces also can be tested. Combat units operating in the area might be included in such operations, to include their analyzing defenses and suggesting improvements.

e. Instilling a positive, can-do attitude in personnel is the most important function of all training programs. There is a tendency for logistical units to avoid all tactical matters and concentrate on their primary support missions. Conditions in Vietnam are such that logistical units must be prepared to accept tactical responsibilities. If combat forces are not available to guard logistical installations, then there is no alternative but for logistical units to defend themselves. The fact that this is normally a mission assigned to combat troops cannot be used as an excuse by unit commanders for not giving proper attention to preparing defenses.

7. Convoys.

a. During the French-Indochina War, the Viet Minh developed convoy ambush techniques to a virtual science. Normal procedure for them was to concentrate initial fires (to include command detonated mines) on several vehicles in a convoy hoping to destroy them and block roadway traffic. Generally, vehicles in the center of the convoy were the preferred targets. With the convoy brought to a standstill, mortar fire would be brought to bear on the immobilized vehicles followed by possible ground attacks on the column. Sometimes the ditches and immediate area on either side of the highway would be booby trapped, further demoralizing any troops debarking from the vehicles to defend their position. Ambushes were characterized by their detailed planning and violent execution with ambush forces creating destruction and then fading back into the jungle before reaction forces could be moved into the area. These tactics still typify enemy ambushes, and no really new countermeasures have been developed to protect our convoys. The best defense remains in being able to react quickly and powerfully, making such encounters so costly to the enemy that he is hesitant to conduct them.

b. A prime advantage we have over the French is our capability of providing greater numbers of aircraft and helicopter gunships to fly convoy cover. When resources permit, every convoy should be covered by at least two helicopter gunships. The presence of the gunships may cause the enemy to cancel his planned ambush and also provides an immediate means of reacting in the event of an ambush. Seldom are sufficient assets available to cover all convoys. Gunships then are maintained on a stand-by ground alert basis. As a minimum, the first convoy over a given route should be provided air cover as it is the most susceptible to enemy action. Spotter aircraft should be used to supplement helicopter gunships or to supplant them when they are not available. Communications must be established between aircraft and the convoy commander to assist in maintaining convoy discipline, to coordinate actions in the event of an ambush, and to use the aircraft as a radio relay station when direct communications fail.

c. Support artillery fires should be planned along the entire convoy route. Firing data should be prepared in advance so that if artillery is needed there will be minimum delay. Again, aircraft flying convoy cover can be used to relay fire commands if direct communications cannot be established between the artillery and the convoy commander. When hard intelligence is available indicating probable enemy ambush activity, artillery should fire interdictory fires along the convoy route.

d. Effective liaison must be maintained with tactical units responsible for guarding convoy routes. These units have responsibility for guarding bridges, for opening roads each day to include minesweeps, and for conducting operations clearing the area of the enemy. Combat units must be kept informed as to the number, composition, and time of convoys. Dispatch times should be varied insofar as possible to avoid establishing patterns the enemy could use in his operational plans. Tactical units must have elements designated as reaction forces ready for immediate employment in the event of any significant enemy activity directed against convoys.

e. Convoy serials should be restricted to approximately 20 vehicles. Armored vehicles, to include tanks, APC's, V100 armored cars, and hardened vehicles should be interspersed about every fifth vehicle in the convoy to serve as escort vehicles. The V100 wheeled vehicle is particularly effective in the role and greater numbers of them are needed. When kits are not available to harden vehicles, salvage hulls of M113's mounted in the bed of 5 Ton trucks have proven very effective. However, kits are preferable as the M113 hulls are excessively heavy, resulting in vehicle maintenance problems. To further augment the firepower available from escort vehicles, tests are to be conducted to determine the effectiveness of mounting Honeywell 40MM grenade launcher devices on every third or fourth convoy vehicle. The device can be mounted and dismounted quickly and easily, therefore not restricting use of the vehicle at other times for routine administrative requirements. It provides firepower out to ranges of 300 meters. In countering ambushes it is of great importance to respond immediately with a heavy volume of suppressive fires and this weapon should be of considerable assistance in fulfilling that need.

f. Drivers must be trained to maintain strict convoy discipline; keep 100 meters between vehicles at all times; when interdicted, continue moving through the killing zone as rapidly as possible with all personnel firing their weapons in the direction of the enemy (to halt or attempt to turn around provides the enemy a "sitting duck" target); if a vehicle is disabled the driver should steer it to the side of the road so as not to block traffic; in the event the convoy is halted, personnel should debark and then as rapidly as possible organize and use fire and movement to attack the enemy ambush force (personnel should rapidly clear the convoy area for mortar fire can be expected to be directed against the immobilized column).

g. Several passive measures taken to reduce the possibility of ambushes include: Clearing of vegetation from both sides of the road out to distances of several hundred meters. (In Vietnam, land clearing companies using Rome Plows do this very effectively; in the absence of adequate concealment near the roads the enemy is forced to establish his ambushes several hundred meters from the road greatly reducing their effectiveness.) Pave roads insofar as possible. Use only surfaced roads for convoys. As mines planted in surfaced roads are easy to detect, they are not so frequently mined as dirt roads. Drivers should be alert for the normal amount of civilian traffic on the road and civilians working in the fields and walking along the road. Absence of usual civilian traffic could serve as a warning that the enemy is in the area.

8. Pipelines.

a. In making decisions to install and operate pipelines, commanders must recognise the inherent problems of securing them. Surveillance can be maintained over lines, but still they are subject to pilferage forays on the part of local populations as well as interdiction by enemy forces. In Vietnam more pipeline fuel has been lost through pilferage than through enemy action. Even when combat units are operating in the area, it is a simple matter for one or two enemy soldiers to place satchel charges on a line or, in the case of pipelines that are above ground, to walk along firing one or two rounds into every section of pipe. Losses of this type have to be expected and cannot be prevented without tying down inordinate numbers of combat troops to pipeline security. Acceptable loss levels should be established, and when exceeded, a decision made either to commit more combat forces to pipeline security or close down operations in favor of transporting fuel by tanker vehicles.

b. When crews are dispatched to repair sections of a pipeline, they should be alert for booby traps and anti-personnel mines in the area of the break. The entire area should be inspected closely for such devices before repair crews are allowed to approach the pipeline.

c. Pilferage is a major problem. The assistance of National Police and local magistrates must be enlisted if the problem is to be controlled. In areas where excessive pilferage continues because of a lack of cooperation on the part of local officials, consideration should be given to burying sections of the pipeline where the pilferage occurs. If pilferage continues it may be practical to establish ambushes in the area and capture those tapping the pipeline.

d. Pumping operations generally are restricted to daylight hours when there is less likelihood that the enemy will interdict the line. Also, it is easier to detect breaks in the line and to dispatch crews to make repairs during the day.

e. Most enemy action against pipelines occurs at night. In areas where the enemy frequently damages sections of a pipeline, combat troops can establish ambushes along the line under cover of darkness and if sufficiently patient eventually may be able to eliminate the enemy operating in the area. It is exceedingly difficult to maintain the degree of secrecy required for this type of operation. Unless carefully planned and executed, the ambushes will have only the negative effect of denying the area to the enemy while the forces are employed.

f. Tank farms themselves are extremely vulnerable to enemy stand-off attacks as well as sapper operations. The most practical solution to these threats is to install underground POL storage tanks when the tank farm is established. When this is not possible storage areas should be selected that are in at least partial defilade providing some protection from direct fire weapons (such as recoilless rifle and RPG weapons) employed by the enemy from positions outside of the perimeter. When storage tanks are filled to capacity, there is less danger of fire than when partially filled tanks are hit by enemy weapons. (The fumes existing in the tanks above the fuel level are highly combustible; an RPG round striking a tank below the fuel level will seldom, if ever result in a fire.) Protective stand-off chain link fencing has been erected around many of the storage tanks in Vietnam. This fencing, in conjunction with sandbag walls of 36" x 48" thickness built around the tanks provides protection against RPG rounds. (Sandbag walls have not been built around the tanks in Vietnam as the effort in time, labor and upkeep is prohibitive. The chain link fencing by itself is of little value in protecting the storage tanks from RPG rounds. Experience to date indicates that the fencing will detonate the RPG round but that the "slug" passes through the hole created in the fencing and still easily penetrates the storage tanks. The screening is of benefit in guarding against hand grenades or satchel charges that might be thrown at the tanks by sappers.)

9. Summary,

There are very few, if any, new lessons to be learned from our operations in Vietnam. Every lesson learned outlined in this report represents either the direct application of principles currently taught in service schools or some logical extension of those principles. This report emphasizes those areas where there has been improper application (or lack of application) of those principles resulting in enemy successes as well as where particular attention to certain principles by our forces accounts for our successes.

SSECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED
OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) PERSONNEL

1. (U) Implementation of Military Justice Act of 1968.

a. OBSERVATION: The Military Justice Act of 1968, effective 1 August 1969, requires that if an accused so requests, he must be represented at a special court-martial by officer lawyer counsel certified as competent to perform such duties by the Judge Advocate General of the Army under Article 27(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice. There are insufficient Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) officer personnel currently available in this command and US Army Vietnam (USARV) to perform such duties. It is anticipated that a sufficient number of JAGC officers will not be available in USARV until May, 1970.

b. EVALUATION: During this quarter this office continued in coordination with the Adjutant General, to identify non-JAGC officer lawyers within this command and secure certification of them by The Judge Advocate General of the Army. Coordination by this office with Headquarters, USARV; appropriate staff agencies, this headquarters; subordinate commanders; and Staff and Command Judge Advocates of subordinate commands, has resulted in an appropriate distribution of non-JAGC lawyers in the support commands. Coordination with the commanders of these non-JAGC lawyers has resulted in the assurance that they will be made available to participate in special courts-martial. This action complies with guidance received from Department of the Army; Headquarters, US Army Pacific; and Headquarters, USARV. There are currently enough JAGC and non-JAGC lawyers within this command to meet the counsel requirements of the Military Justice Act of 1968, and, in addition, to detail lawyers as trial counsel on many of the special courts-martial. To provide for the more efficient utilization of such counsel, the four support commands have consolidated special courts-martial jurisdiction, where feasible, and have frequently placed the non-JAGC office lawyers under the direct supervision of the support command judge advocate.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That identification be continued on non-JAGC officer lawyers upon their arrival in Vietnam so that they may be assigned to commands exercising general court-martial jurisdiction on an equitable basis according to assigned personnel strengths.

2. (U) Army Education Centers

a. OBSERVATION: Although Army Education Centers in the 1st Logistical Command got off to a slow start in 1967 due to low priorities and a shortage of qualified DAC directors, improvement has been made during the latter part of FY 69. Completely furnished, portable classrooms, language laboratory equipment, and badly needed educational supplies have greatly augmented the physical capabilities of each Army Education Center. Vigorous recruitment of DAC Educational Services

Officers throughout CONUS resulted in assignment of a full complement of personnel within the command, with the exception of the Education Center at Pleiku, which soon will be staffed with a qualified Director.

b. EVALUATION: The quality of the General Education Development program advanced materially during this period. The overall participation rate advanced by 8% over the preceding reporting period. University of Maryland courses are now being offered at Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang. Nha Trang has recruited a qualified instructor and arranged for classroom space in order to begin courses in September of this year. High school preparatory courses are regularly scheduled and well attended at major centers. Language instruction is on the increase with the addition of language-instruction equipment. The result has been an overall 12% increase in the number of individuals who have achieved real advancement educationally. The following table shows the number of individuals who have achieved higher educational levels:

	<u>Number of Individuals</u>
Completing 8th grade	175
Completing high school	632
Completing one year of college	32
Completing two years of college	1
TOTAL	<u>840</u>

c. RECOMMENDATION: Although progress has been achieved during this period, it is believed that the full potential has not yet been realized. Vigorous command emphasis placed on the education program during the next reporting period can result in greater achievement without major increases in manpower or facilities.

3. (U) Contracting Officer Representatives

a. OBSERVATION: Army Procurement Procedure (APP) authorizes the Contracting Officer to appoint representatives to assist in administering contracts which are not assigned to Defense Contract Administrative Services (DCAS) for administration. The Army Procurement Instructions, Pacific, state that Contracting Officer Personnel (COR's) will normally be individuals, assigned to requiring activities, who occupy supervisory positions in functional areas related to the particular contract administration duties to be assigned.

b. EVALUATION:

(1) No DCAS organization is present in the Republic of Vietnam to assist the contracting officers in administering their contracts. Consequently, contracts are administered through the medium of COR's nominated by the Commanding Officer of the requiring activity and appointed

by letter from the contracting officer. Such appointments would necessarily be of short duration due to the 12-month nature of a Vietnam assignment. In practice, however, COs turnover averages two appointees per installation annually. The effect of this high turnover rate is accentuated by contracting officer estimates that a new COR will not be fully familiar with his job until he has been at his assignment for 30-60 days.

(2) The cost to the Government directly attributable to this administrative turnover has not been calculated. However, the need for responsible and knowledgeable appointees is evident from a review of the scope of contract DAJB11-70-C-0004 with Pacific Architects & Engineers. This contract provides for FY 70 expenditures in excess of \$100.0 million for facilities engineering services throughout the Republic, with work to be performed at 41 (major) installations, each of which supports one or more lesser installations and/or activities. Initial personnel totals authorized the contractor to be assigned throughout the country were 1470 US, 3923 Third Country Nationals (TCN), and 16,037 local nationals (LN), for a combined total of 21,430 employees. Fifty-seven COs were appointed on 30 June 1969 to administer this contract. Within 1 month of that date, 15 had departed, necessitating new appointments. Each of the new appointees will require time to learn the peculiarities of the location to which he is assigned, and at the same time, will be the contracting officer's only source of information as to the effectiveness of the contractor at that installation. His importance is especially noteworthy in light of the award fee nature of this contract.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: That requiring activities be obliged to adhere to the following guidelines when nominating COR's:

- (1) Individual must be fully qualified to perform the duties his assignment demands.
- (2) Individual's major duty must be that of CO.
- (3) Individual must remain as CO at least 9 months of his 1-year tour.
- (4) A 2 to 4 week overlap must exist on CO arrivals and departures.

4. (U) Shortage of Ammunition Handlers (MOS 55A)

a. OBSERVATION: The 1st Logistical Command continues to be critically short of personnel in MOS 55A, Ammunition Helper.

b. EVALUATION: The 1st Logistical Command is presently at 13 percent of its authorized strength in MOS 55A. The most significant factor contributing to this shortage is the lack of a training base in CONUS for the MOS. A review of the replacements received during the period covered by this report shows that a requisition fill of 13 percent

was obtained in MOS 55A. This shortage has been brought to the attention of Headquarters, USARV and the USCONARC Service School Liaison Team. As an interim measure subordinate commands have been advised to use personnel in other MOS's to perform duties in MOS 55A in accordance with paragraph 3-5b AR 600-200. This is not the most desirable solution however, since the assigned enlisted strength of this command is constantly less than authorized.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That either a training base for MOS 55A be established in CONUS, or this command be authorized to requisition personnel in MOS 55B, Ammunition Storage Specialist in lieu of MOS 55A.

5. (U) Shortage of General Duty Personnel (MOS 57A)

a. OBSERVATION: The 1st Logistical Command continues to be critically short of personnel in MOS 57A, Duty Soldier.

b. EVALUATION: The 1st Logistical Command is presently at 24 percent of its authorized strength in MOS 57A. The most significant factor contributing to this shortage is the lack of a training base in CONUS for the MOS. A review of replacements during the period covered by this report shows that a requisition fill of 10 percent was obtained in MOS 57A. This shortage has been brought to the attention of Headquarters, USARV and the USCONARC Service School Liaison Team. As an interim measure, subordinate commands have been advised to use personnel in other MOS's to perform duty in MOS 57A in accordance with paragraph 3-5b, AR 600-200. This is not the most desirable solution however, since the assigned strength of this command is constantly at less than authorized.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That either a training base for MOS 57A be established in CONUS, or this command be authorized to requisition personnel in MOS 57H, Cargo Handler in lieu of MOS 57A.

6. (U) Vehicle Drivers (MOS 64A and 64B)

a. OBSERVATION: The command strength posture in MOS 64A and 64B has shown considerable improvement during the period covered by this report.

b. EVALUATION: The 1st Logistical Command is presently at 92 percent of its authorized strength in MOS 64A and 64B. The strength posture in this MOS has shown a steady improvement since the command was at 83 percent of authorized drivers on 1 May 1969.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: That the command continue to receive replacements so as to maintain the favorable position in the MOS.

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7. (U) Shortage of Noncommissioned Officers

a. OBSERVATIONS: The 1st Logistical Command is presently experiencing shortages of Noncommissioned Officers in the ammunition, general duty, maintenance and supply career groups.

b. EVALUATION: The 1st Logistical Command is short key noncommissioned officers as follows:

<u>MOS</u>		<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>%</u>
55B	Ammunition Storage Supervisor	283	174	61
57E	Laundry Bath and Impregnation Supv	171	94	54
57H	Cargo Supervisor	490	345	70
63Z	Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor	202	165	81
76V	Equipment Storage Supervisor	514	142	27
76W	Petroleum Storage Supervisor	363	200	55
76X	Subsistence Storage Supervisor	121	87	71
76Z	Senior Supply Sergeant	224	164	73

The continued shortage of Noncommissioned Officers could have a serious impact on the command ability to accomplish its mission in the foregoing MOS areas.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the number of replacement Noncommissioned Officers in the MOS's be increased to allow for a more favorable Noncommissioned Officer Strength Picture.

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B. (C) OPERATIONS

1. (C) Ammunition Storage Planning Factor

a. OBSERVATION: The Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) planning factor of 14 square feet per short ton (STON) of ammunition stored is deemed inconsistent with storage space requirements of adopted guidance within 1st Logistical Command after attacks on Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot.

b. EVALUATION: Ammunition storage planning factors are listed in Appendix III, Section 21, the MACV Construction Program, South Vietnam (S). The planning factor of 14 square feet per STON for ground munitions includes footage for segregation and handling. However, since this factor is based on the stockage objectives (SO), it does not include categories of munitions that are not included in the SO, i.e. excess, unserviceable and suspended. For this reason, and others stated below, the planning factor should be adjusted. Based on losses of several storage activities, storage plans for all Army ammunition activities were modified to incorporate the following:

(1) Each storage locations is limited to 100,000 pounds net explosive weight (NEW).

(2) Class 7 items will be stacked with the NEW per stack not to exceed 15,000 pounds and with 50" separation between stacks.

(3) Stacks will be limited to two pallets high with exception of small arms, prop charges and fuzes.

(4) Intensive managed items will be stored in at least two locations within a sub-depot complex.

The above guidance evolved from an in-depth study and analysis of conditions prior to losses. If ammunition is stored under the above parameters, the present criterion of 14 square feet per STON is too small. An ASP with typical stockage objective and average size pad was calculated to require 18.1 square feet per STON. In the case of modular storage, tonnage is limited by United States Army, Pacific (USA:PAC) to 2,000 STON. Assuming typical category storage under the modular concept and adhering to lot separation, 14 cells are required. Fourteen 50' by 50' cells provide 35,000 square feet of storage space, or 18 square feet per STON (35,000/2000).

c. RECOMMENDATION: On 28 June 1969, a letter containing the above information was forwarded to MACV recommending that the planning factor for Class V storage be revised to 18 square feet/STON to assure that any future construction will provide adequate space for safe and proper storage. Expedited approval is desired in order that changes to storage policy and planning for future construction can be fully implemented.

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2. (C) Change of Class V Storage Concept.

a. OBSERVATION: Headquarters, United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC) challenged a recently initiated policy of using Class 2 items to serve as a buffer between non-mass detonating items and mass detonating munitions.

b. EVALUATION: As a result of three attacks on Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot and a subsequent Ammunition Seminar, new storage policy for Class V was disseminated. It was decided that Classes 4 and 5 will be stored on the outer periphery of the sub-depot complex; Class 7 will be centrally stored, and Class 2 will be used as a buffer between Class 7 and Classes 4 and 5. USAMC expressed the opinion that Class 1 material, rather than Class 2, should be used to separate non-mass detonating munitions from those that may mass detonate. They felt that in the event of an incident on either side of the Class 2 items, this class could act as an explosive train (fuze) to initiate the munitions on the other side. In reply, this headquarters agreed that Class 1 material is the most desirable and is practiced to the maximum extent possible. However, storage must be modified in accordance with conditions which exist in Vietnam, the primary limiting factor being the lack of adequate real estate. Ammunition storage sites are prime enemy targets, and do not enjoy the relative rear area security which existed in previous wars. Therefore, critical items must be dispersed to preclude the loss of the entire stocks of these items. Compounding the problem is the need to provide maximum safety to inhabited areas which, in most cases, are closer than safety criteria prescribed. Such dispersal requires use of Class 1 materials for filler on a number of pads to make maximum use of storage space, and thus dictates the use of Class 2 as the next best buffer material. Analysis of combat losses revealed that Class 2 material was not easily ignited nor did it propagate fires or explosions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: On 28 May 1969, this headquarters responded to USAMC challenge by recommending further research and testing be undertaken in CONUS. This test will hopefully substantiate local experience that Class 2 munitions are not as great a hazard under field storage conditions, as is presently thought by USAMC. Performance of tests and evaluation of the results is desired to prove or disprove current technical doctrine.

3. (C) Transportation Problems Resulting from Continued ARVN Modernization.

a. OBSERVATION: Ammunition vessels destined for Cat Lai are loaded with 25 percent Vietnam Ammunition Program (VAMP) and United States Army Vietnam (USARV) cargo. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) cargo for Cat Lai is discharged at the following barge sites:

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<u>SITE</u>	<u>MAXIMUM CAPABILITY</u>	<u>AVG PERFORMANCE</u>
ARVN Newport	250 STON/Day	200 STON/Day
Binh Trieu	300	250
Thanh Tuy Ha	300	200
Cogide	200	200
	1,050	850

Due to the storage capacity of ASPs supported by above sites, the majority of ARVN cargo must be passed through Thanh Tuy Ha. Presently there are 60 barges dedicated to the ammunition system; additional barges are borrowed from other systems when available and as required. In mid-July there were 73 barges under load.

b. EVALUATION: At the present ratio (25 percent ARVN/75 percent USARV) the Thanh Tuy Ha site is barely able to keep abreast of incoming tonnage. If a vessel with an increased ratio of ARVN cargo arrives, the throughput capability of Thanh Tuy Ha is greatly exceeded and a "logjam" of loaded barges develop.

c. RECOMMENDATION: In order to prevent slowing discharge of deep draft vessels, the discharge capability of ARVN barge sites must be increased commensurately with the changing ratio of ARVN/USARV cargo caused by increased ARVN modernization. Emphasis must be placed upon an even flow of vessels with low ARVN tonnage until this is accomplished. The above was discussed at the USARPAC Ammunition Conference, 28-31 July 1969, between representatives from DA, USARPAC, MACV, USARV and this headquarters. MACV agreed to take action to alleviate these problems.

4. (U) Buoyant Ballistic Fragmentation Vest

a. OBSERVATION: There are many Army personnel operating watercraft in the inland waters of Vietnam in the support of combat and combat service support missions. Experience has shown that personnel are reluctant to wear the issued armored vest based on the fear that the ability to survive a fall overboard would be impaired by the additional weight.

b. EVALUATION: The Provost Marshal's Office sought the assistance of the US Army Natick Laboratories, Natick, Massachusetts, in developing and testing a suitable protective device for Army personnel engaged in water craft operations. The ideal solution would be a Buoyant Ballistic Fragmentation Vest which combines the functions of a life jacket. Since the Navy had developed an experimental vest of this nature, the JSAN Natick Laboratory forwarded a total of six in various sizes for field testing. A test questionnaire was developed and distributed to the 544th TC and 458th TC, along with the vests for field evaluation. Each vest was evaluated for its flotation as well as fragmentation protection features

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over a period of approximately 30 days. The vests were given no special treatment and subjected to the normal wear and tear of daily use. From a review of the completed questionnaires and reports of the commanders, the following conclusions were drawn:

- (1) Due to its bulkiness, the vests proved to be extremely uncomfortable and interfered with normal body movement.
- (2) The bulkiness further hampered normal swimming movements.
- (3) The buoyancy of the vest was maintained during the entire period of the vest.
- (4) The vest collar had a tendency to push the face of the user downward into the water while swimming.

c. RECOMMENDATION: In view of the above, it has been determined that for the best all-round usage, the Army protected vest is better suited for use aboard watercraft. Local commanders must insure boat crews wear the armored vest when involved in waterborne combat or combat support missions.

5. (U) Logistics Review

a. OBSERVATION: Headquarters, US Army, Vietnam (USARV) has tasked the 1st Logistical Command with conducting a "comprehensive, documented, and analytical review of the US Army logistic system in Vietnam." The scope of the review is required to encompass all aspects of Army logistical operations bearing directly upon Vietnam and presumably is meant to be conducted in cooperation with other elements and various interested agencies which have been involved in the Army logistics system in Vietnam. One of the primary purposes of this review is to provide informational input to the Joint Logistics Review Board established by the Secretary of Defense in Washington and chaired by General F.S. Besson. Inasmuch as the "Besson Board" is scheduled to complete its study by 31 March 1970, in order to provide timely input in support of that study, the flow of information must commence as early as practicable and the review should be completed not later than 31 December 1969. The USARV directive requiring the conduct of the logistics review made no provision for additional resources in the way of qualified personnel for a full-time working staff dedicated to the study. On the contrary, the 1st Logistical Command was directed to conduct the study within its own resources. Since an extensive full-time working staff of qualified individuals dedicated to the project was not available, the bulk of the work of researching, analyzing, and writing the various component phases of the study of necessity is required to be performed by committees formed within the

various functional/commodity areas comprising the Army logistics system in Vietnam. A small austere Logistics review Working Group has been formed within the 1st Logistical Command headquarters to carry on the day to day work in conjunction with the logistics review. Within limited capabilities, it provides guidance, advice, and assistance to the functional/commodity committees, effects essential coordination, monitors the progress of the committees, and will put together the final report.

b. EVALUATION: A significant amount of the logistical support to the US Army in Vietnam is provided by commands and agencies outside the 1st Logistical Command, and over which the 1st Logistical Command exercises no direction. These include the areas of medical support, aviation support, engineer support, airlift support, and communications-electronics support. The degree of participation by these other commands and agencies in the logistics review is directly dependent upon the degree of cooperation received from these agencies and the amount of effort which they are willing to devote to the study. In general, the members of the functional/commodity committees are commanders and staff officers who are burdened with the day to day requirements of their operational or staff duties, and work in connection with the logistics review must necessarily be subordinated to their primary mission-essential duties. As a consequence, in some cases they are unable to divert the necessary time and resources for adequate in-depth research, study, and analysis required. Additionally, these officers are required to evaluate the effectiveness of systems over which they have command or staff supervision. Thus, conceivably they may be evaluating their own efforts. A truly objective effort may be suspect under these conditions. An analytical approach to the systems involved in this study is difficult to grasp unless the action officers involved have had previous experience with similar studies, formal staff studies, operations research methodology, or are extremely capable individuals. In this instance the formal systems analysis approach has had to be "softened" to provide what is, in effect, a series of related staff studies or research papers. This "softened" approach may not allow a truly analytical examination of either the sub-systems or the overall logistic system as a whole. This approach may also allow the less perceptive actions officers to overlook less obvious areas of interest. The time frame provided for the study is too short to allow for a really intensive professional effort. The study could have been more efficiently and effectively performed by a full-time staff, dedicated to the project, composed of selected officers experienced in the various areas of logistics and provided with expert contractor methodology and editorial guidance.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Studies of this scope and magnitude covering major systems and operations on a theater wide basis be conducted at theater (USARV) level and supported by adequate resources in the form of a full-time study group comprised of selected experienced officers provided with expert contractor methodology and editorial guidance.

6. (U) Coordination during the change of missions between 1st Logistical Command and 1st Signal Brigade and change of contractors to support fixed CE test equipment.

a. OBSERVATION: On 1 July 1969, the mission to support fixed CE test equipment was transferred from 1st Signal Brigade to 1st Logistical Command. To assume this new mission an accurate listing by number and location of all test equipment to be supported was needed.

b. EVALUATION: Due to the diversity of the systems comprising fixed CE installations and since some of these systems are operated by contractor personnel, it was difficult to get an accurate list of the equipment. 1st Signal Brigade allowed Page Communications Engineers, the previous source of support, to stop accepting equipment on 18 June 1969 and to return unrepairs equipment, which was deadlined for parts, to the sites. This created a backlog of over 160 pieces of equipment at the outset of the mission. Slippage in scheduled time tables was experienced in the beginning of the program. Transportation difficulties were experienced in distributing the facilities in-country. Consequently the new support units were not fully operational until the latter part of July.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Close and early coordination whenever there is a change of support from one organization to another is essential. 1st Logistical Command should have been in place and operational at least one (1) month prior to the assumption of the new personnel and support. This however was not possible due to late delivery of equipment. Contingency plans for all possible cases of slippage should be made so that there will be no time period when the mission is not supported during a change in support. Particular detailed planning has to be made in the situation where different contractor support for a mission is involved.

C. (U) TRAINING

1. (U) Skills Training

a. OBSERVATION: With the implementation of SKILLS I program, trained personnel became available to the Commanders by the establishment of schools and formal on-the-job training in which untrained personnel received either refresher or initial training.

b. EVALUATION: That the element of "self help" in a combat theater is desirable, can be accomplished, and is beneficial to Commanders who receive untrained personnel.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

D. (U) INTELLIGENCE

1. None

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E. (C) LOGISTICS

1. (C) Suspension of A165, Cartridge 7.62mm, 4 and 1, Linked.

a. **OBSERVATION:** During the month of May, three vessel loads of A165, 7.62mm, 4 and 1 minigun ammunition arrived in suspended condition. A total of 5,526,000 rounds were suspended, requiring 100 percent inspection of links prior to issue. Inspection of the suspended ammunition was completed on 10 July 1969. Although 96 percent of the rounds were found to be serviceable, loss of the use of this ammunition during May and June was critical due to increased Free World Armed Forces issues as listed below:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>WEAPON DENSITY</u>	<u>RATE</u>
February	18,270,000	1,689	360.56
March	19,694,000	1,746	375.98
April	19,731,000	1,753	375.19
May	22,039,000	1,749	420.03
June	24,510,000	1,757	464.99

b. **EVALUATION:** Because of the increased rate of issue and the loss of the use of the suspended ammunition for a two-month period, requisitions from the off-shore reserve were necessary. The inspection of over 5,000,000 rounds took an excessive amount of time due to the limited maintenance and inspection line capability in country.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That better quality assurance be emphasized in CONUS production lines to preclude the possibility of a similar occurrence.

2. (U) Disposal of Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) Excesses.

a. **OBSERVATION:** The tremendous quantity of OICC excesses currently being turned over to PDO and the prospect of even greater quantities to be turned in during the ensuing months, has resulted in an increasing responsibility on Property Disposal to be sure that these materials are disposed of in the best interest of the US Government.

b. **EVALUATION:** Since the first declared excesses were turned over to property disposal, the PDO has had the responsibility of determining the best disposition of these materials. Currently there are \$7 million dollars worth of materials being turned in to PDO on Troop Reservation listing 15 alone. During the ensuing months it has been projected that \$30 million more will follow. Rather than to physically receive this material into the PDO where they would not be properly cared for, it was decided that the best solution for obtaining the highest returns for the US Government was to screen for reutilization all items

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identifiable by FSN, retrograde to 2d Logistical Command all items which cannot be identified by FSN, but which are in good condition or have potential reutilization value, make remaining items available for issue to MAPEX and AID, and residue ship to PDO for sale.

a. RECOMMENDATIONS: It has been determined that no requirements exist in the Army for the property. Listings have been received from AID and MAPEX indicating items desired. Lists are also anticipated from PA, CHINA, MAAG, PHIL by 10 August. When all MAPEX and AID requirements are known, OICC will prepare turn-ins to the appropriate PDO listing items requested by AID and MAPEX who will, in turn, concurrently submit requests to the PDO for the property. (The property will not be physically transferred to the PDO yards.) It is anticipated that the remainder of the OICC property on TR 15 will be retrograded to the 2d Logistical Command on Okinawa.

3. (U) Refrigerated Warehouses

a. OBSERVATION: The cost of constructing the Qui Nhon refrigerated warehouse is \$1,036,000 which will be amortized over a period of 8½ months. The other alternative was to lease Hibueras which would cost \$1,045 per day.

b. EVALUATION: The construction of the Qui Nhon refrigerated warehouse produced the following results: significant dollar savings, ability to palletize and mechanize for efficient utilization of material handling equipment, and reduction in number of personnel required to handle subsistence.

c. RECOMMENDATION: When an "A" ration is to be fed in a new theater of operations, refrigerated warehousing should be constructed as early as possible.

4. (U) Barge Mooring Lines

a. OBSERVATION: A recent rash of barge incidents indicated that mooring cables were old, becoming frayed, and that proper inspections of barges were not being conducted.

b. EVALUATION: It was determined that the 5/8" wire rope used for mooring lines was in short supply. Requisitions had been placed for the item however. A message was sent to all support commands reemphasizing the importance of timely and thorough inspection of barges.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That all terminal units obtain and maintain an adequate supply of 5/8" wire rope and continually evaluate and improve where possible, inspection procedures on barges.

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5. (U) Documentation of Vehicles and Equipment for Unit Moves.

a. OBSERVATION: Unit movements from CONUS to overseas areas are largely supported in the documentation area by an experienced and stable DAC force of transportation specialists under the installation transportation officer. Documentation procedures are prescribed by DOD Regulation 4500.32R (MILSTAMP) which is a rather formidable and complex document. Upon announcement of the plan to redeploy the 9th Inf Division from RVN, coordination was immediately initiated to determine if the Division had the capability to prepare its own documentation. It was found there was little experience in this area and the Division transportation office was not adequately staffed to provide extensive assistance to the units. In addition there were far too few MILSTAMP Manuals (none of which were current) in the Division.

b. EVALUATION:

(1) Based on the proposed redeployment of a Brigade of the 9th Inf Division the following concept was tested:

(a) An extract in handbook form of only that data from MILSTAMP which would be applicable to a unit movement was prepared. The handbook was designed to provide a sequential, easily understood set of instructions for preparation of required documents, certification in accordance with AR 740-20, and proper marking of labels, panels and stencils.

(b) A class was presented to divisional personnel (each battalion) on use of the handbook.

(c) Follow up assistance on site was provided by the 402d Documentation Detachment (attached to 4th Trans Comd).

(2) A review of TCMD's submitted by the 9th Division, and evaluation of the manifests prepared from TCMD data, indicated that data was complete and accurate and met requirements of MILSTAMP and AR 740-20.

(3) It was believed that a divisional unit, even without personnel experienced in MILSTAMP can prepare proper documentation, mark their cargo and accomplish the required AR 740-20 certification.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the above procedure, to include use of the handbook, in view of its apparent success, be adopted as standard for unit redeployments from RVN.

6. (U) Rail Equipment

a. OBSERVATION: During July 1969, members of the Rail Branch, Rail & Highway Division, ACoS, Transportation, Hqs 1st Logistical Command, made a spot inspection of US owned rail equipment throughout the II CTZ. The results of the inspection revealed a definite lack of training on the part of the VNRS to maintain US owned refrigerator cars and locomotives. Several pieces of equipment were deadlined by the inspection team. The lack of training was prevalent throughout the II CTZ, with the exception being the Rail Repair Shops at Thap Cham. The shops at Thap Cham have the capability and trained personnel to maintain locomotives and general rolling stock but not the reefer cars.

b. EVALUATION: Due to a lack of trained personnel in areas outside of Saigon, the VNRS cannot maintain the US equipment at standards agreed upon in the current maintenance contract until further training is received.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the VNRS Headquarters in Saigon be made aware of the findings of the inspection team, with a copy of the inspection results furnished the Director of Maintenance, VNRS. Recommend a formal letter be forwarded to the Director VNRS, advising him of the overall problem and that the VNRS be requested to send a maintenance team to all areas inspected (at their own expense) to bring the US equipment up to the standards agreed upon by the VNRS and the US Army. Further recommend that the VNRS bring necessary personnel from other facilities to the Chi Hoa Shops in Saigon for training on the maintenance of US rolling stock and motive power. The above actions will be implemented by this headquarters.

7. (U) Reduction of the transportation segment of order and ship time for transportation priorities 1-4 in accordance with the in-country transportation capabilities of the U.S. Army Vietnam.

a. OBSERVATION: MACV Directive 55-4 prescribes the transportation priority system for RVN. The Directive outlines the normal maximum times allowed from time of offering of cargo for movement until final delivery. Chapter 2, AR 725-50, sets forth the Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System (UMIPS). Contained within the chapter is a chart which prescribes the maximum Order and Ship Time (OST). The MACV Directive is inconsistent with AR 725-50 in that the normal maximum times allowed for transportation shown in the MACV correspond exactly with the times prescribed for the entire OST prescribed in AR 725-50. This results in an extended OST. For example, AR 725-50 shows an OST of 20 days for a priority 12 requisition (trans priority 3 and issue priority group 3) comprised of 12 days supply processing time and eight days transportation time. Under the system prescribed by MACV Directive 55-4, transportation is authorized 20 days which, added to the supply time of 12 days, results in a total OST of 32 days, rather than the 20 days maximum time set forth in AR 725-50.

b. EVALUATION: A Transportation Delivery Standards Sub-committee was established and chaired by the MACV Traffic Management Agency to study the matter and make recommendations. After evaluating movement performance data, the following OST standards were established by the sub-committee and are soon to be published in MACV Directive 55-4. The Committee believed that improvements were realized primarily because of close monitorship of the separate segments of the OST.

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>OST</u>
1	Air	4
2	Air	6
2	Expedited Surface	11
3	Surface (Water)	14
4	Surface (Water)	16

The transportation segment of in-country OST will be closely monitored by this headquarters and present standards adjusted as appropriate when warranted by movement performance data.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

F. (U) ORGANIZATION:

1. (U) Establishment of two new general courts-martial jurisdictions.

a. OBSERVATION: Last November this headquarters recommended to USARV that each of the support commands be granted general courts-martial jurisdiction. USARV forwarded the request to Department of the Army with a recommendation that only US Army Support Command-Saigon (USASUPCOM-Saigon) and US Army Support Command-Qui Nhon (USASUPCOM-Qui Nhon) be granted the new general courts-martial jurisdiction. Department of the Army approved the USARV recommendation and granted, effective 1 June 1969, general courts martial jurisdiction to those two support commands. This headquarters attached, effective 1 July 1969, US Army Support Command-Da Nang to USASUPCOM-Qui Nhon, and US Army Support Command-Cam Ranh Bay to USASUPCOM-Saigon, for general courts-martial jurisdiction.

b. EVALUATION: The newly established courts-martial jurisdictions, together with the attachments, are operating efficiently. This change in organization effects better utilization of personnel as counsel from this Headquarters no longer are required to travel to all parts of the Republic of Vietnam in the preparation of their cases. All 1st Logistical Command general courts-martial in the north are handled by USASUPCOM-Qui Nhon, and all general courts-martial in the south are handled by USASUPCOM-Saigon. Further, prior to the establishment of the two new general courts-martial jurisdictions, a serious back-log of general courts-martial cases was developing in this headquarters. At one time in May, for example, there were approximately 35 general court cases, in various stages of processing, in this headquarters. The continuation of a back-log of that nature could have led to substantial delays in the processing of those cases. General court cases can be expected to move much more expeditiously now that the two new general courts-martial jurisdictions have been established.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

G. (U) OTHER

The following are Lessons Learned resulting from Keystone Eagle redeployment/relocation actions:

1. Local National Considerations

a. Observation: Disposition of LNs employed by relocating units was not considered

b. Evaluation:

(1) Civilian personnel who were employed by relocating units are still needed to continue the mission in some cases. However, the LN personnel are now unauthorized in the units' parent unit, therefore an MTDA must be approved before the unit can employ them.

(2) Annex L (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Logistical Command OPORD 182-69 contains information in Appendix 7 that prescribes procedures for the administering of civilian personnel during the current redeployment. However, it should be noted that sufficient time must be provided, prior to any redeployment, to insure that Civilian Personnel Officers are cognizant of the entire redeployment action and of the impact on recruitment and placement.

c. Recommendation: That consideration be given to the status and usage of critical LN personnel in future unit relocations.

2. Personnel Guidance - Relocation

a. Observation: Guidance concerning personnel to relocate within RVN was not clear.

b. Evaluation:

(1) The question of which personnel were to relocate within RVN with the units was poorly coordinated. There was not enough initial guidance from higher headquarters as far as specific personnel actions were concerned.

(2) Initial guidance received in USARV message 7679, DTG 190317Z Jun 69, was that only Reserve Component personnel who were ordered to active duty or deployed to RVN with the USAR/NG Unit were eligible to redeploy with the unit. ANNEX L, USARV OPORD 182-69, received on 28 Jun 69, changed the eligibility criteria to allow RA and AUS personnel and Individual Ready Reserves assigned to redeploying units on or prior to 8 Jun 69 to redeploy with USAR/NG units.

c. Recommendation: That accurate, specific guidance concerning personnel actions for redeployment units be furnished as early as possible.

3. Short Notification

a. Observation: Lack of time between notification and relocation created problems.

b. Evaluation: The short lead time on notification of units caused some problems and confusion regarding technical inspection and turn-in of equipment. Although these tasks were accomplished prior to the deadline furnished the units, the entire operation would have progressed in a more efficient manner had an earlier notification of movement been possible. Late notification also caused some units to have insufficient time to perform maintenance on vehicles and equipment that were later transferred within the command. In many instances, for the sake of expediency and to accomplish the task of unit relocation, equipment that would not normally be acceptable was accepted in order to meet the time table.

c. Recommendation: That as much prior notification as possible be given redeploying units.

4. Insufficient Stand Down Period

a. Observation: Some relocating units could not be given a sufficient standdown period.

b. Evaluation: Due to unavoidable circumstances, some relocating units could not be given a sufficient standdown period. The mission assigned to relocating units had to be continued until replacement personnel arrived to relieve redeploying units. Since many adjustments of units had to be made within this command in a short period of time, some units were not relieved of their mission in a timely manner.

c. Recommendation: That notification be as early as possible when units are to be relocated so internal adjustments of units may be made in a timely manner.

5. Hold/Personal Baggage Period

a. Observation: Shipping of personal baggage to CONUS by USARV personnel prior to receipt of unit movement orders.

b. Evaluation: Problem was encountered at all units visited, as personnel were concerned about having their personal hold baggage available upon arrival and REFRAD in CONUS. AR 55-71 and USARV Reg 55-2 preclude shipping of personal baggage prior to receipt of the Unit Movement Order, unless the individual submits a request for exception in writing with proper justification, in which case Headquarters, USARV, may grant approval. This problem was brought to the attention of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Transportation, this headquarters, since it fell within his area of interest. Recommendation was made to the ACoS, Transportation, that a request be submitted to USARV for this headquarters to be granted authority to approve request by individuals as outlined above. Further recommendation was made that consideration be given to redelegating this authority to the support command concerned. To facilitate action, a stencil form letter could be prepared, along with an indorsement to approve such omitting variable individual data. Experience indicates that normally the final unit movement directive is received only a few days prior to actual redeployment date, resulting in late shipment of baggage and inconvenience to the individual. ACoS, Transportation, obtained authority

from USARV to grant approval of individual request to ship hold baggage prior to receipt of unit movement orders and the authority was redelegated to Saigon Support Command to approve individual request. It is understood that the procedures outlined herein for early shipment of personal baggage for personnel in the Da Nang Support Command cannot be handled in this manner, since the Navy controls such functions in that area.

c. Recommendation: That in all cases where warranted, authority be obtained and delegated to the support command to approve shipment of personal baggage prior to receipt of unit movement orders.

6. Intratransportation Requirements

a. Observation: Residual units must be taken into consideration when planning transportation requirements.

b. Evaluation: When planning transportation requirements for movement of redeploying units within RVN, care must be taken to insure that the requirements of residual units are also included in the overall plan. Requirements for packing containers such as CONEX and Sea Land containers should also be considered at this time. Residual units which are co-located with redeploying units will have to be relocated if their base is to be closed or turned over to the ARVN and may be easily overlooked when planning transportation.

c. Recommendation: That the requirements for residual units to be relocated be included in redeployment transportation planning.

7. USAF Representative

a. Observation: The US Air Force was not represented at meeting at the USARV level which involved Air Force transportation.

b. Evaluation: At the beginning of any large scale move which involves US Air Force transportation Air Force representatives must be brought into the planning at the USARV level. This would help eliminate confusion and last minute coordination by personnel at the operating level who do not have time to be planners in many cases.

c. Recommendation: That the US Air Force be represented at meetings at the USARV level which involve Air Force transportation.

8. Movement Plans

a. Observation: Movement plans for units redeploying from the 9th Infantry Division were generally inaccurate or non-existent.

b. Evaluation: All units should have accurate up to date movement plans to include packing and preservation materials required in order to assist planners in identifying all transportation requirements in a timely manner.

c. Recommendation: That HQ, USARV emphasize the fact that all units must have accurate up to date movement plans.

9. Hot Line

a. Observation: Problems which require timely resolution are inherent in large scale unit redeployment, and the dial telephone system in use in RVN is not responsive when used off post.

b. Evaluation: "Hot lines" or point to point telephone circuits have proven invaluable in providing information and instructions to, and receiving logistical intelligence from the USASUPCOM-SGN team in support of the 9th Infantry Division redeployment at Dong Tam.

c. Recommendation: That point to point telephone circuits be used in future large scale unit redeployments.

10. Holding Areas

a. Observation: Holding areas for redeploying troops are required at the departure airfield if the airfield is used for redeployment at night.

b. Evaluation: The move out of Bien Hoa Airfield was relatively smooth and constant because it was solely a daylight operation. If airfields in future moves are to be used on a 24 hour basis there is a definite need for a holding area at or near the airfield. The holding area should have adequate billet and mess facilities for a minimum of 800 men or one battalion. The area should include facilities for movies, customs inspection and money changing. The area should be isolated from all other facilities to preclude the possibility of the men acquiring drugs or VD at the last minute. Adequate communications and transportation to the airfield are also necessary for an efficient operation.

c. Recommendation:

(1) Assumption: The number of units to be deployed justifies the establishment of USARV unit holding area and the rotation units will require a hold status of two or three days.

(2) That a holding area be established and operated if a redeployment airfield is to be used at night.

(3) From the point of morale and welfare, a holding area should contain both officer and enlisted field messes to accomodate a battalion. A snack bar should be operated on a 24 hour basis including the sale of beer. A small exchange should be established for the sale of cigarettes, toiletries, magazines and essential items. Billeting facilities are needed with day rooms including movies, television, library, desks and lounge furniture. Also needed are currency exchanges, a first aid type dispensary and Chaplain coverage.

(4) The establishment and operation of open mess facilities is not justified on the basis of the time involved and in the interest of sobriety.

11. Checklists

a. Observation: Guidance, methods and procedures for units relocating within RVN or redeploying out of RVN are contained in many and varied publications which makes it difficult for the units to know the many actions that are involved when required to relocate or redepoly a unit.

b. Evaluation: There are many references and publications which list procedures, methods, reports and other administrative matters that must be accomplished in the preparation and actual movement of a unit. Units which maintained their reference files and pertinent manuals will still require an inordinate effort to conduct a review of this material to determine exactly what steps must be taken and the procedures to accomplish in the relocation/redeployment of a unit. A unit that has not kept its administrative files current will require additional time and effort to locate or accumulate required files in order to make such a review. The time taken to do this could well have been spent in the performance of the reparation actions rather than spending valuable time trying to sift through voluminous files to determine what needs to be done. This time slippage and the probability of overlooking or not being aware of a requirement can best be resolved by the development of check lists which will provide information as to what is required and, if appropriate, the applicable references for further guidance. Attached is a check list developed by this command for Keys' one Eagle.

c. Recommendation: That a check list of required unit actions which must be taken when a unit relocates or redeploys be established and made available to unit commanders during future Keystone Eagle type projects.

12. PP&P

a. Observation: The SUPCOMs did not have an SOP or set of procedures specifying how the PP&P supplies stockpiled in their depot would be issued to the units and controlled.

b. Evaluation:

(1) Certain items and quantities of care and preservations supplies have been specifically stockpiled at each depot in RVN to be available for the packing and preservation of redeploying unit equipment. These supplies are set aside in each depot and rigidly controlled to prevent misuse and retrograde as excess.

(2) The SUPCOM and depot action officers had been briefed as to the procedures regarding the receipt and storage of these supplies. However, instructions concerning their issue and control had not been completed. These instructions are extensively detailed and very complex and the information necessary for their completion had not been received from USARPAC.

c. Recommendation:

(1) An interim procedure was improvised and seemed to prove workable for all elements involved with Keystone Eagle.

(2) The procedure basically is as follows:

(a) S-4 or G-4 of unit would determine PP&P requirement with the assistance of the SUPCOM and AMC technical personnel available at the unit processing location.

(b) These requirements would be submitted to a specific SUPCOM liaison officer at the site or the SUPCOM headquarters who would request release of these requirements from the depot. The depot would pick, pack and arrange for shipment of these supplies to the unit processing location.

(c) Particular items and quantities that were not available from either the prestocked PP&P supplies or regular depot stocks would be sent to the unit from another depot in RVN, Okinawa reserves or LCO-P.

13. TM 750 Series Manual Requirements

a. Observation: Too many types of oils and barrier papers are presently required by TM 750 series manuals.

b. Evaluation:

(1) Training manuals in the 750 series presently require a large amount of basically similar types of oils and barrier papers for use in preservation of materiel. The use of a few basic types of oils and barrier papers would greatly expedite preservation processing.

(2) It is recognized that the instructions contained in TM 750 series manuals are too complicated for use under these conditions. Availability of the manuals for all commodities is a problem. Efforts to secure simplified instructions for use by units has met with limited success.

c. Recommendation: That oils and barrier papers required for use in preservation be standardized to the extent possible while insuring that preservation standards are met.

14. Equipment Processing Training

a. Observation: Most personnel within the Army are not trained in the fundamentals of classification, preservation and packing procedures.

b. Evaluation: Although supervisory personnel may be expected to be available to assist units which are redeploying, these personnel require the assistance of unit members who have fundamental skills in classification, preservation and packing procedures.

c. Recommendation: When a unit is alerted for redeployment it should receive immediate instruction in fundamental classification, preservation and packing procedures.

15. Technical Inspections

a. Observation: Units may attempt to test, inspect, process and package their own equipment independently, resulting in inefficiency.

b. Evaluation:

(1) Once the testing, inspecting, processing, and packaging begins it should be accomplished in a centralized area with "assembly lines" set up for each type of equipment. Each line should be manned by personnel of the redeploying unit and supervised by qualified technical representatives furnished by 1st Logistical Command. This procedure would provide for constant expert supervision and allow the job to be accomplished in a more expeditious manner.

(2) The use of assembly line methods for care and preservation is definitely preferable. However, it must be realized that this is not always possible or practical. The assembly line is recommended when large units, i.e., battalion or larger, are phased out in one centralized location, such as Dong Tam. When small units are phased out in remote locations the use of assembly lines is not practical. The reduction in locations for processing enables the limited number of technical qualified C&P personnel to be most effectively utilized in a supervising capacity.

c. Recommendation: That the "assembly line" method be utilized for processing equipment or redeploying units where practicable.

16. Loss of Class V Command, Control and Stock Control

a. Observation: Loss of Class V command, control, and stock control in USASUPCOM-DNG.

b. Evaluation:

(1) The redeployment of HHC, 336th Ord Bn (Ammo) (DS/GS) resulted in USASUPCOM-DNG losing their Class V stock control and their command and control element over three ordnance companies (ammo).

(2) The present missions and deployment in other support commands of the three remaining ammunition battalion headquarters precluded assumption by either one of them of the mission of the HHC, 336th Ord Bn (Ammo).

c. Recommendation: A composite ammunition and POL battalion has been formed and designated the 274th Ord Bn. This battalion will assume the mission of stock control and command and control previously performed by the 336th Ord Bn (Ammo).

17. Base Camp Close Out

a. Observation: During the "Standdown" of a major organizational element (such as a division) which has been the operator of, as well as the principal tenant on, an overseas installation, provision must be made for the supporting logistical agency to assume "post, camp and station" transportation support upon the "standdown" of the departing organizations organic transportation capability without disruption of service or impairment of the out-processing schedule.

b. Evaluation: The 9th Division has operated its own base camp installation at Dong Tam, Vietnam. Upon receipt of redeployment orders, the 9th Division, in coordination with the Saigon Support Command (SSC), developed a time-phased movement schedule. SSC arranged to provide transportation elements organic to SSC (a light truck platoon, water tanker, POL tankers and bus support) to perform "post, camp and station" transportation functions at Dong Tam effective upon the start of "standdown" of the Division's own S&T Battalion. In this matter, continuity of service was maintained without "Missing a Beat". The management of this transportation service is exercised by SSC, allowing the division to concentrate on its preparations for movement.

c. Recommendation: Future planning for Division, or comparable sized unit retrograde moves should include definite provisions for continuity of logistical support, particularly transportation, of the type generally rendered by posts, camps, stations, or internal elements of the unit to be moved.

18. Transportation Operation Center

a. Observation: In the course of a division or comparable sized unit move, many transportation elements (movement control, motor transport, traffic management, port, air, rail, and staff) may be involved. Controls must be exercised, through a single transportation element, to coordinate the efforts of all these transportation elements for optimum efficiency, economy of effort and harmonious teamwork.

b. Evaluation: In the case of the retrograde movement of the 9th Infantry Division, the complex task of coordinating and synchronizing the combined efforts, on site, of the 3rd TC, 4th TC, 48th Group, TMA and transportation staff, was solved by establishing a "Transportation Operations Center" (TROC) at Dong Tam. The function of the TROC is to serve as a "Clearing House" and point of central coordination, on site, for all participating transportation elements. The TROC need not enter into normal command chains, nor should it. If functions through cooperative effort and the ready interchange of vital information among the participating agencies, allowing each agency to take advantage of the "Pooled" knowledge of all, and thereby promoting better transportation decisions.

c. Recommendation: Future planning for the redeployment of major units should include provision for the activation, at an early stage in preparations for movement, of a "Transportation Operations Center" (or comparable designation) on site with the unit to be moved, until the unit move is completed.

19. Performance of TI and Classification

a. Observation: Technical inspection and classification must be accurate and performed by qualified personnel.

b. Evaluation:

(1) One relocating unit performed its own technical inspections and classification for vehicles and this classification was accepted by its direct support maintenance unit which should have performed this function. Consequently, when the vehicles arrived at the applicable destination within USADLB IAW condition codes assigned by the unit they were not accepted since the codes were incorrect. Coordination was made, and the vehicles were reinspected and turned in prior to the deadline, however, unnecessary confusion and delay was caused by improper procedures.

(2) Instructions must be implicitly followed by units phasing out. The conduct of technical inspections (TIs) is a responsibility of the supporting DSU and not to be performed by the unit. This duplication of effort could be avoided by following instructions.

c. Recommendation: That technical inspection and classification be performed only by the appropriate facility.

20. MILSTAMP Documentation

a. Observation: To provide the intricate MILSTAMP documentation of supplies and equipment being redeployed with the 9th Inf Div (-) to Hawaii.

b. Evaluation: A key element in any successful large scale unit movement is proper documentation and marking of supplies and equipment. Early discussions with the 9th Div transportation officer indicated that without help, the 9th Div did not have sufficient knowhow and experience in documentation, marking and certification procedures required by DOD Reg 4500.32-R and AR 740-20. Previous experience of officers assigned to the ACofS, Trans, 1st Log was that the MILSTAMP regulation is too complex and cumbersome for use by personnel untrained in transportation. When units deployed from CONUS the documentation was by and large closely supervised by installation transportation officers using DA civilians who had years of experience with MILSTAMP. A quick evaluation affirmed that neither USARV, 1st Log or Saigon Support Command had sufficient personnel to provide any sustained documentation assistance. The Documentation Assistance Team, provided from CONUS, would not be able to do all of the documentation for the units and fulfill their mission of staging and cargo planning management.

c. Recommendation: Since the responsibility for documentation, marking and certification rests with the unit, it was decided that 9th Div (-) would do their own documentation. However, it was realized that procedures must be streamlined and simplified. The following actions were taken:

(a) Classes were presented by 1st Log to all 9th Div units. A minimum of 2 personnel from each unit attended the 4 hour classes.

(b) 1st Log ACofS, Transportation, prepared and distributed to 9th Div a Unit Movement Documentation Guide. This guide included only unit movement applicable provisions of DOD Regulation 4500.32R, MIL-STD 129 and AR 740-20.

(c) While the move is incomplete initial document submissions and cargo received at the port indicates that the field units can, with some assistance and simplified, clear language instruction prepare cargo documents on the same or higher standards as that done in CONUS.

AVHGC-LST (20 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco
96375 16 SEP 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "The need for more V-100 Cars to improve convoy security," section I, page BB 8, paragraph 7e. The Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command has recommended that four armored vehicles be added to the TOE's of the Light and Medium Transportation Truck Companies. This headquarters did not concur, but recommended further evaluation by the Department of the Army, to include the doctrinal question of the convoy commanders' responsibilities for security.

b. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Ammunition Handlers (MOS 55A)," section II, page LL3, paragraph A4. Nonconcur with the recommendation for authority to requisition MOS 55B in lieu of MOS 55A. The proper substitute MOS's are 12A and 76A. The records of this headquarters reveal that MOS 55A is currently at 13 percent of authorization in the 1st Logistical Command and USARV. This MOS has been consistently short in USARV.

c. Reference item concerning "Shortage of General Duty Personnel (MOS 57A)," section II, page LL4, paragraph A5. Nonconcur with the recommendation to requisition MOS 57H in lieu of MOS 57A. Proper substitute MOS's are 64A and 76A. USARV and the 1st Logistical Command are currently at 13 percent of the authorized strength in MOS 57A.

AVHGC-DST (20 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

d. Reference item concerning "Vehicle Drivers (MOS 64A and 64B)," section II, page LL4, paragraph A6; concur. The records of this headquarters reveal that the 1st Logistical Command and USARV are currently at 73 percent of the authorized strength in the combination of MOS 64A and 64B.

e. Reference item concerning "Ammunition Storage Planning Factor," section II, page LL7, paragraph B1; concur. MACV has indicated that the 28 June 1969 recommendation will be approved and that the next update of Appendix III, section 21, of the MACV Construction Program, South Vietnam, will be amended accordingly.

f. Reference item concerning "Transportation Problems Resulting from Continued ARVN Modernization," section II, page LL8, paragraph B3; concur. This area will continue to be monitored by Headquarters, USARV and the 1st Logistical Command will be advised of actions taken by MACV. This subject will also be submitted as a topic for the next MACV Jcint Transportation Board meeting.

g. Reference item concerning "Logistics Review," section II, page LL10, paragraph B5; concur. In this case, familiarity with the various sources of information was one of the primary reasons why the project was assigned directly to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. With the emphasis on a reduction of troop strength in RVN together with the overall DOD aim toward the reduction of defense costs, it is not anticipated that a full-time study group for this or similar reports can be formed except from within existing personnel assets.

h. Reference item concerning "Suspension of A165, Cartridge 7.62mm, 4 and 1 linked," section II, page LL15, paragraph E1; concur. This matter was discussed at the USARPAC Munitions Conference held on 23 - 30 July 1969. It was recognized as a serious situation but it was emphasized that this was an isolated case. The problem was encountered after the items had been placed in transit. The overall record of quality vs. quantity shipped is outstanding.

i. Reference item concerning "Disposal of Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) Excesses," section II, page LL15, paragraph E2;

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

concur. These procedures have been approved by CINCPAC. Future lists will be thoroughly screened using the ADP capability. This is expected to reduce the number of items being turned over to the PDO due to the lack of identification.

j. Reference item concerning "Barge Mooring Lines," section II, page LL16, paragraph E4; concur. 1st Logistical Command is charged with the responsibility for the operation of USARV deep draft and shallow draft ports. The corrective actions taken to remedy the problem, namely the requisitioning of 5/8" wire rope and a notification sent to all support commands reemphasizing the importance of timely and thorough inspection of barges, are considered adequate.

k. Reference item concerning "Documentation of Vehicles and Equipment for Unit Moves," section II, page LL17, paragraph E5; concur. For future large unit moves, it has been recommended that training on MILSTAMP/MILSTRIP be given to key personnel so that equipment can be moved with proper documentation. In addition, action has been taken to issue a handbook on MILSTAMP documentation along with the redeployment lessons learned to future redeploying units so that they may benefit from the experiences of the 9th Infantry Division.

l. Reference item concerning "Rail Equipment," section II, page LL18, paragraph E6; concur. The following actions have been taken to improve the training and ability of the Vietnam National Railway Service (VNRS) to maintain US manufactured refrigerator cars and locomotives.

(1) The 1st Logistical Command has notified the VNRS Director of Maintenance, both orally and in writing, of the cited maintenance problems in Qui Nhon and Tuy Hoa. Deficiencies noted during inspections were given to the VNRS.

(2) The VNRS dispatched training teams to Qui Nhon and a recent check by the 1st Logistical Command indicated a definite improvement in the Qui Nhon area VNRS locomotive maintenance capability. Tuy Hoa is still deficient in locomotive maintenance procedures and both areas are deficient in their ability to maintain refrigerator cars. The 1st Logistical Command will continue to advise and assist the VNRS with its maintenance training.

AVHGC-DST (20 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

- m. Reference item concerning "USAF Representative," section II, page LL25, paragraph G7; concur. USAF representatives will be invited to all future meetings at the USARV level which involve Air Force transportation requirements. In addition, USARV provides information to the Air Force on all movements requiring Air Force support.
- n. Reference item concerning "Movement Plans," section II, page LL25, paragraph G8; concur. USARV letter, dated 18 August 1969, subject: Force and Material Reporting, (FAMREP) (CINCPACINST 5230.9) directed all units to prepare accurate, up-to-date movement plans. Information copies of the plans will be provided this headquarters.
- o. Reference item concerning "Holding Areas," section II, page LL26, paragraph G10; concur. Exception is taken to the size and extent of services to be provided in a temporary holding area. Proper scheduling of troop movement will ensure that troops are held in base camps rather than at the APOE's. Out-of-country airlift can be scheduled for a minimum number of missions during the hours of darkness, which will also reduce the holding requirements at the APOE's.
- p. Reference item concerning "Checklists," section II, page LL27, paragraph G11; concur. USARV is presently preparing a Redeployment Guide for publication which will contain guidance, reference material, and general check lists for units involved in future redeployments
- q. Reference item concerning "TM 750 Series Manual Requirements," section II, page LL28, paragraph G13; nonconcur. The preservatives and barrier papers as defined in MIL-P-116E and as required in the TM 750 series each have a separate and distinct application and cannot be further standardized. To combine and further reduce the present number of oils and barrier papers would downgrade the preservation standards.
- r. Reference item concerning "Base Camp Close Out," section II, page LL29, paragraph G17; concur. In the event of larger scale redeployments, the 1st Logistical Command will not be able to provide the same support given units during Keystone Eagle. The concept of establishing

AVHGC-DST (20 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

a provisional "division rear" battalion to provide for transportation and to close out major installations appears to be more feasible and practicable. The 1st Logistical Command would provide the technical assistance not available in the division.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
1st Log Comd


C. D. WILSON
III
Assistant Adjutant General

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CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (20 Aug 69) 2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Logistical Command
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs in subject report, as
indorsed, except as follows.

2. (C) Reference Section I, Annex J, pages J2 and J4.

a. During the period 1 May through 31 July the operational
readiness on 5-ton dump trucks was greatly improved. There
is an indication of supply support improvement, and the
maintenance capability should continue to increase through
the intensified preventative maintenance program established
in RVNAF.

b. The fluctuation of readiness on the rough terrain
and truck mounted 20-ton crane is due to lack of repair parts,
and will probably continue for a few more months due to
parts shortages and overhaul capability of RVNAF.

c. Engines for the 290M wheeled tractor continue to be
a critical item for support of the tractor, and the level of
operational readiness is not expected to significantly
increase in the near future.

d. US Army, Vietnam LOGSUM 8-69 noted that 5-ton dump
trucks were no longer considered to be critical.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. A. Tucker
D. A. TUCKER
CPT, ACC
Asst / C

CF:
CG, USARV

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO 96384

AVCA GO-O

29 June 1969

SUBJECT: Reduction and Redeployment of 1st Log Comd Units in RVN
(25,000 Man Package)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Attached is the prescribed check list as required by para 11a, confidential message this headquarters, 777C AVCA GO-O, DTG 190910Z June 69, subject as above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2978

Robert L. Alderman
ROBERT L. ALDERMAN
LTC, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

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150 - ACofS, SF&O
100 - Da Nang Support Command
100 - Saigon Support Command
30 - Qui Nhon Support Command

Incl 17

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A CHECKLIST
REGARDING
NECESSARY ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN REDEPLOYING OR RELOCATING
1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND UNITS

PURPOSE: To assist the Commander in preparing for and accomplishing unit redeployment or relocation.

CONTENT AND APPLICABILITY: The checklist contains major actions required to redeploy or relocate units within 1st Logistical Command. It is applicable at the company, battalion, group, support command and logistics command levels. It is sub-divided into a unit section, support command section, and headquarters 1st Logistical Command section. The list is not necessarily all-inclusive, thus other non-listed but necessary actions may be required of the commander. When identified, significant actions in this regard, along with recommended deletions or changes should be forwarded to HQ, 1st Logistical Command. As appropriate, reasons for deletions or changes should be indicated.

IMPLEMENTATION: The checklist will be implemented as soon as practicable upon receipt of alert instructions to redeploy or relocate the unit. In all instances, the next higher unit must advise the redeploying or relocating unit regarding mission change, standdown period, and special instructions to be followed.

ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS: Appropriate abbreviations and definitions applicable to the checklist and its utilization are listed at the end of the checklist.

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND CHECKLIST

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
1. Operate LOCC to monitor 1st Log redeployment status.	X	X
2. Provide assistance to SUPCOMs on request.	X	X
3. Allocate transportation assets, identify shortfall and plan for reallocation as necessary.	X	X
4. Disposition Instructions		
a. Receive disposition instructions from USARV for critical items of equipment and disseminate to SUPCOMs.	X	X
b. Provide disposition instructions to the USAICCV for lateral transfers between SUPCOMs.	X	X
5. PR&P		
a. Monitor the stockage levels of PR&P in the depots and replenish as required.	X	
b. Cross level PR&P supplies and loading and lashing gear between SUPCOMs to insure redeployment requirements are met.	X	X
6. Contractual Services		
Coordinate requested changes with Support Commands and USAPAV.	X	X

SUPPORT COMMAND CHECKLIST

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
1. Establish liaison and identify logistical support requirements. Provide required logistical support (if required).	X	X
2. <u>Assistance</u> Request assistance from HQ, 1st Log Comd (if required).	X	X
3. <u>Cargo</u> Insure cargo is documented, booked and called forward.	X	X
4. <u>PDO Operations</u> Enlarge, if necessary.	X	X
5. <u>Excess</u> Insure equipment retrograded to designated destinations.	X	X
6. <u>PP&P, Dunnage and Lashing Gear</u> Receive and stockpile additional supplies	X	X
7. <u>Technical Assistance Personnel</u> Furnish, if necessary.	X	
8. <u>Motor Transportation</u> Review and plan for efficient allocation.	X	X
9. <u>Contractual Services</u> Review and initiate action to expand or terminate, as required.	X	X
10. <u>Movement</u> Provide equipment to assist in moving supplies and equipment, if required.	X	X
11. <u>Distribution of authorized publications</u> (Stars & Stripes, MACV Observer, etc.) Consolidate requests for increase/decrease in number of copies and method of delivery to their subordinate units--Section IV, para 11c, USARV Reg 360-81 and para 15, LC Reg 360-81.	X	X

SUPPORT COMMAND CHECKLIST

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
12. <u>Policy for PI Releases</u> Implement specific IO instructions received from USARV.	X	X
13. <u>Home Town News Releases</u> Send Home Town News Releases (Optional) IAW AR 360-83.	X	
14. <u>Class I, III</u> a. Terminate all supply of Class I and III when unit moves, or as instructed.	X	X
b. Insure that unused Class I and III is turned in by the unit prior to redeployment.	X	X
15. <u>Class V</u> a. Receive and process IAW current policy and procedure. USARV Reg 700-7, TM 750-series.	X	X
b. Stockage Objectives--Adjust SOs at ASPs as supported units or units to be supported move out of or into the area.	X	X
16. <u>Reconciliation</u> Have depot reconcile dues out with unit. Insure unit cancelled Rqns.	X	X
17. <u>PP&P</u> Provide PR&P to units for packing and preservation based on equipment to be packed.	X	X
18. <u>Disposition of Equipment</u> a. Receive disposition instructions from USARV for critical items of equipment.	X	X
b. Redistribute excess supplies and equipment as directed by HQ, 1st Log Comd or USARV (for Critical Items).	X	X
c. Process unit requisitions for supplies from depot stocks to fill unit shortages.		X
d. Obtain list of equipment and supplies to be packed from the units.	X	X

SUPPORT COMMAND CHECKLIST

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
e. Instruct the unit as to the items of equipment to be packed at the processing location, turned into the depot and to be laterally transferred.	X	
f. Laterally transfer equipment within the SUPCOM and provide instructions to the unit.	X	X
19. <u>Property Books</u>		
a. Provide assistance to relocating units in the adjustment of their property books.		X
b. Provide assistance to redeploying units in the adjustment, closing out and disposition of property books.	X	
20. <u>Documentation</u>		
Insure all unit documentation is correct prior to movement to the port or intransit area.	X	
21. <u>Supply Phasedown</u>		
a. Adjust all depot RO's for supply IAW instructions from this Headquarters as units redeploy.	X	X
b. Supervise turn-in of supplies and equipment.	X	X
22. <u>After relocation</u>		
Issue required supply of Class I, III, and V.		X
23. <u>Export Procedures</u>		
Re-orient port personnel in export procedures.	X	
24. <u>Port Workload Scheduling</u>		
Schedule intransit area and loading operations to insure smooth flow of cargo through the port (local port operation SOP applies).	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
1. <u>Organizational Records</u>		
a. <u>Redeploying Units</u> . Before movement to staging area or POE, dispose of files as follows:		
(1) Those eligible for destruction, destroy IAW AR 345-210 or AR 345-215, as applicable.	X	
(2) Redeploying units forward following files to "Overseas Record Holding Area", address, CG, USARV, ATTN:AVHAG-AR, APO SF 96375, IAW AR 345-210 and AR 345-215:	X	
(a) Those eligible for transfer.		
(b) Those more than 12 mos old whether or not eligible for destruction.		
(c) Those less than 12 mos old not required for future action and not eligible for destruction or retirement.		
(3) Files remaining after actions in para 1a(1) and 1a(2), above, will accompany unit. These will include:	X	
(a) Unit Punishment Records		
(b) Morning Reports		
(c) Unit Orders		
(d) TOE or TDA		
b. <u>Relocating units</u> . Relocating units will retain and maintain records IAW current procedures.		X
<u>Personnel Records</u> .		
a. Move as TAT material by UPO or comparable individual. Containers will be level A packed and labeled. Ref para 3-11, AR 220-10.	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
b. Members who move separately will handcarry records IAW AR 640-10.	X	X
3. <u>TDY Personnel</u> Release for return to Parent Unit.	X	X
4. <u>Flagged Personnel</u> .		
a. In confinement will be asgd to another unit by direction of HQ, 1st Log Comd or conf may be suspended, remitted or vacated by Court-Martial and action taken IAW (b) below, if sentence was suspended.	X	
b. Not in conf, will have flagging action transferred IAW Rule 4, Table 7-1, AR 614-30	X	X
5. <u>Disciplinary actions</u> . Initiate flagging action; process prior to movement. Report unprocessed cases to CJA, SUPCOM (LC Reg 27-1)	X	X
6. <u>Personnel on Leave</u> . a. Personnel on Ordinary Leave: (1) Do not allow personnel to depart on 7 day ordinary leave when unit is within 14 days of redeploying. (2) Reassign personnel on either 30 day reenlistment, Special or Emergency leave as directed by 1st Log Comd. Notify individuals by either mail or message depending on the date of expected return to new unit of assignment by the Support Command issuing the reassignment orders. AR 630-5.	X	
b. Notify personnel on Ordinary, Emergency, and Special Leave or R&R by mail or message of the change of location of the unit.		X
7. <u>Personnel Hospitalized</u> . a. Reassignment of hospitalized personnel will be directed by HQ, 1st Log Comd prior to redeployment of unit except when action is taken by Hospital Commander to effect transfer.	X	

UNIT CHECKLIST
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
b. Unit CO notifies indiv of change by most expeditious means.		X
8. <u>Pay of Personnel.</u>		
a. Partial Pay, advance pay, advance travel pay-- on arrival in CONUS (AR 37-104-2).	X	
b. Arrange for conversion of MPC in base camp, or as directed.	X	
c. Notify local F&AO or FDS of change in location.	X	X
9. <u>Special Services and Equipment.</u>		
a. Turn in specified equipment on direction to servicing DSU before move.	X	X
b. After movement, requisition supplies and equipment from servicing DSU (Ref USARV Reg 28-7).		X
10. <u>Relocation Recuperation Leave.</u>		
a. Before mvmt to staging area cancel R&R requests and turn in unused R&R spaces.	X	
b. R&R requests on hand remain valid.		X
c. After mvmt to new location, request R&R spaces from new command. (Ref USARV Reg 28-5)		X
11. <u>Film Account (16mm)</u> (Ref USARV Reg 28-4)		
a. Before movement to staging area:	X	
(1) Cancel film account		
(2) Turn in film projector and cinemascope lens to servicing DSU.		
b. Notify servicing film exchange of move and turn in film. Projector and lens accompany unit.		X
12. <u>Courier/Message Center Service.</u>		
Coordinate with and advise the next higher HQ of change in address/status of unit and service.	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
13. <u>Postal Service</u>		
a. Prior to departing present stations, units will:	X	X
(1) Prepare and distribute locator cards IAW AR 65-75 to:		
1 - Losing APO		
1 - Current APO		
1 - Gaining APO or CONUS installation		
1 - Area Postal Directory, APO 96381		
(2) Insure personnel know and use new APO or Zip Code.		
(3) Provide advance arrival notice to postal officer of gaining APO or installations.		
(4) Provide advance departure notice to losing APO		
(5) Advise personnel on nonavailability of firearms, ammunition, explosives, narcotics, drugs, government property.		
(6) Provide losing APO with revocation date of DD Form 285 for unit mail clerks picking up mail from APO.		
(7) Encourage personnel to advise correspondents and publishers of change in address.		
b. Upon arrival at gaining APO or CONUS installation provide the postal officer with:	X	X
(1) Plan for distribution of unit mail.		
(2) A properly completed DD Form 1175 for each assigned or attached individual.		
(3) DD Form 285 for unit mail clerks picking up mail from the postal activity.		
14. <u>Distribution Service</u> .		
Notify ..G Publications Center of unit status/address:	X	X
(1) CO US Army Publication Center St. Louis, Missouri 63114		

UNIT CHECKLIST
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
(2) CO US Army Publication Center 2800 Eastern Blvd. Baltimore, Maryland 21220		
15. <u>Blank Forms Account</u> Notify AG Printing and Publications Center of unit status/address: Director PPC Japan APO 96503	X	X
16. <u>Awards and Decorations</u>		
a. Valor and Achievement-Process prior to redeployment and submit to SUPCOM IAW App II, para 1g, USARV Reg 672-1.	X	X
b. Meritorious Service-Process prior to departing from parent unit (DEROS personnel) and submit to SUPCOM IAW App II, para 1g, USARV Reg 672-1.	X	X
c. Awards for Meritorious Service-Personnel to be reassigned in RVN, submit recommendation to gaining organization IAW para 5g, USARV Reg 672-1.	X	X
17. <u>Unit Strength Adjustment</u>		
a. Reassignment gains and losses-Prepare Morning Report entry IAW Table 3-6, AR 335-60.	X	X
b. Personnel in AWOL status-Prepare Morning Report entry IAW Table 3-5, AR 335-60, dropping individual from the rolls as a deserter:		
(1) One day prior to the EDCSA date of departure of unit from RVN (para 29h, AR 630-10).	X	
(2) Upon expiration of 29 consecutive days of unauthorized absence.	X	X
c. Personnel in missing status - Prepare Morning Report entry dropping individual from the rolls of the organization IAW Table 3-5, AR 335-60, and para 17b, AR 640-10.	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
18. <u>Record of Unit Actions/Events Morning Report Entries</u>		
a. For the sixth day prior to departure date, prepare Morning Report entry IAW rule 12, Table 4-5, AR 335-60.	X	
b. For the fifth day prior to departure date, prepare Morning Report entry IAW rule 13, Table 4-5, AR 335-60.	X	
c. For the day prior to departure, prepare Morning Report entry IAW rule 15, Table 4-5, AR 335-60.		X
d. For the date of arrival (EDCSA) prepare Morning Report entry IAW rule 14, Table 4-5, AR 335-60.	X	
e. For the date of arrival at new station, prepare Morning Report entry IAW rule 16, Table 4-5, AR 335-60.		X
19. <u>Intra-RVN Transfer Policy for Personnel who wish to remain in RVN.</u>		
a. Prepare request for reassignment on DA Form 2496 (Disposition Form) IAW Chapter V, USARV Reg 600-200 and forward to next higher headquarters by comment 2.	X	
b. Upon approval and reassignment, prepare Morning Report entry IAW Table 3-6, AR 335-60	X	
20. <u>Civilian Personnel</u> Notify ACPO of personnel to be released/reassigned IAW Personnel Policy Manual for US Forces in Vietnam, Section 7, and USARV Reg 690-6.	X	X
21. <u>Claims</u> Process through appropriate SUPCOM SJA; to Claims Officer, HQ, 1st Log Comd (Ref LC Reg 27-20).	X	X
22. <u>Incident Reports</u> Process IAW USARV Reg 1-55 and 335-6.	X	X
23. <u>War Trophies</u> Process IAW USARV Reg 643-20	X	
24. <u>Vehicle Registration</u> Process IAW USARV Reg 190-7	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
25. <u>Disposition of non-appropriated funds</u>		
a. Dissolve/transfer unit funds IAW USARV Reg 230-21 and AR 230-1.	X	X
b. Conduct terminal audit and turn in unit fund. USARV Reg 230-4.	X	
c. Conduct terminal audit and dispose of Open Mess accounts IAW USARV Reg 230-10 and 230-60.	X	X
d. Conduct terminal audit and dispose of Chaplain's Funds IAW USARV Reg 230-36.	X	X
e. Conduct terminal audit and dissolve/transfer other sundry funds IAW USARV Reg 230-5.	X	X
f. Clear accounts with Vietnam Regional Exchange	X	X
g. Conduct terminal audit and turn in central post fund. USARV Reg 230-3.	X	X
h. Submit final audits through channels to Headquarters, 1st Log Comd, ATTN: COMPTROLLER.	X	X
i. Imprest fund - Conduct terminal audit and turn in funds. USARV Reg 37-6.	X	X
j. Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) Imprest Fund. Turn in funds. MACV Reg 35-1.	X	X
k. Army Emergency Relief - Conduct terminal audit and turn in funds. USARV Reg 910-10.	X	X
26. <u>Magazine Subscriptions & Unit Newspapers</u> . Notify appropriate CWF/Unit Fund; cancel magazine subscriptions or have forwarded to new address as appropriate; suspend or stop unit newspaper and notify Chief of Information, DA--AR 360-31, para 31.	X	X
27. <u>Policy for Public Information releases</u> Contact SFCOM IO	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST
MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY AND SERVICES

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
1. <u>TOE equipment, PLL/ASL supplies, PCS property.</u> Perform Inventory (AR 735-35).	X	X
2. <u>Equipment Density Report</u> Submit two (2) copies of current density report (through appropriate Support Command) to USARV, ATTN: AVHGD-MD (1 copy) AVHGD-SP (1 copy) NLT three (3) days after stand-down.	X	X
3. <u>Equipment Shortages.</u> Submit requirements through normal channels prior to relocation.	X	
4. <u>Excess Equipment.</u> a. Report Critical Items to USARV, ATTN: AVHGD-SP (NLT 3 days after initial inventory at unit standdown) Support Commands have Critical Items List.	X	X
b. Report all other excess equipment to Support Command.	X	X
5. <u>Disposition of Excess Equipment and Supplies</u> Dispose as directed by SUPCOM or USARV (for critical items).	X	X
6. <u>Preventive Maintenance Program.</u> a. Initiate intensified Preventive Maintenance (PM) Program upon standdown.	X	X
b. Requisition necessary repair parts/components.	X	X
7. <u>Technical Assistance Team</u> Request DSU team as required.	X	X
8. <u>Technical Inspection of Equipment</u> Schedule time and location with support maintenance (DSU).	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST
MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY AND SERVICES

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
9. <u>Technical Inspection.</u> Upon completion:		
a. Repair equipment within organizational capability.	X	X
b. Job order equipment to DSU support element as required.	X	X
c. Transfer equipment designated for lateral transfer.	X	X
d. Insure TAERS forms/records reflect transfer actions (Maintenance Officer/S-4/PBO coordination).	X	X
10. <u>Unserviceable, Uneconomically Repairable Equipment</u> Evacuate to supporting DSU. (DSU will retrograde equipment to GSU, PDO or CC&S as appropriate).	X	X
11. <u>Economically Repairable Equipment</u>		
a. Evacuate to supporting (DS) maintenance.	X	X
b. Report equipment requiring general support (GS) or higher level repair to Support Command (ATTN: ACoFS, Maintenance).	X	X
12. <u>Deferred Maintenance.</u> (That which will not impair operational capability of equipment):		
a. Identify organizational "Deferred Maintenance" equipment.	X	X
b. Request supporting DSU provide list of deferred maintenance job orders.	X	X
c. Submit list of deferred maintenance equipment to gaining unit if equipment is to be laterally transferred.	X	X
13. <u>MWOs</u>		
a. Record/report applicable MWOs.	X	X
b. Perform "URGENT" MWOs.	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST
MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY AND SERVICES

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
14. Certificate of Destruction, Statement of Missing Parts, Cancellation of Requisitions and Other Statements and Certificates.		
a. Appoint responsible officer to sign and submit in accordance with LC Reg 750-9, dtd 20 Feb 69.	X	X
b. Unit commander must sign all 2 and 5 requisitions.	X	X
15. <u>"Obsolete" or "Contingency and Training" material</u> Repair only if a waiver is approved by HQ, DA (AR 750-27)	X	X
16. <u>SPRs</u> Submit as appropriate.	X	X
17. <u>PLI</u> Insure such items accompany redistributed equipment.	X	X
18. <u>PLL</u>		
a. Move with Unit		X
b. Redistribute to relocating units (in coordination with Support Command).	X	
c. Apply PLL not required against other in-country requirements through normal supply channels.	X	X
19. <u>Outstanding Requisitions</u>		
a. Cancel all except for Class I, III & V, which will be continued until no longer required.	X	
b. Cancel only those for which equipment and supplies have been received through lateral transfer.		X
20. <u>Reconciliation of Dues In</u> Reconcile all cancelled requisitions with DSU/GSU/depot (AR 725-50).	X	
21. <u>Preservation & Packing Materials</u> Requisition from support unit.	X	X

UNIT CHECKLIST
MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY AND SERVICES

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
22. <u>Facilities</u>		
a. Inventory all real and installed property and submit with plot plan to the installation coordinator.	X	X
b. Facility accounted for on DD Form 1354. Turn over to either I&E or the receiving unit in case of direct transfer. (USARV Reg 735-27).	X	X
c. Reports of Survey. Prepare or take other administrative actions for damaged or missing property.	X	X
d. Prevent damage and clean the facility before leaving.	X	X
e. Movement Schedule. Inform Installation Engineer and obtain clearance certificate.	X	X
23. <u>Class V</u> Turn in all ammunition to supporting ASP, when directed by CG, SUPCOM.	X	X

TRANSPORTATION CHECK LIST

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
1. <u>Movement Plan.</u>		
Review, update, submit to higher headquarters as required.	X	X
2. <u>In-country Movement Requirements.</u>		
Identify in-country trans requirements and forward to MCC. Requirements would include movement of personnel to APOE and equipment to ports or APOEs.	X	X
3. <u>Preparation of Vehicles for Shipment.</u> (Relocating units only. Redeploying units turn in equipment).	X	
a. Clean	X	
b. Preserve for sea lift	X	
c. Load unit equipment in cargo compartment to cross country capability.	X	
d. Inflate tires to 10 lbs above authorized load pressure.	X	
e. Grease and cover winches	X	
f. Insure that gas tanks are 2/3 or less full	X	
g. Box or secure sensitive and pilferable cargo	X	
h. Paint UIC on bumpers in large white letters	X	
i. Reduce vehicle to smallest length, width and height (Coordinate with MCC for specific requirements).	X	
4. <u>Documentation.</u>		
Make appointment with servicing MCC for assistance in filling out DD Form 1384-2 (Transportation Control and Movement Document).	X	X
5. <u>Port Calls.</u>		
a. Receive water port call for equipment at R-10 days from the port commander.	X	

TRANSPORTATION CHECK LIST

	<u>Redeploying Unit</u>	<u>Relocating Unit</u>
b. Receive initial air personnel port calls from HQ, USARV at R-7 days.	X	X
c. Receive confirmation of air personnel port calls 24 hours prior to flight time.	X	X
6. <u>Unit Personnel Manifests.</u>		
Make final personnel manifests upon receipt of final personnel port call.	X	X
7. <u>Accompanied baggage will not exceed 66 lbs.</u>	X	X
8. <u>Unaccompanied baggage allowances will be in accordance with the JTR.</u>	X	X
9. <u>Weapons.</u>		
a. Turned in by personnel at staging area.	X	
b. Carried by troop to destination.		X

CONFIDENTIAL**UNCLASSIFIED****Security Classification****DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R&D***(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)*

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
		2b. GROUP 4
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Logistical Command		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CG, 1st Logistical Command		
6. REPORT DATE 20 August 1969	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 194	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 693239	
b. PROJECT NO N/A	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
c.		
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

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DD FORM 1 NOV 1968 1473**UNCLASSIFIED****Security Classification**